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Are digital platforms potential drivers of the populist vote? A comparative analysis of France, Germany and Italy

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
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**Are digital platforms potential drivers of the populist vote?  
A comparative analysis of France, Germany and Italy**

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3 **Are digital platforms potential drivers of the populist vote?**  
4 **A comparative analysis of France, Germany and Italy**  
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11 **Abstract**

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13 Populist parties are often argued to be very skilled in using digital media to attract supporters and  
14 strengthen linkages with their followers. However, only rarely has research shown this linkage  
15 empirically. This study explores whether arguments about the relation between digital platforms and  
16 populist voting can be substantiated using comparative survey data in France, Germany and Italy.  
17 Digital media include a variety of online platforms that can affect populist vote in different ways.  
18 This article addresses the relation between the *political use* of digital platforms and the populist vote.  
19 First, it looks at how the use of Social Networking Sites (SNS) and Mobile Instant Messaging  
20 Services (MIMS) is related to voting for populist parties. Second, it assesses whether the role of  
21 digital platforms is different for supporting digital ‘immigrant’ and digital ‘native’ populist parties.  
22 Third, it explores country differences in the relation between SNS and MIMS’ use and the populist  
23 vote. Using original online surveys, the article shows that political activities on SNS and MIMS  
24 platforms (sending messages or posting, discussing or convincing others to vote for a candidate)  
25 increase the probability of voting for populist parties. However, it also finds that the political use of  
26 digital media is associated with the populist vote under certain (and limited) circumstances, that is  
27 only for a subset of populist parties. Finally, it identifies important differences in how SNS and MIMS  
28 are linked to the populist vote in countries presenting diverse institutional features, web regulations  
29 and constellations of media systems.  
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44 *Keywords:* Populist vote, Social Networking Sites (SNS), Mobile Instant Messaging Services  
45 (MIMS), digital ‘native’ populist parties, online surveys.  
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## Introduction

Digital media have been said to greatly contribute to the emergence and success of the populist parties shaking the European party systems (Kriesi, 2014). Online platforms have often been considered natural allies of outsider parties challenging traditional parties and the mainstream media, which they accuse of being spokespersons for the establishment (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018; Jungherr, Schroeder & Stier, 2019). Indeed, most populist parties appear very skilled at using digital media to attract supporters and strengthen linkages with their followers.

Despite the enduring relevance of the legacy media, in the hybrid media system an important slice of citizens' knowledge of political affairs comes from digital media. Online opportunities for populist actors are, however, not a property of the web as a whole, but they change according to contextual characteristics (Jungherr et al., 2019) as well as the diffusion, use and affordances of different online platforms. Therefore, we posit that diverse online media outlets provide different opportunities for political actors to spread their messages, affecting citizens' likelihood of voting for populist parties, and we analyse this link in France, Germany and Italy. In this article we distinguish between Social Networking Sites (SNS) and Mobile Instant Messaging Services (MIMS). While the relation between the former and populist actors has become an important topic of discussion in the scientific debate, the role of MIMS in political communication has seldom been addressed (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). Furthermore, a systematic comparison of the association between the political use of SNS and MIMS and the vote for populist parties with varying characteristics in different countries is lacking.

We believe this gap in the literature should be addressed for several reasons. First, the increasing strength of populist parties can be related to recent changes affecting media systems. Digital media allow these actors to establish a direct link with people who often feel marginalized by traditional media (Gerbaudo, 2018). However, only rarely has research shown this linkage empirically. *Therefore, this study explores whether often-made statements about the link between digital media – in our case, the political use of SNS and MIMS – and populist voting can be substantiated using comparative survey data. We follow the literature which argues that digital media favour populist parties and their support to demonstrate whether its claims hold.* Second, existing research has focused on the internet and SNS without seriously envisioning different affordances of diverse platforms. MIMS tend to work as hybrids between mass and interpersonal communication channels, allowing users greater intimacy, like-mindedness and expression of emotions than SNS. Therefore, it might be possible that the two means work differently in relation to the populist vote. Third, in generically linking the populist vote and digital platforms, differences between parties we label 'digital natives' vs. 'digital immigrants' have not been considered. Indeed, the former might be

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3 more attentive to digital media than the latter in their use of them for political campaigning. Fourth,  
4 such differences have not been systematically assessed in a comparative perspective but generally  
5 using single case-studies. In contrast, our study aims to explore these relationships in three European  
6 countries – France, Germany and Italy – which present different institutional features, web  
7 regulations and constellations of media systems, by means of original post-electoral online surveys.  
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11 Our findings show that the political use of digital platforms is associated with the populist  
12 vote. There are, however, some important nuances to take into consideration. First, the political use  
13 of SNS and MIMS *seems to* affect the populist vote differently, a finding that is supported by  
14 somewhat counterintuitive evidence. Second, ‘newer’ populist parties that have originated in the last  
15 decade effectively benefit from digital platforms while ‘older’ ones do not, and this might suggest  
16 that the ‘digital’ nature of such parties could be a *crucial* feature for their attractiveness of voters who  
17 use more the internet for political information and participation. Third, the strength of this relation  
18 varies across countries, with Italy displaying a greater association, Germany a lesser one and France  
19 resulting between these two countries. *Therefore, the arguments about the affinity between digital  
20 media and populist support seems to hold empirically only for specific cases, at least according to our  
21 data.*  
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### 32 **Theoretical framework**

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34 The literature has shown that activity on SNS and MIMS can stimulate offline political  
35 participation (Boulianne, 2015). These platforms are argued to ease the collection of political  
36 information from several sources – from family or friends to mainstream or alternative media sources  
37 – which might in turn be used for political mobilization (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela, 2012).  
38 In particular, the political use of the internet is argued to have a positive effect on participation  
39 because it represents an interactive way of communicating, which in turn produces a feeling of  
40 accessibility to politics (Kruikemeier, van Noort, Vliegthart & de Vreese, 2014).  
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### 48 ***Digital platforms and the populist vote***

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50 The concept of populism, although contested, revolves around the contrast between the ‘pure’  
51 people, who should hold sovereignty, and the ‘corrupt’ elite, which do not act in the interest of the  
52 former group (Mudde, 2004). Another conceptualization of populism sees it more as a  
53 ‘communication style’ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) which leaders use to connect with the people  
54 without intermediaries and spread their messages (Gerbaudo, 2018). Therefore, it is worth exploring  
55 whether digital platforms, such as SNS and MIMS, provide opportunities for populist parties’  
56 communication and attract voters.  
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3 We argue that populist parties have an advantage in the online environment vis-à-vis  
4 traditional political parties. Digital media allow populist actors to avoid traditional gatekeepers (i.e.  
5 journalists), establish direct connections with the people and keep an antagonistic stance with the  
6 mainstream parties and media (Kriesi, 2014; Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Büchel, 2017). Moreover, the  
7 interactive features of the web generate new chances for users to be involved in decision-making, as  
8 it is an environment echoing the direct democracy claims which are often at the core of populist  
9 discourse (Mudde, 2004). Eventually, digital platforms vehiculate anti-elitist content that is often  
10 unverified or false which tends to favour populist leaders (Guess, Nyhan & Reifler, 2018).

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12 In sum, according to Gerbaudo (2018) there is an ‘elective affinity’ between online platforms  
13 and populism. In fact, they are seen to give representation to the voiceless who are marginalized by  
14 mainstream media. Moreover, they allow the creation of groups of like-minded disaffected  
15 individuals that can be mobilized against the ‘enemies of the people.’ Both these features are  
16 particularly resounding with populist actors, who tend to deplore the mainstream media as the voice  
17 of the establishment and far from the concerns of common people. Specularly, it should be underlined  
18 that the features of digital media tend not to advantage the mainstream parties, as they prefer to  
19 establish good relationship with mainstream media, do not contest them, and tend to rely on ‘facts’  
20 in their communication, avoiding spreading information on social media which may hinder their  
21 reputation (Schaub & Morisi, 2019).

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23 With the rise of the internet, research has devoted much attention on the relationship between  
24 the use of digital tools and political behaviour and attitudes (Zhuravskaya, Petrova & Enikolopov,  
25 2020), and also populism, although to a much lesser extent (Heiss & Matthes, 2017). Most of the  
26 available literature linking social media use and populist voting applies a ‘supply-side’ approach to  
27 explaining why the former could affect the latter. The general argument is that the internet and/or  
28 social media platforms facilitate the spreading of the messages of populist parties and leaders and that  
29 [using them or being active on them](#) exposes individuals to [such messages](#) (Zhuravskaya et al., 2020),  
30 which might, in turn, increase the likelihood of voting for these actors. A study by Groshek and Koc-  
31 Michalska (2017) [argues that social media use – in particular active use \(as posting, sharing, campaigning, forwarding content\) in contrast to passive use \(as receiving information\) – may be linked to an increasing support for populist candidates. The study demonstrates that using Facebook and Twitter was related to an increased likelihood of supporting populist presidential candidates in the 2016 American primary elections. Focusing on the 2016 Trump campaign, Baldwin-Philippi \(2019\) proves the ability of populists to centre ‘the people’ through various digital platforms and strategies. Cremonesi and colleagues \(2019\) show that social media use is positively associated with populist attitudes in Italy.](#)

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3 Only few studies have *instead* looked into the ‘demand-side’, that concerns the reasons why  
4 voters use platforms and how such use might be driven by partisanship. Regarding the first aspect,  
5 studies have shown that individuals with populist attitudes tend to use more frequently information  
6 coming from the internet (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos & Kleis Nielsen, 2019; Schulz, 2019),  
7 trust less *quality media and more commercial or tabloid* media (Pew Research, 2018) and also  
8 selectively avoid the websites of legacy press media when surfing the internet (Stier, Kirkizh, Froio  
9 & Schroeder, 2020). *Despite a clear gap in the literature, the linkage between populist attitudes and  
10 trust in different media outlets (Fawzi, 2019) provides important indications concerning the  
11 relationship between the former and social media platforms. Since platforms are privately owned and  
12 driven by profit-seeking goals, they share important characteristics with commercial media.  
13 Accordingly, citizens with a populist worldview may be more prone to use them compared with non-  
14 populist citizens as they perceive these platforms as weapons in the hands of ‘the good people’ against  
15 ‘the corrupt elite.’*

16  
17 In-between the two approaches, Hameleers (2018) claimed that what he calls ‘populist mass-  
18 self communication’ manifests itself at the intersections of the supply-side and the demand-side, since  
19 on social media platforms ‘all actors can simultaneously and interchangeably take on the role of a  
20 sender and receiver of populist ideas’ (p. 2178). This makes particularly complicate to clarify the  
21 causal order of the relationship between digital information and voting choices. However, recent  
22 research has tackled the issue of the direction of such an association, providing robust evidence that  
23 digital media use affects populist attitudes or voting, and not the other way around. Schumann and  
24 colleagues (2019) show that more frequent use of social media increases the likelihood of voting for  
25 populist radical right parties in Germany, showing that there is no evidence of reverse causation.  
26 Dealing with a similar problem, Schaub and Morisi (2019) address the issue of causality in the  
27 relationship between internet use and populist voting in Italy and Germany, and provide compelling  
28 evidence that the former affect the latter, and not the opposite.

