Aristotele, Averroè, Tomamso d'Aquino sulla felicità

This article reconsiders the traditional historiographical opposition between philosophical and theological conceptions of happiness in the late Middle Ages. According to this widespread view, philosophers following Aristotle locate happiness in intellectual contemplation achievable in this life, whereas theologians identify true happiness with the beatific vision attainable only in the afterlife. Focusing on Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the article argues that Aquinas rejects such a sharp opposition. Aquinas maintains that both philosophers and theologians ultimately refer to the same notion of happiness, grounded in the contemplation of God, while distinguishing between an imperfect happiness attainable in this life and a perfect happiness reserved for the afterlife. The article reconstructs Aquinas’s reinterpretation of Aristotle and examines his critique of Averroes and other Aristotelian commentators, whom Aquinas accuses of misreading Aristotle by positing a fully achievable perfect happiness in this life through conjunction with a separate agent intellect. In doing so, the paper clarifies Aquinas’s doctrine of “double beatitude” and reassesses the philosophical coherence and exegetical plausibility of his reading of Aristotle.