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Risk aversion in two-period rent-seeking games

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Risk aversion in two-period rent-seeking games

Abstract

This work analyzes a two-period rent-seeking game, with the aim of studying the effect of risk aversion on the optimal choices made by the rent-seekers. We first prove that the equilibrium in two-period rent-seeking games always is unique. The analysis also shows that more risk aversion reduces the investment in the rent-seeking game in a two-period framework without introducing the additional condition of prudence, required in one-period models. Similarly, the introduction of a risky rent, instead of a given rent, implies, in the two-period framework, a reduction in investment under the condition that the rent-seekers are risk averse. Moreover, with risk aversion, larger first-period wealth increases investment in the rent-seeking game and larger second-period wealth reduces it. When both first-period and second-period wealth increase, investment in the rent-seeking game declines if the rent-seeker is risk averse and imprudent. Lastly, when a risky level of second-period wealth is introduced, the rent-seeker increases (reduces) investment in the rent-seeking game if he is risk averse and prudent (imprudent).

Keywords: rent-seeking games, two-period framework, risk aversion, risky rent, changes in wealth.

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1 Introduction

Many activities in peoples' lives can be described by rent-seeking games in which different agents compete for obtaining a rent. Activities of that kind are, for instance, lobbying, R&D rivalry for innovating, sports competitions and competitions for obtaining grants.

All such activities have some common characters. First, all rent-seekers have an *exante* probability of winning the game, whereas, *ex-post*, only one of them will win. Moreover, each individual rent-seeker can increase his probability of winning, simultaneously reducing competitors' probabilities, by investing resources in the game. The investment always is costly, but it can be of a different nature or dimension. For instance, it can be a financial cost in the case of lobbying or R&D competition, training in the case of sports competitions, or effort in preparing a project or application in the case of a competition for a grant.

Thanks to their very general formulation, rent-seeking games have been studied widely in the literature, starting from the seminal papers by Tullock (1967, 1980). Tullock's approach has be applied in many fields. Beyond the examples listed above, rent-seeking games have been shown to be relevant for studying the effects of entrepreneurial activity on economic growth (Baumol 1990; Murphy et al. 1993), military conflicts and election campaigns (Hirshleifer 1989), politicians' behavior (McChesney 1997) and, very recently, to compare development across countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019) and in its early stages (e.g., Carugati et al. 2019) as well as to analyze polycentric governance (Tarko and Farrant 2019).¹

Since in rent-seeking games, each player has only the chances of winning or losing, the games describe a risky context. Despite that observation, the study of rent-seeking games initially was implemented in a framework wherein rent-seekers were assumed to be risk neutral. Starting from Konrad and Schlesinger (1997), a significant literature (e.g., Cornes and Hartley 2003, 2012; Yamazaki 2009) introduced risk aversion into the analysis. In particular, Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) examined the effect of risk aversion on optimal investments in a rent-seeking game, concluding that the direction of the effect is ambiguous. More recently, Treich (2010) found a clear negative effect of risk aversion on investment in the rent-seeking game, relative to risk neutrality, when the risk averse rent-seeker also is prudent, i.e., when the utility function of the rent-seeker has a positive third derivative.² Moreover, Liu et al. (2018) contributed new results to the model studied by Treich (2010) and derived the opposite result, namely that risk aversion has a positive

¹For other recent and less recent applications, see Mitchell and Munger (1991), Congleton (2019) and Mitchell (2019).

²The relevance of prudence was first identified in the precautionary saving problem studied by Leland (1968) and then was formalized in the seminal paper by Kimball (1990). A subsequent and broad body of literature has made prudence a well-established concept in decision theory under risk, and it also has proved prudence to be significant for many economic issues, such as self-protection models (Eeckhout and Gollier 2005; Menegatti 2009), portfolio choice (Chiu et al. 2012) and stochastic dominance (Levy 2006).

effect on investments in rent-seeking games when we introduce a payment contingent on the outcome of the contest and paid only by the winner ("contingent payment"), instead of considering thepayment to be a fixed cost independent from the game's outcome ("up front payment"), as it had been assumed in all of the previous literature. It is worth noting that such heterogenous results suggest clearly that the effect of risk aversion on investments in rent-seeking depend heavily on the structure of the game analyzed.

An important, but substantially neglected element in the analysis of rent-seeking games is the role of the timing of investments in them. In fact, models introducing risk neutrality and those assuming risk aversion both usually study rent-seeking games in a one-period framework, such that rent-seeking effort is expended contemporaneously with the contest that assigns the rent. But, although that timing can be appropriate for some real world situations, it is unsuitable for many others, wherein the investment precedes the beginning of the contest.

