



# UNIVERSITÀ DI PARMA

## ARCHIVIO DELLA RICERCA

University of Parma Research Repository

Exploring the hedging effectiveness of European wheat futures markets during the 2007-2012 period

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:

*Original*

Exploring the hedging effectiveness of European wheat futures markets during the 2007-2012 period / REVOREDO GIHA, Cesar; Zuppiroli, Marco. - In: *PROCEDIA ECONOMICS AND FINANCE*. - ISSN 2212-5671. - 14:(2014), pp. 90-99. (Intervento presentato al convegno International Conference on Applied Economics tenutosi a Chania (Greece) nel 3-5 July 2014).

*Availability:*

This version is available at: 11381/2784815 since: 2015-02-09T11:42:21Z

*Publisher:*

Elsevier

*Published*

DOI:

*Terms of use:*

Anyone can freely access the full text of works made available as "Open Access". Works made available

*Publisher copyright*

note finali coverpage

(Article begins on next page)



International Conference on Applied Economics (ICOAE) 2014

## Exploring the hedging effectiveness of European wheat futures markets during the 2007-2012 period

Cesar Revoredo-Giha<sup>a\*</sup>, Marco Zuppiroli<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Food Marketing Research Team, Scotland's Rural College (SRUC), King's Buildings, West Mains Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JG, UK

<sup>b</sup>Università degli Studi di Parma, Dipartimento di Economia, Parma, Italy

---

### Abstract

The hypothesis that speculative behaviour was the cause of the instability of commodity prices has brought renewed interest in futures markets. In this paper, the hedging effectiveness of European and US wheat futures markets were studied to test whether they were affected by the price instability observed after 2007. Indirectly, this could also be thought as a test of whether the increasing presence of speculators in futures markets have made them divorced from physical markets. A multivariate GARCH model was applied to compute optimal hedging ratios. No important evidence was found of a change in the hedging effectiveness after 2007.

© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>).

Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICOAE 2014

**Keywords:** Futures prices, commodity prices, volatility, wheat, Europe.

---

### 1. Introduction

The relatively recent instability of commodity prices has brought back the interest on futures markets and their use for hedging as a device to reduce vulnerability to risk. Furthermore, this renewed interest has extended use of futures and options contracts to the area of food security, as they have been proposed as a way in which importing countries could manage price volatility (Sarris et al., 2011).

---

\* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-131-535 4344; fax: +44-131-535 4345.

E-mail address: [cesar.revoredo@sruc.ac.uk](mailto:cesar.revoredo@sruc.ac.uk).

Futures markets perform several functions as they provide the instruments to transfer price risk, they facilitate price discovery and they are offering commodities as an asset class for financial investors, such as fund and money managers who had not previously been present in these markets (United Nations, 2011).

Commercial participants use futures contracts to hedge their crops or inventories against the risk of fluctuating prices, e.g., processors of agricultural commodities, who need to obtain raw materials, would buy futures contracts to guard against future price rises. If prices rise (i.e., both cash and futures prices), then they use the increased value of the futures contract to offset the higher cost of the physical quantities they need to purchase. However, hedgers are not the only agents operating in futures markets, as one can also find non-commercial participants, who do not have any involvement in the physical commodity trade in contrast to commercial participants, such as farmers, traders and processors. These are called “speculators” and they buy and sell futures contracts in order to obtain a profit.

This paper focuses on the usefulness of futures prices for hedging against price risk. It is motivated by the relatively recent discussion on the effects that the increasing speculation may have brought to commodity markets (e.g., see Bohl and Stephan, 2012 for a recent literature review on the issue); in particular, whether the increasing speculation may have made futures markets divorced from physical markets and useless for hedging.

Note that the fact that only price risk is considered in the paper means that it is dealing with the usefulness of exchange markets for most of the participants in the supply chain, except farmers, which as it is well known, are also affected by yield risk, not too mention the fact that only a minority of them tend to operate in futures markets (e.g., see Blank et al. 1991 and 1997).

The paper is structured as follows: first, a brief overview of the discussion of how speculation may have affected futures markets is presented. Second, a description of the methods used in the paper (i.e., data and methodological approach). The next section presents and discusses the results of the analysis and the last section offers some conclusions.