### 29 ***Different platforms and the populist vote***

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31 Previous research on the opportunities provided by digital media for populist communication  
32 does not usually distinguish between different platforms. The extant research generally looks at  
33 internet or social media use in general, without considering other digital platforms when studying  
34 populist voting. In contrast, we consider the affordances respectively provided by SNS and MIMS in  
35 populist communication. Because of the impossibility of summarizing a lengthy and ongoing debate,  
36 we rely on the following definition of *affordance*: ‘what various platforms are actually capable of  
37 doing and perceptions of what they enable, along with the actual practices that emerge as people  
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3 interact with platforms' (Kreiss, Lawrence & McGregor, 2018, p. 19).

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5 As already mentioned, SNS have been found to be ideal platforms for personalized  
6 communication connecting leaders with followers, and there is growing evidence on their link with  
7 populist attitudes or support. However, while SNS have rapidly become one of the interests of media  
8 studies, consideration of MIMS and their potential contribution to political communication has been  
9 limited, at least in western European countries. MIMS are in fact one of the main tools for political  
10 propaganda in the Global South (i.e. Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia), where mobile phones  
11 can be the only available devices to access the internet (Balbi & Magaouda, 2018). Nonetheless, as  
12 we will discuss below, some interesting aspects of MIMS may help explain their political use in  
13 Western countries too, especially that by populist actors.

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21 When comparing SNS and MIMS, it should be noticed that while the latter have been  
22 developed for, and are mostly used on, mobile devices (but desktop versions are also available), the  
23 former tend to be accessed from different types of hardware. Building on Bossetta's taxonomy (2018),  
24 we compare SNS and MIMS in Table 1. *Searchability* refers to the opportunities afforded by a  
25 platform to single out new accounts and access their contents. Unlike SNS, where politicians can  
26 easily create public pages that can be liked or followed by users, this feature can only be found on  
27 some MIMS (i.e. Messenger and Telegram) but not on WhatsApp, where new contacts cannot be  
28 searched for and added within the platform. *Filtering* governs how content is displayed to users and  
29 how the latter interact with the platform's features. While contents sorted on SNS tend to be filtered,  
30 MIMS just displays content chronologically. *Reach* describes the visibility of a post across the stream  
31 of contents on SNS. Whilst non-paid Facebook posts only reach a tiny minority of users, MIMS  
32 messages are always directly delivered to the addressee. Whereas *targeting* allows focusing on  
33 audiences that can be persuaded or mobilized, *analytics* permits monitoring and extracting data,  
34 which are used to modify campaigning in real time. Encryption seriously limits datafication in the  
35 case of WhatsApp, while secure communication is not set by default in Telegram and Messenger but  
36 can be enabled by the user. Consequently, SNS and MIMS can be located at the two extremes of a  
37 continuum since most of the above-mentioned characteristics are particularly advanced on the former  
38 while they may only be present in a rudimentary way on the latter.

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53 Table 1 about here

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57 Undoubtedly, the features of SNS make them formidable tools for political campaigning.  
58 Apparently, the basic qualities of MIMS make them more suitable for interpersonal communication.  
59 However, some specific qualities of MIMS may make them interesting platforms for political  
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3 communication, too. Comparing four different platforms, Waterloo and colleagues find that  
4 expressions of positive and negative emotions are more likely on WhatsApp compared to more public  
5 platforms, concluding that ‘more private spaces in which one can communicate with a specific close  
6 friend allow for looser norms of emotion expression’ (2018, p. 1827). Moreover, Dodds (2019)  
7 notices that this platform facilitates intimacy and trust between journalists and sources and also  
8 comradery and mutuality between different journalists. MIMS allow the creation of small  
9 homogeneous groups that, unlike SNS, tend to be characterized by stronger ties. For example,  
10 WhatsApp requires personal phone numbers to establish a connection. Consistently, it is perceived  
11 as a more personal/intimate medium and used to cultivate homophile relations among people sharing  
12 similar political views (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). While Telegram allows the creation of  
13 ‘supergroups’ with thousands of members, groups on WhatsApp and Messenger can only include up  
14 to 250 members. However, they can be scaled up and go viral. The possibility of forwarding messages  
15 circulating in groups to personal contacts and other groups potentially expands their audience  
16 exponentially.

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18 In sum, messages circulating via MIMS are generally sent from trusted and known contacts  
19 and they directly reach users’ devices. Compared to SNS, messages circulated through MIMS may  
20 have a greater impact as they are distributed from reliable and known sources. Because of these  
21 characteristics, MIMS can be conceived as ‘a unique combination of mass and interpersonal  
22 communication channels’ (Malka, Ariel & Avidar, 2015, p. 329). This original mix may facilitate  
23 more effective communication as it is based on the exchange of sensitive messages that would be less  
24 likely to surface on SNS. Furthermore, as populist communication is heavily based on emotions  
25 (Engesser et al., 2017), MIMS appear particularly suited to spreading and amplifying passionate  
26 messages among intimate and trustworthy networks. *In this light, being active users of SNS or MIMS  
27 could be differently related to political choices, such as voting for populist parties. This is because  
28 the logic of such platforms assumes activity rather than passivity, which in turn may favour forms of  
29 offline participation, as voting for populist candidates or parties which are not well depicted by  
30 mainstream media (see Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017).* Based on the above-mentioned literature,  
31 we formulate the following research questions:

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33 RQ1a) Does the political use of SNS and MIMS increase the chances of voting for a populist party  
34 compared to mainstream parties?

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36 RQ1b) Do the greater intimacy, like-mindedness and emotionality afforded by MIMS increase the  
37 chances of voting for a populist party more than SNS do?

### *'Digital native' vs. 'digital immigrant' parties*

We cannot classify populist parties in the countries included in the analysis along the left-right continuum because some of them – such as the Five Star Movement (in Italy) – present an eclectic ideology ‘combining contradictory or elusive visions on policy issues crosscutting traditional cleavages’ (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019, p. 1277). In addition, what unites left and right populist parties is that they share an ideology positing that society is divided in two groups – the ‘corrupt elites’ and the ‘pure people’ – and that the general will should be pursued in politics (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). In Europe, populism is often associated with the ‘right’ and with what comes with it – xenophobic politics, nationalism or opposition to multiculturalism – while populist traits can be found in a variety of actors, including on the ‘left’ (van Kessel, 2015, p. 2). Furthermore, what also unites left and right populist parties is the dimension of political communication. It has been argued that a different way of identifying populist parties is to apply a conception of populism as a ‘strategy’ or a ‘style’ which these actors employ to create a bond with voters (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Populist parties, on both sides, make use of communication emphasizing a link between the leader and the people (Gerbaudo, 2018), and in this regard Reinemann and colleagues argue that ‘populist political communication should be restricted neither to the left nor to the right of the political spectrum’ (2017, p. 14).

An alternative way to distinguish populist parties is to consider their date of foundation. The economic crisis of 2008 can be understood as a turning point in European politics for two distinct reasons: first, increased economic inequalities generated ‘a notable but uneven surge [of populist parties] during crisis’ (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015, p. 322); and second, because the spread of SNS and MIMS reached its peak in Europe at the end of that decade, i.e. 2010s (Chadwick, 2013). Therefore, we assume that parties **founded** during the Great Recession can be considered ‘digital natives,’ which naturally embed digital platforms in their everyday organization. On the contrary, populist parties that emerged before the economic crisis and the spread of digital media may be labelled ‘digital immigrants,’ adapting to digital technologies with much more caution, lagging behind in the process of adapting to new means of communication. We are aware that this generational juxtaposition is one of the myths surrounding digital media (Livingstone, 2017) and could be misleading. Nonetheless, similar arguments have been proposed, among others, by Karpf (2012) who notices that ‘there are important generational differences between the ways that netroots and legacy organizations use information technology’ (p. 18). A path-dependency of organizational cultures (Pettigrew, 1979) could in fact explain different patterns of digital media adoption by diversely-aged parties. According to Gerbaudo (2019), traditional parties are very careful about using digital platforms and consider mainstream media their main campaigning ground, while new-**founded** ones fully employ digital

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3 media both for external communication and for internal decision-making. Accordingly, we formulate  
4 the following research question:  
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8 RQ2) Does the political use of SNS and MIMS increase the probability of voting for ‘new’ rather  
9 than ‘old’ populist parties compared to mainstream parties?  
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### 13 *Digital platforms in context*

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15 Regarding differences in the countries selected that may affect the use and the role of digital  
16 platforms in supporting the populist vote, we can briefly refer to institutional features, the  
17 characteristics of party systems, the configuration of media systems and the regulation of internet  
18 contents. Compared to the other two countries, the German party system is characterized by greater  
19 stability combined with much more stringent web regulation (see Caiani & Parenti, 2013 and also the  
20 recent law on hate speech), a lower spread of SNS and a public sphere where newspapers still play  
21 an important role compared to digital media. In fact, 78% of Germans watch TV while 50% read the  
22 press and 32% use SNS.<sup>1</sup> Germans are very trustful of traditional media and distrustful of digital ones  
23 (70% for TV, 70% for newspapers and 17% for SNS respectively). All these features may act as  
24 barriers to the effectiveness of populist communication on digital media. From this point of view,  
25 Italy is in an opposite situation as it displays a very unstable party system (Chiaramonte & Emanuele,  
26 2017), limited regulation of internet contents (Caiani & Parenti, 2013) and a TV-centred public sphere  
27 associated with widespread use of digital media. TV is watched daily by 90% of Italians, while  
28 newspapers are read by 26%, and SNS are used by 37%. Comparatively, Italians tend to display less  
29 trust in all kinds of media (56% for TV, 60% for newspapers and 19% for SNS respectively). France  
30 occupies an intermediate position between polarized pluralist countries (e.g. Italy) and democratic-  
31 corporatist countries (e.g. Germany) (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). France also presents important  
32 institutional differences such as semi-presidentialism, which could potentially act as a very powerful  
33 driver of personalization and the political use of digital platforms. This effect might, however, be  
34 balanced by the fact that our data refer to the 2017 legislative election and not a presidential one.  
35 Regarding media use, TV is watched by 77%, newspapers are read by 26% and SNS used by 40%.  
36 These media are trusted by 63%, 71% and 27% respectively.<sup>2</sup> Compared to the EU average, Germany  
37 displays higher trust in traditional media and lower trust in digital ones, Italy displays lower trust in  
38 all media sources while France is located between the two other countries. Accordingly, we expect a  
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58 <sup>1</sup> Standard Eurobarometer no. 88 (Autumn 2017) and Eurobarometer no. 464 (April 2018).

