The notion of shared experience refers to the common situation whereby an individual is engaged in consciously experiencing something, while others are present and may be similarly engaged in experiencing it. This chapter frames the problem of shared experience as a Nagelian question. Specifically, it asks whether it can be considered a distinct phenomenal state or remains merely a socially enhanced ordinary experience. Drawing on the concept of duo-formation, I argue that sharing establishes a triadic asymmetric set of relations and that such reorganization of perceptual and cognitive structure is supported by psychophysical, neuroscience, and coordinated action research.
Shared experience / Bruno, Nicola. - (2026), pp. 1-8. [10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00040-9]
Shared experience
Bruno, Nicola
2026-01-01
Abstract
The notion of shared experience refers to the common situation whereby an individual is engaged in consciously experiencing something, while others are present and may be similarly engaged in experiencing it. This chapter frames the problem of shared experience as a Nagelian question. Specifically, it asks whether it can be considered a distinct phenomenal state or remains merely a socially enhanced ordinary experience. Drawing on the concept of duo-formation, I argue that sharing establishes a triadic asymmetric set of relations and that such reorganization of perceptual and cognitive structure is supported by psychophysical, neuroscience, and coordinated action research.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