## **2. Speculation and hedging**

The increasing dispersion observed in commodity prices since 2007 has partially been explained by the increasing use of futures markets by speculators. As pointed by Irwin et al. (2009) – referring to evidence by Gheit (2008); Masters (2008); Masters and White (2008) – it has commonly asserted that speculative buying by index funds in commodity futures and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets created a “bubble” with the result that commodity prices, and crude oil prices, in particular, far exceeded fundamental values at the peak (Irwin, et al., p. 377).

According UNCTAD (2009): “Financial investors in commodity futures exchanges have been treating commodities increasingly as an alternative asset class to optimize the risk-return profile of their portfolios. In doing so, they have paid little attention to fundamental supply and demand relationships in the markets for specific commodities. A particular concern with respect to this financialization of commodity trading is the growing influence of so called index traders, who tend to take only long positions that exert upward pressure on prices. The average size of their positions has become so large that they can significantly influence prices and create speculative bubbles, with extremely detrimental effects on normal trading activities and market efficiency. Under these conditions, hedging against commodity price risk becomes more complex, more expensive, and perhaps unaffordable for developing-country users. Moreover, the signals emanating from commodity exchanges are getting to be less reliable as a basis for investment decisions and for supply and demand management by producers and consumers.” (UNCTAD, 2009, p. iv).

Irwin et al. (2009), who consider that fundamentals offer the best explanation for the rise in commodity prices, pointed out some inconsistencies in use increasing speculative buying by index funds as an explanation

for the behaviour of commodity prices (i.e., the physical). Four of their points are worth noting: first, the arguments of bubble proponents are conceptually flawed and reflect misunderstanding of how commodity futures markets actually work, as they state that the money flows that go into futures and derivatives markets pressures the demand for physical commodities, when that money only operates in the futures market. Note that there are at least two ways in which futures markets can affect the physical markets: the first one is through arbitraging between the two markets. The second way is through the use that commercial entities make of futures prices for pricing their products (e.g., processors selling flour for future delivery). Clearly, the latter strategy makes sense only if the entities believe that the two markets are related. As regards the former reason, note that arbitrage will force both prices (futures and spot) to converge at the delivery time. Second, a number of facts about the situation in commodity markets are inconsistent with the existence of a substantial bubble in commodity prices such as the fact that the available data do not indicate a change in the relative level of speculation to hedging. Third, the available statistical evidence does not indicate that positions for any group in commodity futures markets, including long-only index funds, consistently lead futures price changes and fourth, there is a historical pattern of attacks upon speculation as scapegoat during periods of extreme market volatility.

While Irwin et al. arguments apply for the effects of the increasing use of futures markets for speculation on the evolution of commodity prices; it is clear that if futures markets trends follow factors that are not related to fundamentals, one should expect changes in futures prices and spot prices to become divorced or less correlated.

The implication of the above disassociation between futures and the physical market is necessarily a reduction in the effectiveness of the degree in price risk that can be hedged using futures markets, as the correlation between both prices (futures and spot) is the basis for the traditional minimum variance calculation of the optimal hedge ratio (Ederington, 1979; Sanders and Manfredo, 2004). Moreover, if after computing the hedging ratio and the hedging effectiveness measures one finds that hedging in futures markets is still a useful tool for risk management, then it means that both markets are still related and the financialization of futures markets have not broken that link. This is the topic of the work of the next section.

### **3. Empirical work**

#### *3.1. Data*

Due to their importance for food security, and to a less extent for energy (i.e., biofuels), European wheat markets were selected for the analysis. In this respect, France, Italy and the United Kingdom are three of the major wheat-growing countries in Western Europe.

The price analysis was performed using data for feed wheat contracts from the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (NYSE LIFFE London abbreviated LIFFE) and for milling wheat contracts from the *Marché à Terme International de France* (NYSE LIFFE Paris abbreviated MATIF). In order to provide a comparison data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (abbreviated in CBOT) wheat contracts were also used.