59 <sup>2</sup> Data on access to and trust in different media outlets in the three countries are reported in the online appendix.  
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3 stronger relation between the use of SNS and MIMS and the populist vote in Italy than in Germany,  
4 where digital media are less diffused and not very trusted. We do not have particular expectations  
5 regarding France because of the above-mentioned ambivalence, which has already been highlighted  
6 in previous studies. Consistently, we suggest the following research question:  
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11 RQ3) Does the political use of SNS and MIMS increase the probability of voting for populist parties  
12 in Italy compared to Germany?  
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## 15 16 17 **Research design**

### 18 ***Data***

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20 We test our expectations using three original Computer Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI)  
21 post-election surveys conducted in France (6/20/2017-7/9/2017), Germany (9/25/2017-10/2/2017)  
22 and Italy (3/5/2018-3/28/2018). For each country, samples of 1,750 internet users aged 18-74 years  
23 were collected.<sup>3</sup> The samples are representative of the adult population with internet access and are  
24 based on quota sampling using age, gender, employment status, education and region of residence.  
25 Our surveys were designed to be comparable in terms of both modes of data collection and  
26 questionnaires, providing us with an opportunity to test the link between SNS and MIMS political  
27 use and the populist vote in different contexts.  
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### 35 ***Dependent variable***

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37 The dependent variable distinguishes voting choices in five categories: a) voting for  
38 mainstream parties; b) voting for populist parties; c) voting for other parties (smaller parties with or  
39 without representation in national parliaments, or indicated by the respondents in response to an open-  
40 ended question); d) abstainers; and e) a residual category including spoiled votes, unidentifiable vote  
41 choices, ineligible voters and missing information.  
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46 There is quite considerable debate on how to classify populist parties (van Kessel, 2015). We  
47 consider the following parties to be populist: *Front National* (National Front) and *La France*  
48 *Insoumise* (France Unbowed) in France; *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany) and  
49 *Die Linke* (The Left) in Germany; *Lega* (The League) and the *Movimento 5 Stelle* (Five Star  
50 Movement) in Italy. This classification follows recent research on populist parties which attempts to  
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57 <sup>3</sup> Due to rounding in the construction of the sample, 1,751 internet users were interviewed in France. [The models are](#)  
58 [estimated after list-wise deletion of missing values for the selected variables of interest \(as also reported in Table A4 in](#)  
59 [the online appendix\).](#)  
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3 categorise these actors according to a number of characteristics: the salience of the contrast between  
4 people and the elite, with one being seen in a positive and the other in a negative light; the idea that  
5 the people are part of a homogeneous group and that their interests should be defended against those  
6 of the elite; and popular sovereignty (Mudde, 2004; van Kessel, 2015). These characteristics  
7 constitute a minimal definition of populism and therefore we stress that additional characteristics  
8 which narrow the definition have not been considered.<sup>4</sup>  
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11 To address the second research question, we separate parties founded in the twentieth century,  
12 such as *Front National*, *Die Linke* and *Lega* (the ‘old’, or ‘digital immigrant’, populist parties), from  
13 those born during the Great Recession such as *La France Insoumise*, *Alternative für Deutschland* and  
14 *Movimento 5 Stelle* (the ‘new’, or ‘digital native’, populist parties). The former three parties were  
15 indeed founded much before the spread of digital media. The *Front National* was founded in 1972  
16 and despite its long history and changes, it is still considered a ‘classic populist party’ (Surel, 2019).  
17 *Die Linke*, although founded in 2007, is a direct descendant of the post-1989 Party of Democratic  
18 Socialism, and thus it has its roots well before the 2010s decade and cannot be considered a ‘genuinely  
19 new party’ (Wuttke, 2020). The *Lega* was founded in 1991 and is the oldest party in the Italian  
20 political system. While its current leader, Matteo Salvini, has imprinted important changes to its  
21 organization, the *Lega* still presents the look of a traditional party (Biancalana, 2020). In contrast, *La*  
22 *France Insoumise* was founded in 2016 declaring itself being a populist party (Marlière, 2019).  
23 *Alternative für Deutschland* was founded in 2013 as a consequence of the financial, migration and  
24 Brexit crises hitting Germany (Lees, 2018). Eventually, the *Movimento 5 Stelle* is the oldest among  
25 the selected ‘new’ populist parties as it was founded in 2009, yet this party from the beginning of its  
26 history mainly used the internet as a means of communication (Mosca, Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015).  
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### 43 ***Independent variables***

44 The independent variables of interest are two **additive scales** measuring comparable activities  
45 on SNS (such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) and MIMS (such as WhatsApp, Facebook  
46 Messenger, Telegram and the like). In the first case, we used dichotomous items asking the  
47 respondents whether or not in the previous 12 months, when using SNS, they: a) sent a tweet to, or  
48 commented on, a post by a national party leader, politician or party; b) discussed national political  
49 issues or the [last] general election; and c) tried to convince someone to vote for a specific party  
50 leader, candidate or party. In the second case, respondents were asked whether or not in the previous  
51 12 months, when using MIMS, they: a) sent messages about politics, public affairs or the [last] general  
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59 <sup>4</sup> The classification of other voting choices is reported in the online appendix.  
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3 election; b) discussed politics, public affairs or the [last] general election; c) tried to convince  
4 someone to vote for a specific candidate or party. We applied a Mokken scale analysis to assess the  
5 reliability of the two scales (Van Schuur, 2003). The Loevinger's H for the SNS and the MIMS scales  
6 is 0.55 and 0.67 respectively, which indicates that both are strong. These are similar if we assess the  
7 scales for each country. Therefore, we built two summary indices measuring the political use of SNS  
8 and MIMS from 0 (no use) to 3 (full use).<sup>5</sup> We should underline that these scales capture the political  
9 use of SNS and MIMS and not the exposure to political information or the frequency by which  
10 political information is acquired. Nevertheless, it can be argued that being active on such platforms  
11 is the result of exposure to political information and messages (see Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018; Lee &  
12 Xenos, 2020) which might come from populist actors. Indeed, our strategy is in line with the literature  
13 arguing that the political use of social media platforms matters more than simple use for populist  
14 voting (see for instance Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017).

### 25 **Controls**

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27 The models include a variable classifying respondents in four groups depending on the  
28 frequency with which they use media – whether ‘traditional’ (TV and newspapers) and/or ‘digital’  
29 (internet and SNS) (Mosca & Quaranta, 2016) – for political information: a) those who make  
30 infrequent use of both media; b) those who prevalently use traditional media; c) those who prevalently  
31 use digital media; and d) those who frequently use both. The literature also shows that political  
32 (dis)trust is related to support for anti-establishment/populist parties (Schumacher & Roodujin, 2013).  
33 We use an index of political distrust measuring whether respondents are very confident, confident,  
34 not very confident or not at all confident in parties, government and parliament.<sup>6</sup> We then include  
35 other variables found to be important to the vote choice: political interest measured on a scale ranging  
36 from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested) and the left-right scale in categories (the reference  
37 category ‘not located on the left-right scale/missing’ and ‘radical left,’ ‘left,’ ‘centre,’ ‘right’ and  
38 ‘radical right’). We also include gender, education (the reference category ‘low’ and ‘medium’ and  
39 ‘high’), age (the reference category ‘18-24’ and ‘25-34,’ ‘35-44,’ ‘45-54’ and ‘55-74’) and  
40 employment status (the reference category ‘not employed’ and ‘employed’). Finally, we include  
41 country dummies to control for country heterogeneity.

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55 <sup>5</sup> We report the estimates from additional models excluding from the scales the items measuring discussion in the online  
56 appendix. We do so as such items might be less close to the sphere of institutional politics. Results are consistent with  
57 those presented here.

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59 <sup>6</sup> Cronbach's alpha is 0.87 (similar scores are found in the separate samples).

## Models

We use multinomial models to address the research questions. First, we include all the independent variables. With this model we assess the expectation that political activities on SNS and MIMS are related to the populist vote. We then include, one at a time, interaction terms between the political activity scales and the country dummies. This allows us to assess whether the associations between political activity and the populist vote are heterogeneous across countries. Given that the coefficients of multinomial models are hard to interpret, especially in the presence of interaction terms (Long, 1997), we use average marginal effects.

## Findings

Figure 1 shows the average marginal effects of SNS and MIMS political use on the probability of each vote choice.<sup>7</sup> The left-hand panel shows that an increase of one point on the SNS activity scale increases the probability of voting for a populist party by about 3 percentage points (henceforth p.p.) ( $p \leq 0.001$ ). In contrast, SNS activity is not associated with the probability of voting for mainstream parties. Also, SNS activity is not associated with abstention or with other party choices. Another interesting finding is that the marginal effects of SNS activity on the probability of voting for populist and mainstream parties are different. In fact, a one-point increase on the SNS activity scale increases the probability of voting for a populist party vs. a mainstream party by about 4.4 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.001$ ). Therefore, this online political activity seems to be relevant to understanding the choice to vote for a populist party in contrast to mainstream ones. The right-hand panel shows the associations between MIMS use and the populist vote. In this case, we notice that political activities are only associated positively with the probability of voting for populist parties. A one-point increase on the scale corresponds to an increase in the probability of voting for a populist party of about 1.7 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). Instead, these political activities on MIMS are not associated with other vote choices. As before, we notice that there is a statistically significant difference between the marginal effects of MIMS activities on populist and mainstream vote choices. In fact, a one-point increase on the MIMS scale increases the probability of voting for a populist party vs. a mainstream party by about 3 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.05$ ).

