In this paper I raise some doubts about Brandom’s pragmatic strategy of explanation of norms. I argue that Brandom’s attempt to explain normative statuses through recourse to normative attitudes does not succeed in preserving a hiatus between norms and regularities of behaviour. Since calibrating one’s own behaviour as a consequence of normative assessments can be described, at least in principle, in non-normative vocabulary, the upshot of Brandom’s pragmatism about norms is an account of normative phenomena—and especially of semantic phenomena—that does not require reference to normative notions.
Meaning, Dispositions and Supervenience / Marchettoni, Leonardo. - 444(2009), pp. 100-111. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Towards an Analytic Pragmatism: Workshop on Bob Brandom's Recent Philosophy of Language tenutosi a Genova nel aprile 2009.
Titolo: | Meaning, Dispositions and Supervenience |
Autori: | MARCHETTONI, Leonardo (Corresponding) |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2009 |
Rivista: | |
Citazione: | Meaning, Dispositions and Supervenience / Marchettoni, Leonardo. - 444(2009), pp. 100-111. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Towards an Analytic Pragmatism: Workshop on Bob Brandom's Recent Philosophy of Language tenutosi a Genova nel aprile 2009. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11381/2751358 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 4.1a Atto convegno Rivista |