For LIFFE and CBOT contracts the data comprised the period 1988 until 2013, while for MATIF contracts the data were available only since 1998. As hedging performance requires the contemporary evaluation of cash price changes, spot prices from East Anglia (UK), Rouen (France), Bologna (Italy) and Chicago (USA) were also collected. Descriptive statistics for the price data in levels and first difference are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

Prices in levels	Mean	Max	Min	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis	Jarque-Bera
Spot Chicago (USA)	399.0	1,194.5	192.0	145.7	1.6	5.3	5,877.7
Spot UK	106.5	216.7	53.1	36.7	0.9	3.2	851.8
Spot France	152.7	296.4	94.8	51.4	1.0	2.6	707.0
Spot Italy	174.8	293.0	120.5	47.5	0.9	2.6	627.6
Nearby futures CBOT	414.2	1,282.5	230.8	156.8	1.7	5.6	6,830.6
Nearby futures LIFFE	109.1	225.5	57.5	37.4	1.0	3.3	1,018.2
Nearby futures MATIF	153.1	286.8	99.0	49.5	1.0	2.7	721.5
First differences	Mean	Max	Min	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis	Jarque-Bera
Spot Chicago (USA)	0.16	275.0	-260.0	20.4	-0.3	19.8	107,042.7
Spot UK	0.04	20.2	-21.1	3.1	-0.2	13.8	32,069.7
Spot France	0.10	55.5	-39.0	5.8	0.6	18.5	41,364.3
Spot Italy	0.09	30.0	-52.5	4.4	-3.6	50.2	390,289.7
Nearby futures CBOT	-0.64	260.0	-256.5	19.1	0.1	22.2	140,560.4
Nearby futures LIFFE	-0.03	25.0	-27.5	3.1	0.2	11.6	20,117.1
Nearby futures MATIF	0.24	44.0	-36.0	5.3	0.3	12.1	14,187.5

Note: CBOT and Chicago prices are in US cts/bushel, Liffe and UK prices are in GBP/tonne, and MATIF and France and Italy prices are in Euro/tonne.

### 3.2. Methods

While the economic theory behind hedging is still the minimum variance portfolio approach (Ederington, 1979), i.e., market participants in futures markets choose a hedging strategy that reflects their attitudes toward risk and their individual goals, the econometrics when estimating hedging ratios has evolved with the progress on time series statistics (see Lien and Tse, 2002 for an overview of relatively recent econometric methods to compute the hedging ratio).

The return of a portfolio containing spot and futures positions is given by (1):

$$R_{H,t} = R_{S,t} - \gamma_t R_{F,t} \quad (1)$$

Where  $R_{H,t}$  is return of the hedged portfolio,  $R_{S,t}$  and  $R_{F,t}$  are the return of the spot and future position, and  $\gamma_t$  is the hedge ratio, i.e., the number of future contracts that the hedger must sell for each using of spot commodity on which the price risk is borne (Chang et al., 2011). The variance of the hedged return conditional to the information in  $t-1$  is given by (2):

$$\text{Var}[R_{H,t}|\Omega_{t-1}] = \text{Var}[R_{S,t}|\Omega_{t-1}] - 2\gamma_t \text{Cov}[R_{S,t}, R_{F,t}|\Omega_{t-1}] + \gamma_t^2 \text{Var}[R_{F,t}|\Omega_{t-1}] \quad (2)$$

Where  $\text{Var}[R_{S,t}|\Omega_{t-1}]$ ,  $\text{Var}[R_{F,t}|\Omega_{t-1}]$  and  $\text{Cov}[R_{S,t}, R_{F,t}|\Omega_{t-1}]$  are the conditional variance and covariance of the spot and futures returns. The optimal hedging ratio,  $\gamma_t^*$ , is then defined as the value of  $\gamma_t$  that minimises (2). The result is given by:

$$\gamma_t^* = \frac{\text{Cov}[R_{S,t}, R_{F,t}|\Omega_{t-1}]}{\text{Var}[R_{F,t}|\Omega_{t-1}]} \quad (3)$$

Hedging effectiveness ( $HE_t$ ) is then defined as the reduction in the variance of the unhedged portfolio due to the hedging and defined by (4):

$$HE_t = \frac{\text{Variance}_{\text{unhedged}} - \text{Variance}_{\text{hedged}}}{\text{Variance}_{\text{unhedged}}} \quad (4)$$