These findings provide evidence addressing RQ1a and show that political activity on SNS and MIMS is associated with a populist vote rather than a mainstream vote. This implies that these forms of political activity and the related instruments may favour an exchange of information among

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<sup>7</sup> The estimates of the models are reported in the online appendix.

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3 individuals that tend to avoid expressing themselves politically in public, given that their ideas might  
4 be controversial or non-mainstream, like those of populist party supporters, and so find the digital  
5 space provided by SNS and MIMS more comfortable for their political expression (Wojcieszak, 2010;  
6 Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). Moreover, ‘unlike legacy media, social media are built upon the logic of  
7 virality, which compels political actors to communicate primarily those messages that users like,  
8 comment on, promote, and share within their networks’ (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig & Esser,  
9 2017, p. 1349). However, we find that the role of MIMS is smaller than that of SNS as far as the  
10 populist vote is concerned, [contrasting with RQ1b](#).  
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What about the effects of SNS and MIMS political use on voting for populist parties once we distinguish between ‘old’ and ‘new’ ones? To address this question, we turn our attention to Figure 2 which shows the average marginal effects of the two scales measuring activity on the probability of making the various vote choices. As before, we see that while the role of SNS and MIMS political use is not positively associated with other vote choices, it seems to be relevant to voting for ‘new’ populist parties but not for ‘old’ ones. In fact, a one-point increase on the SNS and MIMS use scales corresponds to increases in the probability of voting for ‘new’ populist parties of about 2.8 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.000$ ) and 1.3 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.05$ ) respectively. Furthermore, if we compare the roles of SNS and MIMS use in voting for ‘old’ or ‘new’ vs. mainstream parties, we find that using SNS or MIMS does not increase the probability of voting for ‘old’ populist parties with respect to mainstream parties. Instead, using SNS and MIMS increases the probability of voting for ‘new’ populist parties vs. mainstream parties by 4.2 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.001$ ) and 2.6 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.05$ ) respectively. These results seem to indicate that ‘new’ populist parties benefit more from digital media use, answering RQ2.

Figure 2 here

We now address RQ3, which asks whether there are country differences in the associations between SNS and MIMS political use and voting for populist parties. Figure 3 shows the average marginal effects of SNS and MIMS political use on the probability of voting for populist or mainstream parties in the three countries.<sup>8</sup> We see that an association between SNS political use and

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<sup>8</sup> The estimates of the models are reported in the online appendix. We omit the associations between SNS and MIMS use and other vote choices from the discussion.



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3 the populist vote is not present in all countries. In fact, in France and Italy a one-point increase on the  
4 SNS scale corresponds to increases in the probability of voting for populist parties of 3.4 ( $p \leq 0.01$ )  
5 and 4 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.01$ ) respectively, while in Germany the association is not statistically significant.  
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7 Regarding MIMS use, we notice that this association is only significant in Italy (3.8 p.p.,  $p \leq 0.01$ ),  
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9 while in France and Germany it is not.  
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17 Finally, we explore the same differences while distinguishing between ‘old’ and ‘new’  
18 populist parties. The average marginal effects are reported in Figure 4. Regarding the role of SNS  
19 use, in no country is this variable associated with the probability of voting for ‘old’ populist parties,  
20 while in France and Italy it is associated with the probability of voting for ‘new’ populist parties but  
21 not in Germany. In fact, in France SNS use increases the probability of this vote choice by 2.6 p.p. ( $p$   
22  $\leq 0.01$ ) and in Italy by 4.9 p.p. ( $p \leq 0.000$ ). This finding suggests that also other factors might be at  
23 play in the relationship between SNS use and the populist vote, that have to do with the characteristics  
24 of *France Insoumise* and the *Movimento 5 Stelle*. Indeed, both parties have been labelled as ‘digital  
25 parties.’ As noted by Gerbaudo (2019) ‘the term digital party attempts to capture the common essence  
26 seen across a number of quite diverse political formations that have risen in recent years, and which  
27 share the common attempt of using digital technology to devise new forms of political participation  
28 and democratic decision-making’ (p. 7). They might attract voters more accustomed with digital  
29 platforms. Indeed, the above-mentioned parties introduced digital innovations allowing supporters  
30 and members to be more involved in their everyday life. There might thus be a special relationship  
31 between the voters who use SNS as a tool of political information and parties, such as these ones,  
32 which emphasize the role of digital platforms in politics. [Nevertheless, this relationship seems to hold  
33 only for a subset of populist parties, so it cannot be generalized beyond these cases.](#) Lastly, the role  
34 of MIMS use across the three countries is like that seen above: the variable is only associated with  
35 voting for ‘new’ populist parties in Italy (3.5 p.p.,  $p \leq 0.010$ ).  
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## 56 Conclusion

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58 To summarize, the empirical analysis has shown a relation between the political use of SNS  
59 and MIMS and populist voting, [providing support to many scholarly claims \(RQ1a\).](#) However, we  
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3 have found that SNS use increases the likelihood of voting for populist parties more than MIMS use  
4 (RQ1b). This disconfirms our argument, which was built on the greater degree of intimacy afforded  
5 by MIMS vis-à-vis SNS. In this concluding section we can only advance a tentative interpretation of  
6 this unexpected result.  
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10 First, because of financial constraints and restricted technical skills of their staff, populist  
11 parties (especially in Western countries) may be more inclined to invest in and concentrate their  
12 limited resources on SNS rather than MIMS. Second, since SNS tend to be visited by users for a  
13 longer period during the day than MIMS, the visibility of populist parties and leaders may be  
14 perceived to be greater on such platforms, pushing them to look after their presence there more. Third,  
15 because of interdependency mechanisms typical of hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2013), contents  
16 published on SNS (often used by journalists as information sources) have a greater possibility of  
17 travelling ‘from the desktop to the television screen’ than those on MIMS (Bennett, 2003, p. 164).  
18 There are then potential indirect benefits in being present on SNS that are less likely to exist on MIMS  
19 since the virality and metrics of SNS contents can prove very important in attracting traditional media  
20 coverage (Klinger & Svensson, 2015).  
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29 Regarding our second research question (RQ2), we have only found **partial** evidence that  
30 digital media tend to only favour populist parties. In fact, only some of the parties we called ‘digital  
31 natives’ **seem to** benefit more from the political use of SNS and MIMS than ‘older’ populist parties,  
32 which have a longer history and originated in a different landscape where traditional media were  
33 absolutely dominant and central. In fact, out of three parties we classified as ‘digital natives’ only  
34 two display a clear relation with the political use of SNS and only one with the political use of MIMS.  
35 Accordingly, we should take into consideration alternative explanations downplaying the  
36 generational differences between the populist parties included in our study while focusing on their  
37 digital nature. From this point of view, we can notice that while *Alternative für Deutschland* is  
38 certainly very skilled in the use of social media (Serrano, Shahrezaye, Papakyriakopoulos &  
39 Hegelich, 2019), differently from *La France Insoumise* and *Movimento 5 Stelle* the development of  
40 participatory platforms to involve its supporters in the life of the party is lacking. Unfortunately, our  
41 survey did not ask about the use of such platforms nor allows us to explore this relation in other digital  
42 parties active in the countries we considered.<sup>9</sup> From this point of view the differences emerged  
43 between the populist parties we addressed could be related to the digital nature of these parties and  
44 the actual involvement of their supporters in their digital platforms.  
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56 Finally, we addressed country-specific differences with our third research question (RQ3).  
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60 <sup>9</sup> For example, only 9 respondents declared their vote for the German Pirate party in our survey.

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3 Our findings show that the relation between the political use of digital media and populist voting  
4 varies significantly across France, Italy and Germany. While Italy displays a stronger influence of  
5 SNS and MIMS on the populist vote, this relation is lighter in France and only holds for SNS, and it  
6 completely disappears in Germany for both types of platforms. As stated above, differences in  
7 institutional features, media systems and web regulations help interpreting this outcome. In a  
8 reinforcing pattern, government surveillance and concerns about privacy are culturally sensitive  
9 issues in Germany (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018) coupled with a comparatively tougher regulation of  
10 the web, a less widespread use of digital media and a greater role of traditional media in the national  
11 media system. The Italian case could be put at Germany's antipodes: a relatively deregulated digital  
12 environment, wider diffusion of digital media and a lower degree of trust in different media outlets  
13 coupled with a very fragile and volatile party system (Chiaromonte & Emanuele, 2017) which is  
14 particularly open to challengers. The case of France – where SNS are relevant in influencing the  
15 populist vote but MIMS are not – is located between Italy and Germany, confirming Hallin &  
16 Mancini's classification (2004) of the country as one displaying a media system mixing features of  
17 the continental and Mediterranean types, to which Germany and Italy respectively belong.

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29 Last, it is worth noticing that digital platforms are moving targets, which makes any  
30 observation provisional and highly subject to the passing of time. Because of the continually changing  
31 nature of SNS and MIMS it is extremely difficult to study and interpret the linkage between digital  
32 platforms and the populist vote. For example, in recent times more constraints on the use of  
33 WhatsApp as a tool for political propaganda have been enacted by the application of the European  
34 General Data Protection Regulation (May 2018) and by the imposition of stricter limits on the  
35 forwarding function (from 20 to 5 recipients) by the platform itself to contrast the spread of fake  
36 news, thus reducing the virality of contents circulating on the platform and shifting it towards being  
37 a more private messaging app. Even stricter measures have been implemented as consequence of the  
38 Covid-19 crisis. To test how the platform works when the focus moves from popularity to contents,  
39 Instagram has recently hidden 'like' counts in a selected group of countries. Facebook might soon  
40 follow 'the like ban,' perhaps reducing the importance of virality for these platforms and their  
41 attractiveness in the eyes of traditional media outlets.

