This paper attends to treat the question about the “following a rule” in the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein and to connect it with the relation between pragmatics and semantic. In the philosophical Investigations this argument (§§ 185-142) represents the culmination of the attempt to elucidate the concepts of use, meaning and understanding, which are introduced in the previous paragraphs. I mean to show that the rule, designed like a sign which indicates how take an action, is an inscrutable fact if we don’t insert it in a precise context of human practices and behaviour. This inscrutability of the rule and of the sign raises an apparent contradiction: the rules make possible our lived but they have not sense if considered alone. Such dependence of the rules on the practices is mutual because it’s impossible thinking a practice without a rule. The connection rule-practice, that is treated similarly as the relation meaning-use, permit us to introduce the follow arguments my paper will consider: holism of the rule and of the meanings, the question about the understanding and the recognizing of rules and meanings, finally the question about the agreement in the actions.
Subject against Procedure: the Argument of Following a Rule in the Second Wittgenstein / Guido Seddone. - In: ETICA & POLITICA. - ISSN 1825-5167. - XI:1(2009), pp. 412-426.
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