In this paper, the conditional variance and covariance of spot and future prices (and therefore the optimal hedging ratios) were estimated using a restricted version of the BEKK model (BEKK stands for the initials of Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner, see, Engle and Kroner, 2005), i.e., the diagonal BEKK model (Engle and Kroner, 1995, Chang et al., 2011). The BEKK model is a multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model (MGARCH), which allows model the dynamics of conditional variance and covariance of the series of interest (i.e., in this case the spot price and the nearby futures price) and in addition it has the attractive property that the conditional covariance matrices are positive definite (therefore, the estimation will not produce negative variances).

The choice of restricted version of the BEKK model instead of its full version was not only due to the fact that it is more parsimonious but also because it was found to perform better than the full BEKK model (Chang, 2011). The diagonal BEKK model for MGARCH(1,1), i.e., one lag for the residuals and for the GARCH term, is given by:

$$H_t = C'C + A'\varepsilon_{t-1}\varepsilon'_{t-1}A + B'H_{t-1}B \quad (5)$$

With the parameters matrices defined as (for the bivariate case):

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} c_{11} & 0 \\ c_{21} & c_{22} \end{bmatrix}; A = \begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{22} \end{bmatrix}; B = \begin{bmatrix} b_{11} & 0 \\ 0 & b_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

With  $a_{ii}^2 + b_{ii}^2 < 1$ ,  $i=1,2$  for stationarity. The conditional means of the model were estimated following Moschini and Myers (2002) as:

$$R_{S,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(T-t) + \beta_2D_2 + \beta_3D_4 + \beta_4P_{t-1}^S + \beta_5P_{T,t-1}^F + u_{1t} \quad (6)$$

$$R_{F,t} = \delta_0 + u_{2t} \quad (7)$$

Where  $P_{T,t}^F$  is the nearby future price at  $t$  for delivery at expiration date  $T$ ,  $P_t^S$  is the spot price at  $t$ ,  $D_2$  and  $D_4$  are quarterly dummies for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> quarters,  $u_{1,t}$  and  $u_{2,t}$  are random shocks. In addition, the model considers the time to maturity  $(T-t)$ . The returns were computed as the difference of the price series considering a span of 5 days between  $t$  and  $t-1$  (i.e., a short hedge).

The model comprising equations (5), (6) and (7) was estimated by quasi maximum likelihood (Moschini and Myers, 2002).

#### 4. Results and discussion

Table 2 presents the results of the unit root tests for the data. As shown in the Table all the prices in levels showed the presence of unit roots, while the series in differences were free of them.

Table 2. Unit root tests 1/

Prices	In levels		In differences	
	Phillips-Perron test	Sig.	Phillips-Perron test	Sig.
Spot Chicago (USA)	-3.2		-29.9	*
Spot UK	-2.0		-23.6	*
Spot France	-2.7		-17.8	*
Spot Italy	-2.4		-18.7	*
Nearby futures CBOT	-3.1		-26.1	*
Nearby futures LIFFE	-1.9		-23.7	*
Nearby futures MATIF	-2.6		-16.8	*

Notes:

1/ All the tests include constant term and linear trend.

2/ “\*” denotes rejection of the null hypothesis that the series have a unit root at the 1 per cent statistical significance level.

The market efficiency hypothesis requires that the current futures prices and the future spot price are cointegrated, meaning that futures prices are unbiased predictors of spot prices at maturity (Chang et al., 2011). Table 3 presents the results of the Johansen test for cointegration (1995) between spot and futures prices. The trace test and maximum eigenvalue test statistics are used, based on minimizing AIC. The results show that the two series are cointegrated, and there exists at least one cointegrating vector in all the cases and for all the model specifications.