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Despite ongoing changes in the platform ecosystem, our contribution *seems to* confirm the  
importance of digital media for a new breed of populist parties and shows, however, a pivotal role of  
SNS, a lighter but significant role of MIMS, the importance of contextual national characteristics in  
magnifying or limiting this linkage *and the relevance of the features of the specific parties considered*.  
Of course, the analysis shown here presents limitations that are related to the cross-sectional design

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3 of our surveys and the scope of the comparison. Thus, future research should look further into the  
4 link between digital media use and populist voting addressing such problems.  
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6 To conclude, it is worth mentioning that this study has some limitations that should be  
7 addressed in future research. Indeed, the measurement of the political use of SNS and MIMS does  
8 not allow us to assess the extent to which individuals find populist messages via selective or incidental  
9 exposure, thus directly affecting their voting preferences. That being said, it is also important to stress  
10 that research on the relation between the use of digital media and populist attitudes suffers from a  
11 clear myopia on the demand-side which needs to be seriously addressed in future studies. Despite this  
12 evident imbalance between supply and demand of populist ideas we believe roles of senders and  
13 receivers are increasingly blurred. While the reasons why populist actors tend to rely on digital  
14 platforms have been clarified, the motivations pushing citizens to use them needs to be further  
15 substantiated. One reasons for this could be that digital platforms generate unconstrained and safe  
16 places where diverse actors can freely consume, share and exchange ideas that tend to be silenced in  
17 traditional media outlets (Hameleers, 2018). Further research is needed to shed light on this complex  
18 intertwining.  
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Table 1: Main differences between SNS and MIMS.

| Platform | Searchability | Filtering | Reach | Sophistication of Targeting/Analytics |
|----------|---------------|-----------|-------|---------------------------------------|
| SNS      | High-medium   | High      | Low   | High-medium                           |
| MIMS     | Medium-low    | Low       | High  | Low                                   |

Source: own adaptation from Bossetta (2018).

For Peer Review Only

Figure 1: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream or populist parties or making other vote choices, with 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 2: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream, ‘old’ – ‘digital immigrant’ – or ‘new’ – ‘digital native’ – populist parties or making other vote choices, with 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 3: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream or populist parties in France, Germany and Italy, with 95% confidence intervals.





Figure 4: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream, 'old' – 'digital immigrant' – or 'new' – 'digital native' – populist parties in France, Germany and Italy, with 95% confidence intervals.



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**Online Appendix**

For Peer Review Only

Table A1: Access to different media outlets in the selected countries

| Country    | TV |       | Newspaper |       | SNS |       |
|------------|----|-------|-----------|-------|-----|-------|
|            | %  | Delta | %         | Delta | %   | Delta |
| France     | 77 | -4    | 26        | -2    | 40  | -2    |
| Germany    | 78 | -3    | 50        | +22   | 32  | -10   |
| Italy      | 90 | +9    | 19        | -9    | 37  | -5    |
| EU average | 81 |       | 28        |       | 42  |       |

*Source:* Standard Eurobarometer no. 88 (Autumn 2017). Note: Delta indicates differences to the EU average.

Table A2: Trust in different media outlets in the selected countries

| Country    | TV |       | Newspaper |       | SNS |       |
|------------|----|-------|-----------|-------|-----|-------|
|            | %  | Delta | %         | Delta | %   | Delta |
| France     | 63 | -3    | 71        | +8    | 27  | +1    |
| Germany    | 70 | +4    | 70        | +7    | 17  | -9    |
| Italy      | 56 | -10   | 60        | -3    | 19  | -7    |
| EU average | 66 |       | 63        |       | 26  |       |

*Source:* Standard Eurobarometer no. 464 (April 2018). Note: Delta indicates differences to the EU average.

Table A3: Classification of parties.

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*Mainstream parties*

France: La République En Marche! (The Republic Onwards!), Les Republicains (The Republicans), Mouvement Democrate (Democratic Movement), Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party).

Germany: Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union), Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany), Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party), Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (Alliance 90 / The Greens).

Italy: Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), Forza Italia (Go Italy!).

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*Other parties*

France: Debout la France (France Arise), Europe Écologie – Les Verts (Europe Ecology – The Greens), Lutte Ouvriere (Workers' Struggle), Nouveau Parti Anti-Capitaliste (New Anti-capitalist Party), Parti Communiste Francais (French Communist Party), Parti Radical De Gauche (Left radical Party), Union des Democrates et Independants (Union of Democrats and Independents).

Germany: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party), Piratenpartei Deutschland (German Pirate Party).

Italy: Insieme (Together), Civica Popolare (Popular Civic List), +Europa (+Europe), Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy), Italia agli Italiani (Italy to the Italians), Liberi e Uguali (Free and Equal), Noi con l'Italia (Us with Italy), Potere al Popolo (Power to the People).

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Table A4: Descriptive statistics.

|                                      | France         |       | Germany        |       | Italy          |       | Range |     |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|-------|-----|
|                                      | Prop./<br>Mean | SD    | Prop./<br>Mean | SD    | Prop./<br>Mean | SD    | Min   | Max |
| Vote choice classifications:         |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |     |
| Mainstream                           | 0.302          |       | 0.558          |       | 0.154          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Populist                             | 0.244          |       | 0.224          |       | 0.478          |       | 0     | 1   |
| ‘Old’ / ‘digital immigrant’ populist | 0.145          |       | 0.121          |       | 0.145          |       | 0     | 1   |
| ‘New’ / ‘digital native’ populist    | 0.099          |       | 0.102          |       | 0.333          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Other                                | 0.081          |       | 0.039          |       | 0.129          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Abstained                            | 0.304          |       | 0.092          |       | 0.124          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Residual                             | 0.068          |       | 0.087          |       | 0.115          |       | 0     | 1   |
| SNS political use                    | 0.589          | 0.934 | 0.454          | 0.814 | 0.707          | 0.959 | 0     | 3   |
| MIMS political use                   | 0.471          | 0.948 | 0.449          | 0.858 | 0.692          | 1.023 | 0     | 3   |
| Political information:               |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |     |
| Neither (traditional/digital)        | 0.214          |       | 0.138          |       | 0.185          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Prevalently traditional media        | 0.189          |       | 0.188          |       | 0.143          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Prevalently digital media            | 0.074          |       | 0.104          |       | 0.080          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Both (traditional/digital)           | 0.523          |       | 0.570          |       | 0.592          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Political distrust                   | 2.955          | 0.740 | 2.693          | 0.723 | 3.175          | 0.655 | 1     | 4   |
| Political interest                   | 2.922          | 1.001 | 3.506          | 0.699 | 2.915          | 0.837 | 1     | 4   |
| Political discussion                 | 0.381          |       | 0.338          |       | 0.396          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Left-right scale:                    |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |     |
| Not identified                       | 0.302          |       | 0.195          |       | 0.292          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Radical left                         | 0.082          |       | 0.041          |       | 0.072          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Left                                 | 0.199          |       | 0.302          |       | 0.183          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Centre                               | 0.121          |       | 0.266          |       | 0.103          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Right                                | 0.185          |       | 0.182          |       | 0.247          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Radical right                        | 0.111          |       | 0.015          |       | 0.103          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Gender:                              |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |     |
| Male                                 | 0.491          |       | 0.513          |       | 0.572          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Female                               | 0.509          |       | 0.487          |       | 0.428          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Age:                                 |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |     |
| 18-24                                | 0.118          |       | 0.104          |       | 0.125          |       | 0     | 1   |
| 25-34                                | 0.189          |       | 0.196          |       | 0.179          |       | 0     | 1   |
| 35-44                                | 0.212          |       | 0.176          |       | 0.245          |       | 0     | 1   |
| 45-54                                | 0.210          |       | 0.246          |       | 0.238          |       | 0     | 1   |
| 55-74                                | 0.271          |       | 0.278          |       | 0.213          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Education:                           |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |     |
| Low                                  | 0.158          |       | 0.152          |       | 0.265          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Medium                               | 0.458          |       | 0.561          |       | 0.516          |       | 0     | 1   |
| High                                 | 0.385          |       | 0.287          |       | 0.219          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Employment:                          |                |       |                |       |                |       |       |     |
| Not employed                         | 0.368          |       | 0.279          |       | 0.339          |       | 0     | 1   |
| Employed                             | 0.632          |       | 0.721          |       | 0.661          |       | 0     | 1   |
| N                                    | 1409           |       | 1475           |       | 1500           |       |       |     |

*Note.* N refers to the number of observations after the list-wise deletion of missing values for the selected variables.



Table A5: Multinomial model predicting vote choice.

