Reinhard Lauth argues that the light of evidence is accepted by the subject, but does not originate from the subject itself. This overcoming of a type of evidence that is centered on the epistemological subject is now accompanied by the rejection of any form of psychological reflection that could claim to serve as the basis of philosophical argument. This, however, means that the truth from which all evidence originates is ultimately accepted within an objectivism of the true, that is not necessarily capable of proving truth itself to be genetically determined by a transcendental, validity-constituting subjectivity. The result is a rigid objectivism of truth, which inevitably goes hand in hand with the denial of a transcendental psychology that is just as necessary for transcendental philosophy.

Die Sichbewährung der Wahrheit als Wahrheit – Zu Reinhard Lauths Evidenzbegriff / Fabbianelli, F.. - STAMPA. - (2026), pp. 129-142. [10.1515/9783111389899-006]

Die Sichbewährung der Wahrheit als Wahrheit – Zu Reinhard Lauths Evidenzbegriff

Fabbianelli, Faustino
2026-01-01

Abstract

Reinhard Lauth argues that the light of evidence is accepted by the subject, but does not originate from the subject itself. This overcoming of a type of evidence that is centered on the epistemological subject is now accompanied by the rejection of any form of psychological reflection that could claim to serve as the basis of philosophical argument. This, however, means that the truth from which all evidence originates is ultimately accepted within an objectivism of the true, that is not necessarily capable of proving truth itself to be genetically determined by a transcendental, validity-constituting subjectivity. The result is a rigid objectivism of truth, which inevitably goes hand in hand with the denial of a transcendental psychology that is just as necessary for transcendental philosophy.
2026
9783111389776
Die Sichbewährung der Wahrheit als Wahrheit – Zu Reinhard Lauths Evidenzbegriff / Fabbianelli, F.. - STAMPA. - (2026), pp. 129-142. [10.1515/9783111389899-006]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11381/3075554
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