Husserl and Lotze on First and Second Generality

In this paper, I present Lotze’s and Husserl’s efforts to describe an original dimension of generality that is given in direct perceptual experience and precedes logical or conceptual generality. Accordingly, Lotze and Husserl both distinguish between first and second generality. I argue that Lotze influenced Husserl significantly on this important matter. After presenting Lotze’s views on first generality and sketching out his theory of second generality, I move to consider Husserl, who identifies first generality in the strict sense with individual essences and in a broader sense with concrete essences. I then discuss Husserl’s characterization of second generality, which he associates with generic essences and pure eide. I conclude by spelling out the way in which the consideration of Lotze sheds new light on the key problem of eidetics in Husserl’s phenomenology.