|                                       | Populist             | Other                | Abstained            | Residual             |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| SNS activities                        | 0.166**<br>(0.058)   | -0.003<br>(0.084)    | 0.076<br>(0.071)     | -0.105<br>(0.093)    |
| MIMS activities                       | 0.115*<br>(0.056)    | 0.001<br>(0.080)     | 0.117<br>(0.068)     | -0.046<br>(0.088)    |
| Political information (r.c. Neither): |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Prevalently traditional media         | -0.090<br>(0.158)    | -0.263<br>(0.222)    | -0.217<br>(0.171)    | -0.423*<br>(0.206)   |
| Prevalently digital media             | 0.219<br>(0.195)     | 0.014<br>(0.271)     | 0.216<br>(0.210)     | 0.279<br>(0.240)     |
| Both                                  | 0.018<br>(0.142)     | -0.436*<br>(0.199)   | -0.337*<br>(0.155)   | -0.356*<br>(0.179)   |
| Political distrust                    | 1.024***<br>(0.067)  | 0.608***<br>(0.098)  | 0.776***<br>(0.080)  | 0.504***<br>(0.096)  |
| Political interest                    | 0.074<br>(0.063)     | 0.073<br>(0.090)     | -0.513***<br>(0.067) | -0.425***<br>(0.083) |
| Political discussion                  | 0.030<br>(0.099)     | 0.274<br>(0.145)     | 0.011<br>(0.124)     | 0.064<br>(0.148)     |
| LR scale (r.c. Not identified):       |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Radical left                          | 0.306<br>(0.199)     | 1.183***<br>(0.253)  | -0.353<br>(0.241)    | -0.959**<br>(0.331)  |
| Left                                  | -0.594***<br>(0.130) | 0.021<br>(0.193)     | -1.163***<br>(0.154) | -1.665***<br>(0.189) |
| Centre                                | -1.018***<br>(0.147) | -0.451*<br>(0.228)   | -1.091***<br>(0.164) | -1.143***<br>(0.179) |
| Right                                 | -0.409**<br>(0.131)  | -0.457*<br>(0.212)   | -0.881***<br>(0.153) | -1.398***<br>(0.187) |
| Radical right                         | 0.399*<br>(0.198)    | 0.734**<br>(0.264)   | -0.429<br>(0.230)    | -1.406***<br>(0.357) |
| Female (r.c. Male)                    | -0.146<br>(0.088)    | -0.029<br>(0.128)    | -0.278**<br>(0.105)  | -0.183<br>(0.126)    |
| Age (r.c. 18-24):                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 25-34                                 | 0.100<br>(0.175)     | 0.009<br>(0.237)     | 0.051<br>(0.183)     | -0.632**<br>(0.222)  |
| 35-44                                 | 0.146<br>(0.173)     | -0.360<br>(0.243)    | -0.424*<br>(0.188)   | -0.554*<br>(0.217)   |
| 45-54                                 | -0.026<br>(0.170)    | -0.362<br>(0.234)    | -0.888***<br>(0.191) | -0.964***<br>(0.218) |
| 55-74                                 | -0.047<br>(0.167)    | -0.421<br>(0.230)    | -1.049***<br>(0.190) | -0.962***<br>(0.217) |
| Education (r.c. Low):                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Medium                                | -0.208<br>(0.122)    | 0.191<br>(0.192)     | -0.460**<br>(0.141)  | -0.086<br>(0.167)    |
| High                                  | -0.573***<br>(0.134) | 0.243<br>(0.204)     | -0.591***<br>(0.157) | -0.341<br>(0.193)    |
| Employed (r.c. Not employed)          | 0.172<br>(0.102)     | 0.128<br>(0.147)     | 0.227<br>(0.123)     | 0.276<br>(0.144)     |
| Country (r.c. France):                |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany                               | -0.421***<br>(0.112) | -1.131***<br>(0.186) | -1.303***<br>(0.132) | 0.004<br>(0.167)     |
| Italy                                 | 1.054***<br>(0.114)  | 1.114***<br>(0.152)  | -0.559***<br>(0.134) | 1.023***<br>(0.164)  |
| Intercept                             | -3.040***<br>(0.347) | -3.110***<br>(0.502) | 0.956**<br>(0.370)   | 0.280<br>(0.448)     |

Note. The reference category is 'mainstream'. Estimates are log-odds. Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo R-sq. = 0.1589. N = 4384. Sig.: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A6: Multinomial model predicting vote choice distinguishing between ‘old’ – ‘digital immigrant’ – or ‘new’ – ‘digital native’ – populist parties.

|                                       | Old                  | New                  | Other                | Abstained            | Residual             |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| SNS activities                        | 0.059<br>(0.073)     | 0.242***<br>(0.065)  | 0.002<br>(0.084)     | 0.078<br>(0.071)     | -0.096<br>(0.093)    |
| MIMS activities                       | 0.068<br>(0.070)     | 0.138*<br>(0.063)    | 0.006<br>(0.080)     | 0.117<br>(0.068)     | -0.042<br>(0.088)    |
| Political information (r.c. Neither): |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Prevalently traditional media         | 0.053<br>(0.193)     | -0.233<br>(0.188)    | -0.270<br>(0.222)    | -0.219<br>(0.171)    | -0.434*<br>(0.206)   |
| Prevalently digital media             | 0.165<br>(0.248)     | 0.238<br>(0.223)     | 0.020<br>(0.271)     | 0.217<br>(0.210)     | 0.282<br>(0.240)     |
| Both                                  | 0.094<br>(0.176)     | -0.046<br>(0.164)    | -0.439*<br>(0.199)   | -0.337*<br>(0.155)   | -0.360*<br>(0.179)   |
| Political distrust                    | 0.904***<br>(0.083)  | 1.103***<br>(0.080)  | 0.617***<br>(0.098)  | 0.780***<br>(0.080)  | 0.513***<br>(0.096)  |
| Political interest                    | 0.003<br>(0.076)     | 0.128<br>(0.074)     | 0.078<br>(0.090)     | -0.511***<br>(0.067) | -0.420***<br>(0.083) |
| Political discussion                  | -0.030<br>(0.123)    | 0.088<br>(0.116)     | 0.278<br>(0.145)     | 0.011<br>(0.124)     | 0.069<br>(0.149)     |
| LR scale (r.c. Not identified):       |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Radical left                          | 0.430<br>(0.247)     | 0.233<br>(0.221)     | 1.171***<br>(0.253)  | -0.360<br>(0.241)    | -0.969**<br>(0.332)  |
| Left                                  | -0.304<br>(0.166)    | -0.808***<br>(0.151) | -0.002<br>(0.193)    | -1.170***<br>(0.154) | -1.681***<br>(0.189) |
| Centre                                | -1.315***<br>(0.222) | -0.886***<br>(0.166) | -0.438<br>(0.228)    | -1.082***<br>(0.165) | -1.137***<br>(0.179) |
| Right                                 | 0.113<br>(0.161)     | -0.837***<br>(0.153) | -0.502*<br>(0.212)   | -0.896***<br>(0.153) | -1.434***<br>(0.187) |
| Radical right                         | 1.380***<br>(0.216)  | -0.928***<br>(0.252) | 0.634*<br>(0.265)    | -0.433<br>(0.230)    | -1.486***<br>(0.358) |
| Female (r.c. Male)                    | 0.001<br>(0.108)     | -0.273**<br>(0.104)  | -0.035<br>(0.128)    | -0.280**<br>(0.105)  | -0.195<br>(0.126)    |
| Age (r.c. 18-24):                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 25-34                                 | 0.180<br>(0.230)     | 0.044<br>(0.202)     | 0.008<br>(0.237)     | 0.053<br>(0.183)     | -0.633**<br>(0.222)  |
| 35-44                                 | 0.241<br>(0.226)     | 0.076<br>(0.200)     | -0.364<br>(0.243)    | -0.426*<br>(0.188)   | -0.558*<br>(0.217)   |
| 45-54                                 | 0.136<br>(0.221)     | -0.151<br>(0.197)    | -0.370<br>(0.234)    | -0.889***<br>(0.191) | -0.972***<br>(0.218) |
| 55-74                                 | 0.070<br>(0.219)     | -0.144<br>(0.194)    | -0.426<br>(0.230)    | -1.051***<br>(0.190) | -0.968***<br>(0.217) |
| Education (r.c. Low):                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Medium                                | -0.270<br>(0.146)    | -0.174<br>(0.140)    | 0.194<br>(0.192)     | -0.456**<br>(0.141)  | -0.081<br>(0.167)    |
| High                                  | -0.628***<br>(0.163) | -0.539***<br>(0.157) | 0.244<br>(0.204)     | -0.587***<br>(0.157) | -0.338<br>(0.193)    |
| Employed (r.c. Not employed)          | 0.180<br>(0.126)     | 0.188<br>(0.120)     | 0.126<br>(0.147)     | 0.225<br>(0.123)     | 0.276<br>(0.144)     |
| Country (r.c. France):                |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany                               | -0.348*<br>(0.136)   | -0.422**<br>(0.145)  | -1.145***<br>(0.186) | -1.304***<br>(0.132) | 0.001<br>(0.168)     |
| Italy                                 | 0.395**<br>(0.139)   | 1.570***<br>(0.135)  | 1.110***<br>(0.152)  | -0.546***<br>(0.134) | 1.047***<br>(0.164)  |
| Intercept                             | -3.442***<br>(0.432) | -4.021***<br>(0.413) | -3.118***<br>(0.502) | 0.938*<br>(0.370)    | 0.247<br>(0.449)     |

Note. The reference category is ‘mainstream’. Estimates are log-odds. Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo R-sq. = 0.1586. N = 4384. Sig.: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A7: Multinomial model predicting vote choice including the interaction between countries and political activities on SNS.

