Tolerance: A Phenomenological Approach

In this chapter I present and criticize the dominant Two-Component View (TCV) of tolerance and propose to replace it with a One-Component View (OCV) based on Husserlian phenomenology. In the first part of the chapter I present the TCV as the view that tolerance consists of the conjunction of a positive and a negative component, and I discuss four specifications of the TCV by Preston King, Rainer Forst, Achim Lohmar, and Lester Embree. I argue that the paradox involved in the conjunction of two opposite components is not plausibly solved by any of these views. In the second part of the chapter I proceed to outline a Husserlian OCV, according to which tolerance is a moral attitude that neutralizes a positing of value in the context of empathy in order to avoid a valueconflict with another subject. When we tolerate another person we refrain from rebuking or otherwise sanctioning them because we care about their autonomous moral progress more than we care about being axiologically right about our value-positings.