Moore’s hands: a puritan view on the Proof of an external world

One way many philosophers in the analytic tradition make realism more acceptable is by suggesting a natural connection with common sense and the ordinary use of language. Moore’s text, which I comment on here, can be seen as a source of this attitude: from obvious truths, something of interest to metaphysics is—or is supposed to be—deduced. Moore offers us a commonsense-guided path toward a realist philosophy, aiming to clarify concepts such as external object, object encountered in space, and the like—a perfectly respectable philosophical endeavor. My position is that “domestic” common certainties cannot be brought into the philosophy that comes “after physics.” I would like to convince the reader that there are no metaphysical truths to be related to ordinary truths (such as “this is a hand”) or technical-scientific ones (“the string is a hypothetical subatomic structure”)