Corruption is a proxy of low detection of opportunistic behavior and may influence managers' decisions. Considering an international scenario, the study investigates whether income shifting between subsidiaries and parents is emphasized for subsidiaries in less corrupted countries. Data refer to groups with the parent company in France, German, Italy, Spain, or UK. Using financial data, tax rate, and country corruption level, linear regression is carried out to determine the impact of corruption on income shifting process. Using anomie theory, this study offers additional evidence that corruption is a symptom of instability and influences managers' decision‐making processes. Managers tend to shift income towards less corrupted countries and so, high bribery reduces the incentive to attract foreign income. These results are novel given we focus on European international groups and not merely on single firms. They confirm the positive effects of responsible business and the attractiveness of countries that control for corruption.
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