In my thesis I propose to understand thought experiments as social imagination games. I highlight three main points: (i) imagination is not a single kind of mental phenomenon but a family composed of different types of imaginations with their own peculiarities; (ii) one can imagine together with others, and thought experiments are prototypical examples of such social imaginings; (iii) one can conduct a thought experiment without agreeing on what they prescribe to imagine, and these dynamics are at the heart of thought experiments as social practice. I argue that thought experiments are props in games of make-believe that are played by members of a research community. Contributions on this topic often focus on propositional imagination and on cases in which the coordination between imaginers is immediately successful. Instead, I suggest to consider the wide variety of imaginings: we can imagine propositions, objects, experiences, and mental states in more or less creative ways. These forms of imaginings are different activities that can play a role in thought experiments. It should also be noted that imaginative harmony is only one of the possible outcomes. I draw attention to situations in which this is not the case, as the practice of thought experiments proceeds through criticism, rejection, and manipulation of fictional worlds. I focus on cases in which imaginers do not approve the conclusion of a thought experiment and, using a Waltonian-inspired language, (i) reject the principles of generation, (ii) draw different fictional truths from the same principles, or (iii) manipulate the principles of generation. Even though instances of imaginative disharmony are usually dismissed as failures, I recognize them as dialectical moves in debates in which thought experiments are employed. When cooperative imaginers deviate from (or add to) the authorized rules of generation, they can frame the scenario through a different perspective and so contribute to a refinement of the fictional world which, in turn, can add to our scientific or philosophical debate in significant ways.
Immaginare insieme. Gli esperimenti mentali come pratica sociale e lo scontro tra immaginatori(2023).
Immaginare insieme. Gli esperimenti mentali come pratica sociale e lo scontro tra immaginatori
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2023-01-01
Abstract
In my thesis I propose to understand thought experiments as social imagination games. I highlight three main points: (i) imagination is not a single kind of mental phenomenon but a family composed of different types of imaginations with their own peculiarities; (ii) one can imagine together with others, and thought experiments are prototypical examples of such social imaginings; (iii) one can conduct a thought experiment without agreeing on what they prescribe to imagine, and these dynamics are at the heart of thought experiments as social practice. I argue that thought experiments are props in games of make-believe that are played by members of a research community. Contributions on this topic often focus on propositional imagination and on cases in which the coordination between imaginers is immediately successful. Instead, I suggest to consider the wide variety of imaginings: we can imagine propositions, objects, experiences, and mental states in more or less creative ways. These forms of imaginings are different activities that can play a role in thought experiments. It should also be noted that imaginative harmony is only one of the possible outcomes. I draw attention to situations in which this is not the case, as the practice of thought experiments proceeds through criticism, rejection, and manipulation of fictional worlds. I focus on cases in which imaginers do not approve the conclusion of a thought experiment and, using a Waltonian-inspired language, (i) reject the principles of generation, (ii) draw different fictional truths from the same principles, or (iii) manipulate the principles of generation. Even though instances of imaginative disharmony are usually dismissed as failures, I recognize them as dialectical moves in debates in which thought experiments are employed. When cooperative imaginers deviate from (or add to) the authorized rules of generation, they can frame the scenario through a different perspective and so contribute to a refinement of the fictional world which, in turn, can add to our scientific or philosophical debate in significant ways.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


