La critica delle illusioni morali: Max Scheler e la fenomenologia

In order to recognize and legitimise the existence of moral facts which are the core of the value-theory proposed by Scheler, the criticism of so-called «moral illusions » plays a fundamental role. Theoretically speaking, according to Scheler, we are dealing with "moral illusion", when we consider the psychic sphere as it were neutral from the axiological point of view. Thus the identification and explanation of moral illusions is an essential step in order to both outline and ground a phenomenological investigation of value-experience inasmuch it allows the outflanking of the moral "idols" hindering intrinsic-values. Accordingly this essay is aimed to demonstrate which are the most frequent moral illusions occurring in the history of modern and contemporary philosophy, focusing especially on the «psychologist-account» proposed by Franz Brentano.