Husserl e la fondazione della normatività

According to phenomenology each type of experience assumes a normative surplus from whose exact explanation depends the validity of the experience itself. Nevertheless the individuation of this «surplus» is very difficult given that we are deal with intertwining dynamics. Indeed Husserl argued that phenomenology should be able to show the origin of the normative character of the experience: only in this it can be a presuppositionless science. The aim of this contribution is twofold: on one hand it is aimed to show in which sense phenomenology can be defined a foundationalist theory, on the other hand it focuses on the central role that Husserl claim for the methodological-problem and for the normative-character underlying to a phenomenological description of the experience. Accordingly this clarification allows to rightly understand the relationship between theoretical and practical principles and then to grasp the specific way to intend the mind-body problem focusing on the various operation carried out by the subject.