|                                       | Populist             | Other                | Abstained            | Residual             |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| SNS activities                        | 0.137<br>(0.086)     | -0.194<br>(0.133)    | -0.060<br>(0.095)    | -0.123<br>(0.158)    |
| MIMS activities                       | 0.117*<br>(0.055)    | 0.007<br>(0.080)     | 0.123<br>(0.068)     | -0.042<br>(0.087)    |
| Country (r.c. France):                |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany                               | -0.448***<br>(0.130) | -1.408***<br>(0.219) | -1.566***<br>(0.154) | -0.112<br>(0.187)    |
| Italy                                 | 1.086***<br>(0.140)  | 1.048***<br>(0.182)  | -0.554***<br>(0.160) | 1.099***<br>(0.189)  |
| Country × SNS activities:             |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany × SNS activities              | 0.056<br>(0.116)     | 0.504**<br>(0.194)   | 0.485***<br>(0.135)  | 0.232<br>(0.198)     |
| Italy × SNS activities                | -0.038<br>(0.114)    | 0.129<br>(0.162)     | 0.013<br>(0.140)     | -0.165<br>(0.197)    |
| Political information (r.c. Neither): |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Prevalently traditional media         | -0.093<br>(0.158)    | -0.255<br>(0.223)    | -0.204<br>(0.172)    | -0.419*<br>(0.206)   |
| Prevalently digital media             | 0.210<br>(0.195)     | -0.002<br>(0.272)    | 0.200<br>(0.211)     | 0.268<br>(0.240)     |
| Both (traditional/digital)            | 0.013<br>(0.142)     | -0.436*<br>(0.199)   | -0.339*<br>(0.155)   | -0.361*<br>(0.179)   |
| Political distrust                    | 1.023***<br>(0.067)  | 0.607***<br>(0.098)  | 0.779***<br>(0.080)  | 0.507***<br>(0.096)  |
| Political interest                    | 0.076<br>(0.063)     | 0.077<br>(0.090)     | -0.508***<br>(0.067) | -0.417***<br>(0.083) |
| Political discussion                  | 0.029<br>(0.099)     | 0.272<br>(0.145)     | 0.004<br>(0.124)     | 0.056<br>(0.149)     |
| LR scale (r.c. Not identified):       |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Radical left                          | 0.300<br>(0.199)     | 1.176***<br>(0.253)  | -0.361<br>(0.241)    | -0.972**<br>(0.332)  |
| Left                                  | -0.597***<br>(0.130) | 0.017<br>(0.193)     | -1.166***<br>(0.154) | -1.672***<br>(0.189) |
| Centre                                | -1.017***<br>(0.147) | -0.437<br>(0.228)    | -1.073***<br>(0.165) | -1.134***<br>(0.179) |
| Right                                 | -0.414**<br>(0.131)  | -0.462*<br>(0.212)   | -0.886***<br>(0.153) | -1.407***<br>(0.187) |
| Radical right                         | 0.394*<br>(0.198)    | 0.730**<br>(0.264)   | -0.432<br>(0.230)    | -1.417***<br>(0.357) |
| Female (r.c. Male)                    | -0.148<br>(0.088)    | -0.038<br>(0.128)    | -0.287**<br>(0.105)  | -0.188<br>(0.126)    |
| Age (r.c. 18-24):                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 25-34                                 | 0.105<br>(0.175)     | 0.017<br>(0.237)     | 0.046<br>(0.183)     | -0.624**<br>(0.222)  |
| 35-44                                 | 0.149<br>(0.173)     | -0.360<br>(0.244)    | -0.435*<br>(0.188)   | -0.552*<br>(0.217)   |
| 45-54                                 | -0.021<br>(0.170)    | -0.358<br>(0.235)    | -0.899***<br>(0.192) | -0.956***<br>(0.218) |
| 55-74                                 | -0.042<br>(0.167)    | -0.420<br>(0.230)    | -1.056***<br>(0.190) | -0.949***<br>(0.217) |
| Education (r.c. Low):                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Medium                                | -0.207<br>(0.122)    | 0.189<br>(0.192)     | -0.462**<br>(0.142)  | -0.080<br>(0.168)    |
| High                                  | -0.570***<br>(0.134) | 0.249<br>(0.204)     | -0.583***<br>(0.157) | -0.336<br>(0.193)    |
| Employed (r.c. Not employed)          | 0.173<br>(0.102)     | 0.133<br>(0.148)     | 0.236<br>(0.123)     | 0.278<br>(0.144)     |
| Intercept                             | -3.023***<br>(0.351) | -3.009***<br>(0.506) | 1.015**<br>(0.373)   | 0.269<br>(0.454)     |

Note. The reference category is 'mainstream.' Estimates are log-odds. Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo R-sq. = 0.1606. N = 4384. Sig.: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A8: Multinomial model predicting vote choice including the interaction between countries and political activities on MIMS.

|                                       | Populist             | Other                | Abstained            | Residual             |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| SNS activities                        | 0.172**<br>(0.058)   | 0.005<br>(0.084)     | 0.075<br>(0.071)     | -0.104<br>(0.093)    |
| MIMS activities                       | -0.016<br>(0.090)    | -0.155<br>(0.133)    | 0.101<br>(0.091)     | -0.026<br>(0.156)    |
| Country (r.c. France):                |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany                               | -0.483***<br>(0.124) | -1.198***<br>(0.205) | -1.409***<br>(0.149) | -0.050<br>(0.181)    |
| Italy                                 | 0.965***<br>(0.132)  | 1.010***<br>(0.174)  | -0.467**<br>(0.153)  | 1.064***<br>(0.182)  |
| Country × MIMS activities:            |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany × MIMS activities             | 0.142<br>(0.114)     | 0.167<br>(0.202)     | 0.202<br>(0.130)     | 0.109<br>(0.193)     |
| Italy × MIMS activities               | 0.166<br>(0.113)     | 0.206<br>(0.157)     | -0.154<br>(0.136)    | -0.107<br>(0.188)    |
| Political information (r.c. Neither): |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Prevalently traditional media         | -0.090<br>(0.158)    | -0.261<br>(0.222)    | -0.210<br>(0.172)    | -0.418*<br>(0.206)   |
| Prevalently digital media             | 0.219<br>(0.195)     | 0.012<br>(0.271)     | 0.217<br>(0.210)     | 0.283<br>(0.240)     |
| Both (traditional/digital)            | 0.023<br>(0.142)     | -0.427*<br>(0.199)   | -0.337*<br>(0.155)   | -0.356*<br>(0.179)   |
| Political distrust                    | 1.020***<br>(0.067)  | 0.602***<br>(0.098)  | 0.779***<br>(0.080)  | 0.507***<br>(0.096)  |
| Political interest                    | 0.068<br>(0.063)     | 0.064<br>(0.090)     | -0.511***<br>(0.067) | -0.424***<br>(0.083) |
| Political discussion                  | 0.031<br>(0.099)     | 0.274<br>(0.145)     | 0.002<br>(0.124)     | 0.056<br>(0.149)     |
| LR scale (r.c. Not identified):       |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Radical left                          | 0.311<br>(0.199)     | 1.189***<br>(0.253)  | -0.364<br>(0.241)    | -0.968**<br>(0.332)  |
| Left                                  | -0.596***<br>(0.130) | 0.020<br>(0.193)     | -1.168***<br>(0.154) | -1.673***<br>(0.189) |
| Centre                                | -1.020***<br>(0.147) | -0.454*<br>(0.228)   | -1.085***<br>(0.165) | -1.141***<br>(0.179) |
| Right                                 | -0.408**<br>(0.131)  | -0.454*<br>(0.212)   | -0.890***<br>(0.153) | -1.408***<br>(0.187) |
| Radical right                         | 0.405*<br>(0.199)    | 0.744**<br>(0.264)   | -0.442<br>(0.230)    | -1.415***<br>(0.358) |
| Female (r.c. Male)                    | -0.148<br>(0.088)    | -0.033<br>(0.128)    | -0.279**<br>(0.105)  | -0.185<br>(0.126)    |
| Age (r.c. 18-24):                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 25-34                                 | 0.106<br>(0.175)     | 0.016<br>(0.237)     | 0.038<br>(0.183)     | -0.635**<br>(0.221)  |
| 35-44                                 | 0.155<br>(0.174)     | -0.350<br>(0.244)    | -0.431*<br>(0.188)   | -0.555*<br>(0.216)   |
| 45-54                                 | -0.023<br>(0.170)    | -0.360<br>(0.235)    | -0.894***<br>(0.191) | -0.966***<br>(0.218) |
| 55-74                                 | -0.048<br>(0.168)    | -0.423<br>(0.230)    | -1.045***<br>(0.190) | -0.956***<br>(0.217) |
| Education (r.c. Low):                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Medium                                | -0.218<br>(0.122)    | 0.180<br>(0.192)     | -0.457**<br>(0.142)  | -0.088<br>(0.168)    |
| High                                  | -0.571***<br>(0.134) | 0.245<br>(0.204)     | -0.589***<br>(0.157) | -0.340<br>(0.193)    |
| Employed (r.c. Not employed)          | 0.179<br>(0.102)     | 0.137<br>(0.148)     | 0.227<br>(0.123)     | 0.278<br>(0.144)     |
| Intercept                             | -2.958***<br>(0.350) | -3.009***<br>(0.506) | 0.957*<br>(0.372)    | 0.276<br>(0.452)     |

Note. The reference category is 'mainstream'. Estimates are log-odds. Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo R-sq. = 0.1600. N = 4384. Sig.: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A9: Multinomial model predicting vote choice distinguishing between ‘old’ – ‘digital immigrant’ – or ‘new’ – ‘digital native’ – populist parties and including the interaction between countries and political activities on SNS.

