This paper studies pork barrel spending in a model where two symmetric parties compete for an electorate consisting of groups which have different ideological preferences. In equilibrium, party electoral promises decrease with voter ideological biases, and a “swing voter” outcome emerges. In this context, a problem of exclusion from party transfer plans arises which depends on ideology distribution. Groups with extreme ideological preferences are excluded from these plans, and also within moderate groups a share of voters receives a nil transfer from the parties. This exclusion problem is generally reduced if a transformation of the electorate occurs which decreases the polarization of the distribution of ideology.

Electoral competition with ideologically biased voters / Magnani, Marco. - In: JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS. - ISSN 0951-6298. - 29:3(2017), pp. 415-439. [10.1177/0951629816650761]

Electoral competition with ideologically biased voters

MAGNANI, Marco
2017

Abstract

This paper studies pork barrel spending in a model where two symmetric parties compete for an electorate consisting of groups which have different ideological preferences. In equilibrium, party electoral promises decrease with voter ideological biases, and a “swing voter” outcome emerges. In this context, a problem of exclusion from party transfer plans arises which depends on ideology distribution. Groups with extreme ideological preferences are excluded from these plans, and also within moderate groups a share of voters receives a nil transfer from the parties. This exclusion problem is generally reduced if a transformation of the electorate occurs which decreases the polarization of the distribution of ideology.
Electoral competition with ideologically biased voters / Magnani, Marco. - In: JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS. - ISSN 0951-6298. - 29:3(2017), pp. 415-439. [10.1177/0951629816650761]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11381/2807372
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