Table 3. Cointegration test using the Johansen approach (Number of cointegrating relationships by model)

Market	Test type	Model specification				
		No trend		Linear trend		Quadratic trend
		No intercept or trend	Intercept on CE	Intercept in CE and test VAR	Intercept and trend in CE, no intercept in VAR	Intercept in CE and in VAR
US wheat	Trace test	1	1	2	1	2
	Max-Eigenvalue	1	1	2	1	2
UK wheat	Trace	1	1	1	1	1
	Max-Eigenvalue	1	1	1	1	1
France wheat	Trace	1	1	1	1	2
	Max-Eigenvalue	1	1	1	1	2
Italy wheat	Trace	1	1	1	1	2
	Max-Eigenvalue	1	1	1	1	2

Notes:

1/ CE stands for cointegrating equations and VAR for vector autoregressions.

2/ Lags were selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).

Table 4 and Table 5 present the results from the estimation of the models (i.e., one per country). Table 4 presents the results from the conditional means and Table 5 the results for the diagonal BEKK model (where the shadowed panels are matrices). The results show that the parameters are in general statistically significant, for both the condition means and variances. Using the BEKK model the optimal hedging ratios were constructed.

Note that while the results of the estimations are interesting, the focus of this paper is on the effectiveness of the hedging activity, and in particular whether that effectiveness was affected by the price instability

observed after 2007. For this purpose Table 6 was constructed, where the concentration is on the mean of the optimal hedging ratios and effectiveness (rather than the daily results coming the estimation) as the purpose is to track a structural change on the series after 2007.

Table 4. Conditional mean equations

		$\beta_0, \hat{\sigma}_0$	$\beta_1$	$\beta_2$	$\beta_3$	$\beta_4$	$\beta_5$
US wheat	Spot	<b>0.004</b>	<b>-0.00004</b>	<b>-0.001</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>-0.065</b>	<b>0.065</b>
	z-test	(1.8)	(-9.5)	(-2.8)	(9.2)	(-42.4)	(41.1)
France wheat	Nearby	<b>-0.001</b>					
	z-test	(-4.4)					
France wheat	Spot	<b>-0.048</b>	<b>0.00004</b>	<b>0.008</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.298</b>	<b>0.307</b>
	z-test	(-13.8)	(6.8)	(16.8)	(1.5)	(-73.4)	(72.1)
Italy wheat	Nearby	<b>0.000</b>					
	z-test	(1.5)					
Italy wheat	Spot	<b>0.069</b>	<b>-0.00003</b>	<b>-0.005</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.099</b>	<b>0.088</b>
	z-test	(54.4)	(-14.4)	(-41.2)	(5.8)	(-77.9)	(77.6)
UK wheat	Nearby	<b>0.000</b>					
	z-test	(-2.5)					
UK wheat	Spot	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.0001</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.179</b>	<b>0.177</b>
	z-test	(0.2)	(21.4)	(19.2)	(3.1)	(-127.7)	(123.9)
	Nearby	<b>0.000</b>					
	z-test	(0.2)					

Notes:

1/ The value of the log likelihood and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is presented in Table 5 and the conditional mean and variance where estimated together.

Table 6 presents averages for the optimal hedging ratios and the hedging effectiveness for the entire sample and the broken down into two periods: before and since 2007 for all the markets. In addition, it reports statistical tests for differences in the means and variances of the series during the two mentioned periods.

When one considers the means for the optimal hedging ratios for the entire period, the value for the US is significantly higher than the ones for the European Exchanges. Thus, while for the US the ratio is close to 1 (i.e., 0.99), while the highest value for the other markets is for France (0.53), with Italy and UK exhibiting ratios of 0.17 and 0.28, respectively.

The ranking observed on the optimal hedging ratios is also reflected on the hedging effectiveness reached. Whilst hedging with CBOT reduces the price variability by 77 per cent, the European exchanges only reduces the price variability by 28.2 per cent at most (France).

The above results of the European exchanges, i.e., their low effectiveness, probably indicate that they are not sufficiently attractive for firms, in particular if one adds the costs linked with the hedging process (i.e., brokerage fees and innovations in the entrepreneurial activity). However, it is important to recall that here only short term hedges are being considered. In addition, it should be noted that these results are close to those from Revoredo-Giha and Zuppiroli (2013), which show that European exchanges do not perform very well in very short hedges.

