The Dual Character of Social Interaction: Habit, Embodied Cognition and Social Action

In this chapter, I present an understanding of social action based on the notion of habit which to my mind could offer a basis for developing a naturalistic social philosophy and a cross-disciplinary conceptual framework from which both social sciences and cognitive sciences could benefit. The approach that I will present is based on a socio-ontological reconstruction of some basic pragmatist ideas. I will argue that the pragmatist notion of habit is particularly useful as a cross-disciplinary framework for social philosophy insofar as, by overcoming the dualism between routine and skilled action, it can help us to read anew the constitutive role that automation plays for action. This may let us appreciate the importance of a still-understated phenomenon that emerges both in cognitive sciences and social sciences, which I will label as the “two-sided” character of interaction; it’s being both active and passive, spontaneous and receptive.