In Appearance and Reality (1893), F. H. Bradley held that reality is both immanent to thought (as a known object) and transcendent to it (as non-relational in structure). This cohabitation of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in his metaphysics was relevantly attacked by J. Dewey (1907) as being self-contradictory. The goal of my essay is to defend Bradley against this charge by elucidating the structure of the thought-reality relationship and the proper status of contradiction.
Fra immanenza e trascendenza: una contraddizione? Il rapporto pensiero-realtà nella metafisica di F. H. Bradley / Cavalli, Giulio. - In: ROSMINI STUDIES. - ISSN 2385-216X. - 10:(2023), pp. 379-389. [10.15168/2385-216X/2533]
Fra immanenza e trascendenza: una contraddizione? Il rapporto pensiero-realtà nella metafisica di F. H. Bradley
Giulio Cavalli
2023-01-01
Abstract
In Appearance and Reality (1893), F. H. Bradley held that reality is both immanent to thought (as a known object) and transcendent to it (as non-relational in structure). This cohabitation of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in his metaphysics was relevantly attacked by J. Dewey (1907) as being self-contradictory. The goal of my essay is to defend Bradley against this charge by elucidating the structure of the thought-reality relationship and the proper status of contradiction.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
