In this article I present and criticize the dominant Two-Component View (TCV) of tolerance and propose to replace it with a One-Component View (OCV) based on Husserlian phenomenology. In the first part of the chapter I present the TCV as the view that tolerance consist of the conjunction of a positive and a negative component, and I discuss four specification of the TCV by Preston Kind, Rainer Forst, Achim Lohmar, and Lester Embree. I argue that the paradox involved in the conjunction of two opposite components is not plausibly solved by any of these views. In the second part I proceed to outline a Husserlian OCV, according to which tolerance is a moral attitude that neutralizes a positing of value in the context of empathy in order to avoid a value-conflict with another subject. When we tolerate another person we refrain from rebuking or otherwise sanctioning them because we care about their autonomous moral progress more than we care about being axiologically right about our value-positings
Tolerancia. Un enforque fenomenològico / Staiti, Andrea Sebastiano. - In: DÓKOS. - ISSN 1889-0202. - 25-26(2020), pp. 25-62.
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