Consider the examples mentioned above. It is clear that lobbying is carried out over a long time horizon before the relevant decision on rent attribution is taken. Similarly, R&D investment typically precedes the period in which the innovation is discovered. Training for a sports competition takes place for a long period before the competition starts and grant applications require investments of time and knowhow that precede the grant's assignment.

It is worth noting that issues associated with a game's time structure were not as salient in the literature assuming risk neutrality, since the models studied there, although formally one-period games, basically were "atemporal". That feature, which will be explained in more detail in Section 3, depends substantially on the fact that in a two-period framework and in the case of risk neutrality, the intertemporal allocation of wealth is irrelevant for the decision maker, meaning that one-period and two-period frameworks substantially are equivalent in the case of risk neutrality.

However, the issue of the time structure of the game becomes important in the case of risk aversion for at least two reasons. First, wealth allocation between periods matters for a risk averse rent-seeker. Second, the literature on other economic problems, such as self-protection models (see Eeckhoudt and Gollier 2005; Menegatti 2009), shows that, in the presence of risk aversion, the conclusions in one-period and in two-period frameworks can be very different.

Moreover, the analysis of a two-period framework for rent-seeking games likewise is important for a different reason. As emphasized in the recent survey by Dechenaux et al. (2015, p. 627) "it appears that ... the findings from experimental studies suggest that more risk-aversion leads to lower effort in contests",³ while it has been noted that "theoretically, the direction of the effect of risk aversion on effort depended on the third derivative of utility". The results obtained in the present paper provide new insights into

³Some experimental economics papers obtaining results in this direction are, for instance, Anderson and Freeborn (2010), Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) and Mago et al. (2013).

that issue. A brief relevant discussion will be proposed in Section 4.

Starting from the foregoing premises, the aim of this paper is to study, for the first time, investment in rent-seeking games in a two-period framework, wherein investment occurs before the rent assignment.⁴

It will be shown that our two-period framework yields results that differ significantly from those obtained in the case of one-period games. In particular, the main results relate to the effects of risk aversion on optimal investment. We show that, once a constraint on contestants' wealth is introduced, risk aversion alone reduces optimal investment in the two-period framework, without requiring the additional condition of prudence. That result, which differs from Treich (2010), holds both when comparing the risk averse rentseeker with the risk neutral rent-seeker and when comparing two rent-seekers with different levels of risk aversion.

The paper also addresses the case of risky rent. In that context, we show that, unlike the previous literature, introducing a risky rent in a two-period framework again yields clear effects of risk aversion without needing to introduce other preference requirements.

Lastly, as emphasized recently by Schroyen and Treich (2016), an important issue in the study of contests is the effect of changes in wealth. We examine different cases considering changes in first-period wealth, second-period wealth, wealth in both periods and the effects of shifting from non-random to risky wealth. For all of those cases we derive clear conclusions relating to the effects of attitudes toward risk on players' investments in the game, providing for each of them a specific interpretation.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the rent-seeking game and its properties. Section 3 studies the benchmark case of risk neutrality. Section 4 examines optimal investment in the rent-seeking game under risk aversion. Section 5 analyzes the effect of changes in wealth. Section 6 concludes.

2 The game

The framework introduced is based on Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) and Treich (2010), except for the time structure of the model. We consider a contest with n identical utility maximizing agents competing for a rent b > 0. The probability of winning the contest for the representative rent-seeker i is given by $p_i = p_i(x_1, ..., x_n)$, where $x_j \ge 0$ for j = 1, ..., n is the investment made in winning the contest by rent-seeker j. The contest success function (CSF) p_i is assumed to be both differentiable and symmetric, such that for all i = 1, ..., n, $p_i \in [0, 1]$ with $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i = 1$.

⁴It is worth emphasizing that the issue of a two-period game studied in the present paper is different from that of two-stage games previously analyzed in the literature (e.g., Sheremeta 2010; Stracke et al. 2014). In fact, two-stage games consider one contest occurring over two periods but, instead, a kind of game comprising two contests wherein the winners of the first stage are admitted to the second.

As in Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) and Treich (2010), we introduce the following assumptions for the contest success function:

Assumption A1: $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial x_i}(x_1, ..., x_n) \ge 0$ and $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial x_j}(x_1, ..., x_n) \le 0$ for all x_i .

Assumption A2: $\frac{\partial^2 p_i}{\partial x_i^2}(x, ...x) < 0$ for all x.

