This note shows that there exists a threshold level of optimal prevention for a risk neutral agent which separates the case where a risk averse agent exerts less effort in prevention than a risk neutral agent and the case where she exerts more effort. We also show that the risk averse agent makes "more accentuated" choices than the risk neutral agent (i.e. lower prevention when prevention is low and higher prevention when prevention is high). Finally we demonstrate that the threshold level for prevention depends on agent's attitude toward prudence/imprudence and that this effect acts in opposite directions in one-period and in two-period frameworks

New results on optimal prevention of risk averse agents / Menegatti, Mario. - In: ECONOMICS BULLETIN. - ISSN 1545-2921. - 32:3(2012), pp. 2166-2173.

New results on optimal prevention of risk averse agents

MENEGATTI, Mario
2012-01-01

Abstract

This note shows that there exists a threshold level of optimal prevention for a risk neutral agent which separates the case where a risk averse agent exerts less effort in prevention than a risk neutral agent and the case where she exerts more effort. We also show that the risk averse agent makes "more accentuated" choices than the risk neutral agent (i.e. lower prevention when prevention is low and higher prevention when prevention is high). Finally we demonstrate that the threshold level for prevention depends on agent's attitude toward prudence/imprudence and that this effect acts in opposite directions in one-period and in two-period frameworks
2012
New results on optimal prevention of risk averse agents / Menegatti, Mario. - In: ECONOMICS BULLETIN. - ISSN 1545-2921. - 32:3(2012), pp. 2166-2173.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11381/2556445
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