When one compares the periods before and since 2007 (see Table 6), it is clear that broadly on average the US optimal hedging ratios remained around 1 (0.98 and 1.01 before and since 2007, respectively). In fact, the test for the difference in variances could not reject the hypothesis that the variance of the ratios remained the same, although the t test rejected that average ratios remained the same in both periods.



Table 5. Estimation of the diagonal BEKK model

Markets	Matrices					
	C		A		B	
<b>US wheat market</b>						
Coefficient	0.006		0.724		0.676	
z-test	(103.3)		(78.6)		(187.5)	
Coefficient	0.012	0.013		0.735		0.636
z-test	(58.0)	(72.0)		(78.5)		(162.0)
Log-likelihood	45,153.7					
AIC	-9.8					
<b>France wheat market</b>						
Coefficient	0.004		0.846		0.148	
z-test	(4.2)		(55.7)		(9.8)	
Coefficient	0.012	0.005		0.700		0.717
z-test	(38.8)	(53.4)		(47.2)		(111.8)
Log-likelihood	22,076.5					
AIC	-10.6					
<b>Italy wheat market</b>						
Coefficient	0.003		1.063		-0.119	
z-test	(13.5)		(70.9)		-(10.1)	
Coefficient	0.003	0.003		0.705		0.762
z-test	(13.3)	(41.1)		(57.2)		(156.0)
Log-likelihood	24,001.0					
AIC	-11.6					
<b>UK wheat market</b>						
Coefficient	0.008		0.896		-0.108	
z-test	(64.3)		(68.7)		-(9.2)	
Coefficient	0.006	0.008		0.818		0.525
z-test	(44.2)	(58.4)		(59.9)		(64.6)
Log-likelihood	36,095.3					
AIC	-11.0					

Notes:

1/ AIC stands for Akaike Information Criterion.

In contrast with the US case, France, UK and Italy ratios showed statistically significant changes in both their mean and variance for the periods before and after 2007. The average optimal hedging ratio for France and Italy (i.e., using the MATIF exchange) decreased between the two samples from 0.63 to 0.40 and from 0.22 to 0.10, respectively. In the case of the UK, the ratio increase from 0.23 to 0.40, respectively.

The comparison of hedging effectiveness before and since 2007 indicates that these changed in all the countries (in all cases, the tests rejected the hypothesis that the means and variances remained the same). In fact, in most of the cases, there were only slightly increases in the effectiveness of the hedges (i.e., they remained almost the same). Only in the UK that change was more pronounced as the effectiveness went from 22.9 to 36.6 per cent.

The other aspect worthwhile to highlight from Table 6 concerns whether the increasing presence of speculation mentioned in the literature since year 2007 affected the hedging effectiveness (or what is the same the degree of association between spot and futures markets). Although in most of the cases, the mean and variance tests rejected the hypotheses that optimal hedging ratios and hedging effectiveness were the same before and since 2007, in practical terms they changed relatively little. Probably the UK case is almost an exception to the mentioned result (the mean effectiveness went from 22.9 to 36.6 per cent), however, note that its results since 2007 are actually better than before implying that spot and future in the UK became closer and not more divorced.

Table 6. Evaluation of hedging strategy

Market	Optimal hedging ratio							Hedging effectiveness (%)						
	Entire period	Until 2007	Since 2007	Test 1/	Sig.	Test 2/	Sig.	Entire period	Until 2007	Since 2007	Test 1/	Sig.	Test 2/	Sig.
US wheat	1.01	0.99	1.07	1.4	0.0	46.0	0.0	77.6	77.3	79.1	1.1	0.2	9.8	0.0
France wheat	0.61	0.70	0.50	1.7	0.0	144.9	0.0	34.3	34.6	34.0	1.6	0.0	0.6	0.4
Italy wheat	0.13	0.15	0.10	3.0	0.0	7.9	0.0	17.9	16.3	19.9	1.4	0.0	39.8	0.0
UK wheat	0.34	0.33	0.35	1.6	0.0	1.3	0.2	27.4	25.5	32.1	1.5	0.0	107.7	0.0

Notes:

1/ Test of the hypothesis that variances of the series are equal before and since 2007 (F test).

2/ Test of the hypothesis that the means of the series are equal before and since 2007 (t test).