|                                       | Old                  | New                  | Other                | Abstained            | Residual             |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| SNS activities                        | 0.056<br>(0.105)     | 0.248*<br>(0.107)    | -0.197<br>(0.133)    | -0.060<br>(0.095)    | -0.123<br>(0.158)    |
| MIMS activities                       | 0.071<br>(0.070)     | 0.140*<br>(0.063)    | 0.011<br>(0.080)     | 0.124<br>(0.068)     | -0.038<br>(0.087)    |
| Country (r.c. France):                |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany                               | -0.412**<br>(0.157)  | -0.380*<br>(0.173)   | -1.425***<br>(0.218) | -1.566***<br>(0.154) | -0.113<br>(0.187)    |
| Italy                                 | 0.504**<br>(0.167)   | 1.638***<br>(0.169)  | 1.047***<br>(0.182)  | -0.538***<br>(0.160) | 1.127***<br>(0.190)  |
| Country × SNS activities:             |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany × SNS activities              | 0.129<br>(0.142)     | -0.045<br>(0.148)    | 0.507**<br>(0.194)   | 0.485***<br>(0.135)  | 0.229<br>(0.198)     |
| Italy × SNS activities                | -0.164<br>(0.143)    | -0.085<br>(0.130)    | 0.127<br>(0.162)     | 0.012<br>(0.140)     | -0.160<br>(0.197)    |
| Political information (r.c. Neither): |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Prevalently traditional media         | 0.058<br>(0.193)     | -0.240<br>(0.189)    | -0.262<br>(0.223)    | -0.205<br>(0.172)    | -0.429*<br>(0.206)   |
| Prevalently digital media             | 0.159<br>(0.248)     | 0.229<br>(0.223)     | 0.004<br>(0.272)     | 0.202<br>(0.211)     | 0.272<br>(0.240)     |
| Both (traditional/digital)            | 0.090<br>(0.176)     | -0.054<br>(0.164)    | -0.439*<br>(0.199)   | -0.339*<br>(0.155)   | -0.365*<br>(0.180)   |
| Political distrust                    | 0.906***<br>(0.083)  | 1.100***<br>(0.080)  | 0.615***<br>(0.098)  | 0.782***<br>(0.080)  | 0.515***<br>(0.096)  |
| Political interest                    | 0.009<br>(0.076)     | 0.129<br>(0.075)     | 0.081<br>(0.090)     | -0.506***<br>(0.067) | -0.412***<br>(0.083) |
| Political discussion                  | -0.037<br>(0.123)    | 0.088<br>(0.116)     | 0.275<br>(0.145)     | 0.003<br>(0.124)     | 0.061<br>(0.149)     |
| LR scale (r.c. Not identified):       |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Radical left                          | 0.420<br>(0.247)     | 0.225<br>(0.221)     | 1.166***<br>(0.253)  | -0.368<br>(0.241)    | -0.981**<br>(0.332)  |
| Left                                  | -0.309<br>(0.166)    | -0.811***<br>(0.151) | -0.007<br>(0.194)    | -1.172***<br>(0.155) | -1.687***<br>(0.189) |
| Centre                                | -1.311***<br>(0.222) | -0.889***<br>(0.166) | -0.424<br>(0.229)    | -1.064***<br>(0.165) | -1.129***<br>(0.180) |
| Right                                 | 0.104<br>(0.161)     | -0.842***<br>(0.153) | -0.506*<br>(0.213)   | -0.901***<br>(0.154) | -1.441***<br>(0.188) |
| Radical right                         | 1.374***<br>(0.216)  | -0.938***<br>(0.252) | 0.634*<br>(0.265)    | -0.431<br>(0.230)    | -1.488***<br>(0.358) |
| Female (r.c. Male)                    | -0.000<br>(0.108)    | -0.274**<br>(0.104)  | -0.045<br>(0.128)    | -0.289**<br>(0.105)  | -0.200<br>(0.126)    |
| Age (r.c. 18-24):                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 25-34                                 | 0.178<br>(0.230)     | 0.050<br>(0.202)     | 0.015<br>(0.237)     | 0.048<br>(0.183)     | -0.627**<br>(0.222)  |
| 35-44                                 | 0.242<br>(0.226)     | 0.083<br>(0.199)     | -0.365<br>(0.244)    | -0.437*<br>(0.188)   | -0.556*<br>(0.217)   |
| 45-54                                 | 0.139<br>(0.221)     | -0.145<br>(0.197)    | -0.367<br>(0.235)    | -0.901***<br>(0.192) | -0.965***<br>(0.218) |
| 55-74                                 | 0.077<br>(0.219)     | -0.139<br>(0.194)    | -0.426<br>(0.231)    | -1.060***<br>(0.190) | -0.957***<br>(0.217) |
| Education (r.c. Low):                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Medium                                | -0.271<br>(0.146)    | -0.171<br>(0.141)    | 0.191<br>(0.192)     | -0.459**<br>(0.142)  | -0.077<br>(0.168)    |
| High                                  | -0.629***<br>(0.163) | -0.535***<br>(0.157) | 0.250<br>(0.204)     | -0.580***<br>(0.157) | -0.334<br>(0.194)    |
| Employed (r.c. Not employed)          | 0.178<br>(0.126)     | 0.186<br>(0.120)     | 0.130<br>(0.148)     | 0.233<br>(0.123)     | 0.278<br>(0.144)     |
| Intercept                             | -3.456***<br>(0.436) | -4.024***<br>(0.419) | -3.010***<br>(0.506) | 0.999**<br>(0.373)   | 0.243<br>(0.454)     |

Note. The reference category is ‘mainstream’. Estimates are log-odds. Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo R-sq. = 0.1603. N = 4384. Sig.: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A10: Multinomial model predicting vote choice distinguishing between ‘old’ – ‘digital immigrant’ – or ‘new’ – ‘digital native’ – populist parties and including the interaction between countries and political activities on MIMS.

|                                       | Old                  | New                  | Other                | Abstained            | Residual             |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| SNS activities                        | 0.060<br>(0.073)     | 0.250***<br>(0.066)  | 0.011<br>(0.084)     | 0.077<br>(0.072)     | -0.095<br>(0.093)    |
| MIMS activities                       | 0.079<br>(0.105)     | -0.121<br>(0.119)    | -0.156<br>(0.133)    | 0.100<br>(0.091)     | -0.032<br>(0.156)    |
| Country (r.c. France):                |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany                               | -0.349*<br>(0.150)   | -0.562***<br>(0.161) | -1.213***<br>(0.205) | -1.412***<br>(0.149) | -0.055<br>(0.181)    |
| Italy                                 | 0.430**<br>(0.159)   | 1.415***<br>(0.155)  | 1.008***<br>(0.174)  | -0.454**<br>(0.153)  | 1.088***<br>(0.183)  |
| Country × MIMS activities:            |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany × MIMS activities             | 0.000<br>(0.140)     | 0.300*<br>(0.150)    | 0.169<br>(0.203)     | 0.204<br>(0.130)     | 0.113<br>(0.193)     |
| Italy × MIMS activities               | -0.056<br>(0.138)    | 0.289*<br>(0.138)    | 0.203<br>(0.157)     | -0.153<br>(0.136)    | -0.099<br>(0.188)    |
| Political information (r.c. Neither): |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Prevalently traditional media         | 0.052<br>(0.193)     | -0.232<br>(0.188)    | -0.268<br>(0.222)    | -0.212<br>(0.172)    | -0.428*<br>(0.206)   |
| Prevalently digital media             | 0.165<br>(0.248)     | 0.242<br>(0.223)     | 0.018<br>(0.271)     | 0.219<br>(0.211)     | 0.287<br>(0.240)     |
| Both (traditional/digital)            | 0.093<br>(0.176)     | -0.036<br>(0.164)    | -0.430*<br>(0.199)   | -0.336*<br>(0.155)   | -0.359*<br>(0.179)   |
| Political distrust                    | 0.902***<br>(0.083)  | 1.100***<br>(0.080)  | 0.612***<br>(0.098)  | 0.782***<br>(0.080)  | 0.515***<br>(0.096)  |
| Political interest                    | 0.002<br>(0.076)     | 0.121<br>(0.074)     | 0.069<br>(0.090)     | -0.509***<br>(0.067) | -0.419***<br>(0.083) |
| Political discussion                  | -0.031<br>(0.123)    | 0.090<br>(0.116)     | 0.278<br>(0.145)     | 0.003<br>(0.124)     | 0.062<br>(0.149)     |
| LR scale (r.c. Not identified):       |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Radical left                          | 0.427<br>(0.247)     | 0.246<br>(0.221)     | 1.180***<br>(0.253)  | -0.372<br>(0.241)    | -0.976**<br>(0.332)  |
| Left                                  | -0.306<br>(0.166)    | -0.811***<br>(0.151) | -0.003<br>(0.193)    | -1.176***<br>(0.154) | -1.688***<br>(0.189) |
| Centre                                | -1.317***<br>(0.222) | -0.886***<br>(0.166) | -0.439<br>(0.228)    | -1.078***<br>(0.165) | -1.135***<br>(0.180) |
| Right                                 | 0.110<br>(0.161)     | -0.836***<br>(0.153) | -0.499*<br>(0.212)   | -0.905***<br>(0.153) | -1.441***<br>(0.188) |
| Radical right                         | 1.377***<br>(0.216)  | -0.927***<br>(0.253) | 0.640*<br>(0.265)    | -0.442<br>(0.230)    | -1.492***<br>(0.358) |
| Female (r.c. Male)                    | -0.001<br>(0.108)    | -0.277**<br>(0.104)  | -0.039<br>(0.128)    | -0.280**<br>(0.105)  | -0.197<br>(0.126)    |
| Age (r.c. 18-24):                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 25-34                                 | 0.177<br>(0.230)     | 0.045<br>(0.203)     | 0.014<br>(0.237)     | 0.040<br>(0.183)     | -0.638**<br>(0.221)  |
| 35-44                                 | 0.242<br>(0.226)     | 0.086<br>(0.201)     | -0.355<br>(0.244)    | -0.434*<br>(0.188)   | -0.559**<br>(0.217)  |
| 45-54                                 | 0.137<br>(0.221)     | -0.152<br>(0.198)    | -0.369<br>(0.235)    | -0.896***<br>(0.191) | -0.975***<br>(0.218) |
| 55-74                                 | 0.073<br>(0.219)     | -0.151<br>(0.195)    | -0.428<br>(0.230)    | -1.047***<br>(0.190) | -0.964***<br>(0.217) |
| Education (r.c. Low):                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Medium                                | -0.274<br>(0.146)    | -0.191<br>(0.141)    | 0.183<br>(0.192)     | -0.454**<br>(0.142)  | -0.085<br>(0.168)    |
| High                                  | -0.633***<br>(0.163) | -0.536***<br>(0.157) | 0.248<br>(0.204)     | -0.585***<br>(0.157) | -0.339<br>(0.194)    |
| Employed (r.c. Not employed)          | 0.179<br>(0.126)     | 0.196<br>(0.120)     | 0.135<br>(0.148)     | 0.226<br>(0.123)     | 0.279<br>(0.144)     |
| Intercept                             | -3.435***<br>(0.434) | -3.870***<br>(0.417) | -3.017***<br>(0.505) | 0.945*<br>(0.372)    | 0.249<br>(0.453)     |

Note. The reference category is ‘mainstream’. Estimates are log-odds. Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo R-sq. = 0.1598. N = 4384. Sig.: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Figure A1: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream or populist parties or making other vote choices, with 95% confidence intervals. The AMEs are estimated from models specified as in Table A5. The scales measuring activities on SNS and MIMS exclude the items capturing discussion. The additive scale sums the number of activities; the dichotomous scale measures whether either activity was performed.




Figure A2: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream, 'old' – 'digital immigrant' – or 'new' – 'digital native' – populist parties or making other vote choices, with 95% confidence intervals. The AMEs are estimated from models specified as in Table A6. The scales measuring activities on SNS and MIMS exclude the items capturing discussion. The additive scale sums the number of activities; the dichotomous scale measures whether either activity was performed.




Figure A3: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream or populist parties in France, Germany and Italy, with 95% confidence intervals. The AMEs are estimated from models specified as in Tables A7-A8. The scales measuring activities on SNS and MIMS exclude the items capturing discussion. The additive scale sums the number of activities; the dichotomous scale measures whether either activity was performed.




Figure A4: The average marginal effects of using SNS and MIMS for political activity on the probability of voting for mainstream, ‘old’ – ‘digital immigrant’ – or ‘new’ – ‘digital native’ – populist parties in France, Germany and Italy, with 95% confidence intervals. The AMEs are estimated from models specified as in Tables A9-A10. The scales measuring activities on SNS and MIMS exclude the items capturing discussion. The additive scale sums the number of activities; the dichotomous scale measures whether either activity was performed.

