In this article, we reply to Jost et al.'s (2023) rejoinder to our article reviewing evidence for the social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA; Rubin et al., 2023). We argue that (1) SIMSA treats system justification as the outcome of an interaction between general social psychological process and specific historical, political, cultural, and ideological environments; (2) it does not conflate per-ceived intergroup status differences with the perceived stability and legitimacy of those differences, (3) it is not fatalistic, because it assumes that people may engage in social change when they perceive an opportunity to do so; (4) it adopts a non-reductionist, social psychological explanation of system justifica-tion, rather than an individualist explanation based on individual differences; (5) it presupposes “existing social arrangements”, including their existing legiti-macy and stability, and assumes that these social arrangements are either passively acknowledged or actively supported; and (6) it is not reliant on minimal group experiments in its evidence base.
Social identity explanations of system justification: Misconceptions, criticisms, and clarifications / Rubin, Mark; Owuamalam, Chuma Kevin; Spears, Russell; Caricati, Luca. - In: EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. - ISSN 1046-3283. - 34:2(2023), pp. 268-297. [10.1080/10463283.2023.2184578]
Social identity explanations of system justification: Misconceptions, criticisms, and clarifications
Caricati, Luca
2023-01-01
Abstract
In this article, we reply to Jost et al.'s (2023) rejoinder to our article reviewing evidence for the social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA; Rubin et al., 2023). We argue that (1) SIMSA treats system justification as the outcome of an interaction between general social psychological process and specific historical, political, cultural, and ideological environments; (2) it does not conflate per-ceived intergroup status differences with the perceived stability and legitimacy of those differences, (3) it is not fatalistic, because it assumes that people may engage in social change when they perceive an opportunity to do so; (4) it adopts a non-reductionist, social psychological explanation of system justifica-tion, rather than an individualist explanation based on individual differences; (5) it presupposes “existing social arrangements”, including their existing legiti-macy and stability, and assumes that these social arrangements are either passively acknowledged or actively supported; and (6) it is not reliant on minimal group experiments in its evidence base.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.