Pier Luigi e Ottavio Farnese (1545-1586). Gli albori del Ducato di Parma e Piacenza

The Duchy of Parma and Piacenza was created by Pope Paul III for his son Pier Luigi Farnese in 1545 . In 1547, some nobles organised a plot to kill the new duke, instigated by Charles V, who aspired to the direct control of Piacenza, the city where the exchange markets organised by the Genoese bankers took place . The Farneses managed to regain control of Piacenza only after ten years. Since then, their policy aimed at weakening the Duchy’s great aristocratic families. The fact that the Farneses did not originate from that territory represented an obstacle: they did not possess any land of their own, nor could they weigh too heavily on their subjects by increasing fiscal pressure. The greatest part of the dukes’ financial resources came from their Roman feuds. The chance to weaken the aristocracy arose from a deep economic crisis caused by a long series of failed harvests that resulted in a famine. Between 1589 and 1593, crops were always largely below the population’s needs, generating one of the typical subsistence crises of the ancient regime: the common people starved to death, the countryside did not produce any surplus for the urban markets, craftsmen could not sell their wares, trade was paralysed and the Duchy’s economy was in depression. Among the many calamities afflicting the Duchy during the XVI and XVII centuries, the most “transparent”, in the sense of a typical subsistence crisis generated by a series of adverse climatic factors and not further aggravated by external causes such as war or epidemics, was that which developed between 1590 and 1593. We can almost say that famine was predictable, as almost thirty years had passed from the last grave crisis3, an unusually long period for ancient regime societies. A sharp increase in the price of cereals signalled the impending catastrophe.4 The weather had been dismal: the spring of 1589, cold and wet, and the cool summer which followed, contributed to the poor harvest, insufficient to satisfy the urban population’s needs for a whole year. The particular circumstances were made worse by speculation encouraged by high prices: the ecclesiastical feudatories, taking advantage of their immunity, smuggled and sold their stocks in bordering states5. The bitterly cold winter which followed the cool, damp autumn aggravated the situation for the poorest city and country dwellers, who started to suffer from starvation. Famine was widespread in the North of Italy and the magistrates in charge of victuals had great trouble finding cereals to feed the hungry population: “We couldn’t purchase any wheat in Apulia or anywhere else in the Kingdom of Naples […] and we could not find any in several other countries, although we used all powerful means available to us”.6 The picture is shocking: the birth rate fell about 22% on average, but some areas witnessed a 45% drop.7 Generally speaking, the reduction in the birth rate is the clearest sign of an ancient regime crisis caused by famine. However, in this case, the mortality rate also increased remarkably, reducing the population of vast areas even further. The negative effects of the crisis produced a strong demographic decline in the Parma territory.8 The town magistrates could at least partially fight the calamity only by taking out loans for about 110,000 escudos from private bankers or religious orders, enough to buy about 100,000 tons of cereals in Flanders. In order to assuage the worst effects of famine, the authorities adopted exceptional measures aimed at increasing the offer of grains on urban markets, rationalising consumption and supporting the poorest inhabitants, whilst the countryside was abandoned to its own devices, as no measures were envisaged to supply it with food. Feeding the towns was the prime objective, also to prevent the population from rioting:9 cereals were requisitioned from wealthy citizens, if they possessed more than what was deemed sufficient for normal everyday needs; foreign beggars were forbidden entrance into the cities, whilst whoever possessed food stocks above eight days’ needs was forbidden to buy any further wheat; moreover, deals above 4.7 kg of grain were also prohibited. However, Flemish wheat turned out to be of rather poor quality, lighter than the sample and not very suitable for baking, whilst transporting it from the coast to the towns, across the mountains, meant a long and arduous journey.10 The harvests of the next two years were also largely insufficient. Adversity sharpened the contrasts between social classes and between the different communities making up the state. First of all between nobles and common people, as the first opposed the formation of public food reserves at prices fixed by the town authorities, while the latter accused the first of speculating and worsening the famine.11 Moreover, there were conflicts between towns and country, as well as between Parma and Piacenza, the two largest cities of the Duchy, as the latter accused the authorities to favour the capital as regards food supplies.12 The nobles, already weakened by the long inflation of the XVI century (the “price revolution” which reduced their income), were not in a condition to help the peasants. The town magistrates in charge of supplying towns were also impotent. The Duke Alessandro Farnese, the hero of Flanders, took advantage of this situation to strengthen his ducal power. Alessandro imposed by force a supplementary tax to buy cereals, and took out a large loan from the Balbani, the Lyons bankers1 . Later, the Duke subscribed another loan in Anvers, with the Genoese bankers Spinola, in order to buy wheat in Danzig1 . The Duke struck a deal with the Spinolas, agreeing to purchase great quantities of wheat and rye to feed the starving citizens of Parma and Piacenza. In January 1592, the authorities carried out a survey of urban population, to assess the quantity of cereals required and compare it with the stocks available in town and with the amounts bought from the Spinolas. The notable reduction in the population showed that available stocks exceeded requirements, so the Parma community decided to sell to Genoa part of the rye coming from the Baltic, to recover at least some of the expenses occurred. Unfortunately, the strong influx of foodstuffs from Northern Europe contributed to lower prices.15 Part of the capitals thus obtained was used to build a new fortress in Parma, which absorbed a lot of manpower . This way, Alessandro solved the subsistence crisis and strengthened the power and prestige of the Farnese dynasty. The Duchy’s great aristocratic families saw their traditional ties to the people seriously weakened. At last the climatic situation improved and the 1592 harvest was satisfactory, even though things went back to normal only in 1593.17 Beyond the level of material life, the period of crisis produced important political and social changes. The famine of 1590-93, a peculiar event because it was caused only by climatic factors without the incidence of war and/or epidemics, destroyed any remaining illusions as to the weight and role of feudatories inside the state, highlighting on the one hand their decline, and on the other the presence of a widespread system of patronage centred around the ruling family. It also accelerated the ascent of a special social class, that of the urban, non-aristocratic magnates (who would, however, acquire nobility status during the XVII century). These wealthy individuals, after a long apprenticeship as urban magistrates (and therefore in a subordinated position vis-à-vis the powerful rural nobility) had now taken advantage of the alliance stipulated with the Farneses in order to acquire a privileged political status, as well as the financial benefits linked to their office. “New men” were then climbing the social ladder and ensured the future of their families by making use of and thus supporting the reigning prince’s ambitions.18 A few years later, the Duke Ranuccio, Alessandro’s son, used an alleged plot, perhaps created by his own fantasy, as an excuse to sentence to death the most important noblemen of Parma and Piacenza, confiscating their feuds . Thus the Duke became the greatest landowner in the state. Part of the confiscated land was granted to officials and merchants loyal to the Duke. As a result of these measures, ducal power was never seriously challenged again. After some early difficulties, the Farneses’ success was due to their ability to manoeuvre public finances in the Duchy, adapting taxation to necessity, and to their capacity to obtain loans from international bankers, also thanks to Alessandro’s prestige and to his close relationship with Philip II . Alessandro Farnese’s audacious policy succeeded in reaping benefits for the dynasty from the negative effects of the 1590 crisis. Public expenditure and public works were the instruments he used to mitigate the consequences of the crisis. If we compare it with contemporary recession, the paradox is that a terrible material crisis generated by the scarcity of foodstuffs was mitigated thanks to the use of financial measures, such as the subscription of loans with the great bankers, who in their turn earned their wealth, beside their involvement in international trade, especially from their capacity to use the most sophisticated financial tools available at the time (bills of exchange) in trade fairs organised for the purpose.