## 5. Results and discussion

The primary aim of this paper has been to study whether hedging in futures markets can be considered as a useful instrument for price risk reduction for commercial entities operating with commodities along the wheat supply chain. The focus was on two European wheat futures markets, LIFFE and MATIF, using the CBOT market for comparison purposes. In all the cases the data spanned up to the end of 2013.

The results show that in the case of the short hedge used in the paper, the US market performs better than the European wheat markets. In fact, the hedging in the US market reduces the price variances of the portfolio by 77 per cent whilst in the European market the reductions are below 30 per cent of the price risk. This result implies that very short-term hedges (1 week only) are not of great utility for participants of the wheat supply chain, except for those firms operating on the US market.

As regards the divorce between the spot and futures market after 2007, it is clear that speculation did not made the situation worse, as all the cases showed an increase in the hedging effectiveness (despite the fact that in some cases this is poor). In fact, the results indicate that both prices got closer after 2007.

Finally, it is important to stress that the analysis carried out in this paper is confined to a very short period hedge (although not uncommon amongst firms) and the results may change when other hedging intervals are considered as shown in Revoredo-Giha and Zuppiroli (2013). This is topic for future research.

## References

- Blank, S., Carter, C., Schmiessing, B., 1991. *Futures and Options Markets: Trading in Commodities and Financials*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
- Blank, S., Carter, C., McDonald, J., 1997. Is The Market Failing Agricultural Producers Who Wish To Manage Risks?, *Contemporary Economic Policy*, Western Economic Association International, 15, p. 103.
- Bohl, M., Stephan, P., 2012. Does Futures Speculation Destabilize Spot Prices? New Evidence for Commodity Markets. Available at SSRN 1979602, 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
- Chang, C., McAleer, M., Tansuchat, R., 2011. Crude Oil Hedging Strategies using Dynamic Multivariate GARCH. *Energy Economics*, 33, p. 912.
- Ederington, L. H., 1979. The Hedging Performance of the New Futures Markets. *Journal of Finance*, 34, p. 157.
- Engle, R.F., Kroner, K.F., 1995. Multivariate Simultaneous Generalized ARCH. *Econometric Theory*, 11, p.122.
- Gheit, F., 2008. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives. Available at: Internet Site: [http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte\\_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062308.Gheit-testimony.pdf](http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062308.Gheit-testimony.pdf).
- Irwin, Scott H., Sanders, Dwight R., Merrin, Robert P., 2009. Devil or Angel? The Role of Speculation in the Recent Commodity Price Boom (and Bust), *Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics*, 41, p. 377.
- Johansen, S., 1995. *Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Lien, D., Tse Y. K., 2002. Some recent developments in futures hedging. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 16, p. 357.

- Masters, M.W., 2008. Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. Available at: [http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/\\_files/052008Masters.pdf](http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/052008Masters.pdf).
- Masters, M.W., White A.K., 2008. 'The Accidental Hunt Brothers: How Institutional Investors are Driving up Food and Energy Prices. Available at: <http://accidentalthuntbrothers.com/>.
- Moschini, G., Myers, R. J., 2002. Testing for constant hedge ratios in commodity markets: a multivariate GARCH approach, *Journal of Empirical Finance*, 9, p. 589.
- Myers, R. J., Thompson, S. R., 1989. Generalized Optimal Hedge Ratio Estimation, *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 71, p. 858.
- Revoredo-Giha, C., Zuppiroli, M., 2013. Commodity futures markets: are they an effective price risk management tool for the European wheat supply chain?, *Bio-based and Applied Economics*, 2, p. 237.
- Sanders, D. R., Manfredo, M. R., 2004. Comparing Hedging Effectiveness: An Application of the Encompassing Principle. *Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics*, 29, p. 31.
- Sarris, A., Conforti, P., Prakash, A., 2011. Using futures and options to manage price volatility in food imports: theory. In Adam Prakash (ed.), *Safeguarding food security in volatile global markets*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.
- UNCTAD, 2009. *Trade and development report 2009*, Geneva.
- United Nations, 2011. *Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses*. Policy Report including contributions by FAO, IFAD, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF. June, United Nations, Rome.