Négation et contradiction. Les réponses du Kant précritique à Lisbonne

In opposition to some interpretations which underline the continuity of Kant’s theodicy before the Kritik der reinen Vernunft I argue in my paper that there is a significant evolution within his precritical theory of evil. Whereas until the essay Versuch über den Optimismus (1759) evil for Kant can be interpreted from the standpoint of the logical negation and therefore considered a „defectus“, after the essay Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763) Kant claims that the kind of negation which matters in relationship to the problem of evil is the real one; evil represents not only an „absentia“, but is a real privation. It is asserted that the reason of this evolution in Kant’s thought can be found in the separation between logic and metaphysics which occurs with his reading of Hume. To this theoretical step can also be reconducted Kant’s different evalutions of the concept of real negative ground as well as of the relation between the Realgrund and Idealgrund.