Assumption A3: $\frac{\partial^2 p_i}{\partial x_i \partial x_j}(x, ...x) \leq 0$ for all x.

Assumption A4: $p_i(x, ..., x) = \frac{1}{n}$ for all x

Assumption A1 states that the probability of success is a non-decreasing function of one's own investment and a non-increasing function of the investments of the other rent-seekers. Assumptions A2 and A3 introduce the usual requirements of decreasing marginal returns to investment. Assumption A4 states that, when all rent-seekers exert the same level of effort, they have the same probability of winning the contest.

Notice that our analysis is restricted to the case of symmetric games. That is the same restriction as in the contributions of Konrad and Schlesinger (1997), Treich (2010) and Liu et al. (2018), which provide the main starting point for the present paper.

Unlike Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) and Treich (2010), we assume that the investment in the game is made *before* the rent is assigned, which means that the investment is made in Period 0 and the contest for obtaining the rent takes place in Period 1. In the two periods, the representative rent-seeker is endowed with initial wealth w_0 and w_1 , respectively.

In the specified framework, we consider the representative rent-seeker's choice of the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game, x_i , in order to maximize his intertemporal expected utility:

$$U(x_i) = u(w_0 - x_i) + \delta[p_i u(w_1 + b) + (1 - p_i)u(w_1)],$$
(1)

where u is the rent-seeker's one-period utility function and $\delta \leq 1$ is the subjective intertemporal discount factor.⁵ We assume that intertemporal utility is such that at least one solution for the maximization problem exists.

Lastly, notice that Eq. (1) implicitly assumes that one-period utility is the same in the two periods. That assumption often is introduced in two-period problems but it is worth emphasizing that it is necessary for some of the results derived henceforth.

⁵Notice the formal similarity between the present game and the "ability contest" of Schroyen and Treich (2016). That model, however, does not study an intertemporal framework but, rather, a one-period framework wherein the cost of participating in the contest is non-monetary.

3 Risk neutrality

In order to analyze the effects of risk aversion on the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game, we first study the benchmark case of risk neutrality. In that case intertemporal utility (1) simply becomes

$$F(x_i) = w_0 - x_i + \delta[p_i(w_1 + b) + (1 - p_i)w_1] = w_0 - x_i + \delta[w_1 + p_ib].$$
 (2)

Given (2), the optimal level of x_i for the risk neutral agent (labelled x_n) satisfies the first-order condition:

$$p'_n = \frac{1}{\delta b} \tag{3}$$

(where $p'_n = \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial x_i}$ for $x_i = x_n$). Note that the maximum is unique since Assumption A2 ensures that $\frac{d^2 F}{dx_i^2} = F''(x_i) < 0$ for every x_i .

As anticipated in Section 1, under the assumption of no intertemporal discounting $(\delta = 1)$, the formalization of the choice problem for the risk neutral agent essentially is atemporal, since the two-period intertemporal utility in (2) is analytically equivalent to the corresponding utility in the one-period framework given by

$$p_i(w+b) + (1-p_i)w = w - x_i + p_i b,$$
(4)

letting $w = w_0 + w_1$.

The foregoing implies that the first-order condition for Problem (4) is the same as for Problem (2), implying in turn that:

Proposition 1. Under no intertemporal discounting, the optimal investment in the rentseeking game is the same in the one-period and in the two-period frameworks with risk neutrality.

The equivalence of the one-period and the two-period games in the case of risk neutrality has a straightforward interpretation. With risk neutrality, the allocation of wealth between the two periods is irrelevant because the rent-seeker wants only to maximize his total wealth. Choosing in a one-period framework or in a two period framework thus is the same for the rent-seeker.

The picture clearly changes in the case of positive intertemporal discounting. Here, in fact, the first-order conditions for the one-period and two-period frameworks differ because the two-period framework includes the term δ . Moreover, since p'_n is decreasing in x_i by assumption A2, we obtain immediately that

Proposition 2. Heavier intertemporal discounting (i.e., a smaller δ) reduces the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game x_i with risk neutrality.

The interpretation of that result again is straightforward. More discounting means that the rent seeker assigns lesser importance to future wealth. Since in a two-period setup the cost of investing in the game is in the present, while the potential benefit is in the future, the implication is that the potential benefit is less valuable for the rent-seeker and, hence, less is invested in the game.

