Although the ethical intuitionism and the phenomenological theory of value have been considered to be in some way incompatible, both acknowledge the distinction between facts and value. Starting from this basic assumption in this paper I focus on the ethical accounts proposed respectively by G.E. Moore and E. Husserl referring to the psychological-ethical model proposed by F. Brentano. Accordingly I argue that (a) Moore’s ethical intuitionistic approach is not able to clarify, within ethical considerations, the fundamental difference between axiology and deontology and that the (b) Husserlian distinction between technical and practical dimension of moral reasoning represent a valid response to the difficulties arising from the fact-value distinction.

Value Theory: between Husserl's Phenomenology and Moore's Intuitionism / Iocco, Gemmo. - In: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN SOCIETY. - ISSN 1022-3398. - XXII:(2014), pp. 138-140. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Analytische und Kontinentale Philosophie: Perspektiven und Methoden Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives Programm des 37. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums tenutosi a Kirchberg am Wechsel nel 10-16 August 2014.

Value Theory: between Husserl's Phenomenology and Moore's Intuitionism

IOCCO, GEMMO
2014-01-01

Abstract

Although the ethical intuitionism and the phenomenological theory of value have been considered to be in some way incompatible, both acknowledge the distinction between facts and value. Starting from this basic assumption in this paper I focus on the ethical accounts proposed respectively by G.E. Moore and E. Husserl referring to the psychological-ethical model proposed by F. Brentano. Accordingly I argue that (a) Moore’s ethical intuitionistic approach is not able to clarify, within ethical considerations, the fundamental difference between axiology and deontology and that the (b) Husserlian distinction between technical and practical dimension of moral reasoning represent a valid response to the difficulties arising from the fact-value distinction.
Value Theory: between Husserl's Phenomenology and Moore's Intuitionism / Iocco, Gemmo. - In: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN SOCIETY. - ISSN 1022-3398. - XXII:(2014), pp. 138-140. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Analytische und Kontinentale Philosophie: Perspektiven und Methoden Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives Programm des 37. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums tenutosi a Kirchberg am Wechsel nel 10-16 August 2014.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11381/2761370
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