In this paper I present Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s philosophy of science, which he develops as a critical response to the Neo-Kantians. Frischeisen-Köhler draws on insights from both his teacher Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. In the first four sections I examine Frischeisen-Köhler’s criticism of Marburg and Southwestern Neo-Kantianism. This criticism revolves around the view that reality factors into cognition as a fully independent element that cognition must acknowledge and can never construct out of its own intrinsic lawfulness. In the fifth section I turn to Frischeisen-Köhler’s ‘phenomenology.’ His main thesis is that reality is experienced as such in agency, such that our consciousness of reality does not stem from theoretical considerations about the hypothetical causes of our sensations, but from our transactions in the world as agents. Science takes its departure from this pre-scientific experience of reality. I conclude with a criticism of Frischeisen-Köhler’s distinction between consciousness in general and individual subjectivity from a phenomenological viewpoint.

Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s Vindication of the Material Component of Cognition / STAITI A. - In: PHILOSOPHIA SCIENTIAE. - ISSN 1775-4283. - 20:1(2016), pp. 119-142. [10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1158]

Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s Vindication of the Material Component of Cognition

STAITI, ANDREA SEBASTIANO
2016

Abstract

In this paper I present Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s philosophy of science, which he develops as a critical response to the Neo-Kantians. Frischeisen-Köhler draws on insights from both his teacher Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. In the first four sections I examine Frischeisen-Köhler’s criticism of Marburg and Southwestern Neo-Kantianism. This criticism revolves around the view that reality factors into cognition as a fully independent element that cognition must acknowledge and can never construct out of its own intrinsic lawfulness. In the fifth section I turn to Frischeisen-Köhler’s ‘phenomenology.’ His main thesis is that reality is experienced as such in agency, such that our consciousness of reality does not stem from theoretical considerations about the hypothetical causes of our sensations, but from our transactions in the world as agents. Science takes its departure from this pre-scientific experience of reality. I conclude with a criticism of Frischeisen-Köhler’s distinction between consciousness in general and individual subjectivity from a phenomenological viewpoint.
Cet article présente la philosophie des sciences de Max Frischeisen- Köhler, conçue comme une réponse critique aux néo-kantiens. Frischeisen- Köhler tire son enseignement à la fois de son professeur Wilhelm Dilthey et d’Edmund Husserl. Dans les quatre premières parties j’examine la critique que Frischeisen-Köhler adresse au néo-kantisme de l’École de Marbourg et à celui de l’École de Baden. Cette critique défend l’idée que la réalité joue un rôle dans la cognition en tant qu’élément totalement indépendant que la cognition doit reconnaître et qui ne peut jamais se développer en dehors de sa propre légalité. Dans la cinquième section, je m’attache à la phénoménologie de Frischeisen- Köhler. Sa thèse principale est que la réalité est expérimentée comme telle dans l’action, de sorte que notre conscience de la réalité ne provient pas de considérations théoriques sur les causes hypothétiques de nos sensations, mais de nos activités dans le monde en tant qu’agents. La science part de cette expérience pré-scientifique de la réalité. Je conclus par une critique de la distinction que Frischeisen-Köhler établit entre conscience en général et subjectivité individuelle d’un point de vue phénoménologique.
Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s Vindication of the Material Component of Cognition / STAITI A. - In: PHILOSOPHIA SCIENTIAE. - ISSN 1775-4283. - 20:1(2016), pp. 119-142. [10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1158]
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11381/2822481
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 4
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact