Syrianus on Place as the (Empty?) Interval of the Cosmos

This paper aims to reconstruct Syrianus’ account of place as an empty interval that serves as a cosmological intermediary between the physical cosmos and the World Soul. Rather than being a passive container filled by physical bodies, place plays a crucial role: teleologically oriented by higher hypostases and acting on behalf of the World Soul at the cosmic level, it presides over the motion of each element and the cosmos as a whole. In this way, Syrianus offers an insightful theoretical solution to a major problem in Plato, namely the relationship between intelligent and mechanical causes: by transmitting intelligent causality throughout the cosmos, place effectively accounts for the ordered, natural motions within the physical world, thereby preserving the primacy of the World Soul. Accordingly, Syrianus’ treatment of place is not merely a precursor to Proclus’ views, but stands out as distinctive and valuable in its own right.