It is worth emphasizing that a larger discount rate also can be interpreted as a circumstance in which the interval between the two periods is longer. Such an interpretation may open the model for applications to analyses comparing choices under different waiting times. For example, different firms may have different head-starts in their R&D projects or in building relationships with governments, implying that the time before they might gain the rent can vary for them. Those differences affect the extent of rent dissipation, since if a firm has to wait longer for projects to bear fruit, it invests less. For example, the previous literature has noted that restrictions on who is allowed or not allowed to seek rents may have the purpose of securing morer rents by preventing dissipation (Haber 2002; Aligica and Tarko 2014).

4 Risk aversion

4.1 Uniqueness of the equilibrium

We consider now a risk averse rent-seeker, whose preferences are represented by the utility function u(.), with $\frac{du}{dx_i} = u'(.) > 0$ and $\frac{d^2u}{dx_i^2} = u''(.) < 0$. It is worth noting that the assumption of the utility function's concavity, which identifies risk aversion with reference to the rent-seeker's attitude toward risk, also has consequences for the optimal intertemporal allocation of wealth. In particular, in an intertemporal framework, the concavity of the utility function is related to both risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. A discussion of some of the implications of that for our analysis is provided in the interpretations of Propositions 6 and 7 in Subsection 4.2. Moreover, the restriction can be seen as a possible limitation of the present analysis and opens space for future development of the model in the direction of considering more complex kinds of preferences. An example, although not widely adopted in the literature, is the case of Kreps-Porteus (1978) preferences. .⁶Lastly, for a general discussion of the issue, see, for instance, Gollier (2001, chapter 20).

In order to clarify some of the following results and the comparison between the results in the present paper and those in the previous literature, we also recall that a risk-averse agent can be either prudent, imprudent or prudence-neutral, depending on whether the

⁶Kreps-Porteus preferences describe a setting which distinguish between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. They are, however, not widely adopted because of their complexity from an analytical standpoint.

third derivative of the utility function is positive, negative or null.⁷

The risk-averse rent-seeker chooses the optimal level of investment, x_i , in order to maximize intertemporal expected utility (1). Given (1), the optimal level of x_i for the risk-averse rent-seeker (labelled x_a) satisfies the first-order condition:

$$U'(x_a) = -u'(w - x_a) + \delta p'_a[u(w + b) - u(w)] = 0,$$
(5)

where $p'_a = \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial x_i}$ for $x_i = x_a$. One of the first issues with (5) is the uniqueness of the equilibrium. As such, we obtain that

Proposition 3. The optimal investment in the rent-seeking game is unique in the twoperiod setup with risk aversion.

Proof. The result is straightforward since, given assumption A2 and risk aversion, we have $\frac{\partial p'_a}{x_i}$ unexpected "inmath < 0 and u'' < 0 for every x_i which ensure that $U''(x_i) < 0$ for every x_i .

The last result is important since to date the literature has shown that multiple equilibria may, in general, arise in one-period rent-seeking games (see Cornes and Hartley 2008; Yamazaki 2009; Treich 2010), with the exception of the case of contingent payment (Liu et al. 2018). Proposition 3 shows instead that, in the two-period framework, the optimal level of investment in the rent-seeking game always is unique.

Moreover, as in the case of risk neutrality, we can identify the effect of a larger intertemporal discounting (lower δ) on the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game:

Proposition 4. Heavier intertemporal discounting (i.e., a smaller δ) reduces the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game under risk aversion.

Proof. By the implicit function theorem we have that

$$\frac{dx_a}{d\delta} = -\frac{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial \delta}}{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a}}.$$
(6)

As shown above, $\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a} < 0$, while

$$\frac{\partial U'}{\partial \delta} unexpected'' inmath = p'_a[u(w+b) - u(w)] > 0, \tag{7}$$

impling that $\frac{dx_a}{d\delta} > 0$ and proving the proposition.

⁷For a more detailed description of prudence see, for instance, Kimball (1990). Also note that, as shown by Menegatti (2014), risk aversion and imprudence are compatible only when the utility function is defined over a bounded domain. That assumption is, however, suitable for the context studied herein.

4.2 Risk aversion and optimal investment

The main issue for the analysis of risk aversion in rent-seeking games is to study how it affects the optimal choice of investment x_i . To examine that problem, we first compare the optimal choices of risk averse and risk neutral rent-seekers. We start the analysis with the simplified case wherein rent-seeker wealth in the two periods is the same ($w_0 = w_1 = w$). We obtain the following results:

Proposition 5. When rent-seeker wealth in the two periods is the same, the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game is smaller with risk aversion than with risk neutrality $(x_a < x_n)$.

