In this paper I argue that Husserl's critique of naturalism does not amount to a one-sided rejection of it. I illustrate Husserl's anti-emergentism about the mind and insist on the distinction between the eidetic and the transcendental dimension of phenomenology. The so-called mind/body problem only arises and can be meaningfully tackled as an eidetic problem within the naturalistic attitude.
The Relative Right of Naturalism. Reassessing Husserl on the Mind/Body Problem / STAITI A. - STAMPA. - (2016), pp. 125-150.
Titolo: | The Relative Right of Naturalism. Reassessing Husserl on the Mind/Body Problem | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2016 | |
Serie: | ||
Citazione: | The Relative Right of Naturalism. Reassessing Husserl on the Mind/Body Problem / STAITI A. - STAMPA. - (2016), pp. 125-150. | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11381/2822501 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 2.1 Contributo in volume (Capitolo di libro) |
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.