Proof. We evaluate $U'(x_i)$ in (5) for $x_i = x_n$, obtaining

$$U'(x_n) = -u'(w - x_n) + \delta p'_n[u(w + b) - u(w)],$$
(8)

which, by (3), is equivalent to

$$U'(x_n) = -u'(w - x_n) + \frac{1}{b}[u(w + b) - u(w)]$$
(9)

and, by the mean value theorem is, in turn, equivalent to

$$U'(x_n) = -u'(w - x_n) + u'(w + k),$$
(10)

where $k \in (0, b)$. Now, risk aversion implies that

$$u'(w - x_n) > u'(w + k),$$
 (11)

implying in turn that $U'(x_n) < 0$. That result, together with U''(.) < 0, implies $x_a < x_n$, proving the proposition.

Proposition 5 states clearly that risk aversion leads to less investment in the rentseeking game than risk neutrality when rent seekers are endowed with the same wealth in both two periods. Although that case is simplified, it has a clear and relevant interpretation. In fact, assuming that wealth is the same in the two periods means removing the incentive for the rent-seeker to reallocate wealth from one period to the other for the purpose of consumption smoothing.⁸ Therefore the problem analyzed here is "free" of consumption smoothing reallocation effects.

In the more general case (where $w_0 \neq w_1$), we have:

⁸It should be noted, however, that, if saving were introduced in the model in the place of effort, it would not be zero because of the presence of risk and according to the so-called "precautionary motive for saving".

Proposition 6. Ooptimal investment in the rent-seeking game is lower with risk aversion than with risk neutrality $(x_a < x_n)$, when first-period wealth is not larger than second-period wealth (i.e., $w_0 \le w_1$).

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5 until Equation (10). That equation is replaced here by

$$U'(x_n) = -u'(w_0 - x_n) + u'(w_1 + k).$$
(12)

Risk aversion now implies that

$$u'(w_0 - x_n) > u'(w_1 + k) \tag{13}$$

if $w_0 \leq w_1$. Given that result, the last steps of the proof are the same as in the proof of Proposition 5.

The interpretation of Proposition 6 is related to that of Proposition 5. Proposition 5 showed that, under no incentive of intertemporal reallocation for consumption smoothing, risk aversion implies less investment in the rent-seeking game than risk neutrality. Proposition 6 shows that, if the incentive for intertemporal reallocation exists, the same result holds when the goal of consumption smoothing (related to the comparison between w_0 and w_1) pushes the rent-seeker to reallocate wealth to the present, reinforcing the incentive to reduce the investment in the game.

Propositions 5 and 6 reveal significant findings for the analysis of the effects of risk aversion on investment in rent-seeking games. In fact, in a one-period framework, Treich (2010) showed that a risk averse agent chooses to invest less in rent-seeking games than the risk neutral agent does under the assumption that the risk averse agent also is prudent (i.e., that his the third derivative of his utility function is positive). However, Liu et al. (2018) showed that, in a one-period game wherein the payment of the entry cost is contingent on winning the contest, risk aversion implies a larger investment than risk neutrality does. The present paper shows that, in a two-period game, when the incentive of consumption smoothing is not relevant, risk aversion implies less investment in rent-seeking games than risk neutrality, without requiring the assumption of prudence.

The next step in the analysis of the effects of risk aversion on the optimal investment in rent-seeking games is the comparison between two rent-seekers who both are risk averse, but one is more risk averse than the other. For that case, we consider two rent-seekers whose preferences are represented by the utility functions u(.) and v(.), both of which are increasing and concave. We also assume that rent-seeker u is more risk averse than rentseeker v in the sense of Arrow and Pratt, which implies that function u can be written as an increasing and concave transformation of function v (i.e., that a function h(.) exists such that u(.) = h(v(.)), where h'(.) > 0 and h''(.) < 0). In this case we obtain:

Proposition 7. If rent-seeker u is more risk averse than rent-seeker v in the sense of Arrow and Pratt then he chooses less investment in the rent-seeking game, when first-period wealth is not larger than second-period wealth (i.e., $w_0 \leq w_1$).

Proof. We let $U(x_i) = u(w_0 - x_i) + \delta[p_i u(w_1 + b) + (1 - p_i)u(w_1)]$ and $V(x_i) = v(w_0 - x_i) + \delta[p_i v(w_1 + b) + (1 - p_i)v(w_1)]$. We also label by x_u the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game for rent-seeker u and by x_v the optimal investment in the rent-seeking game for rent-seeker v. The first-order condition for rent-seeker v requires

$$V'(x_v) = -v'(w_0 - x_v) + \delta p'_v[v(w_1 + b) - v(w_1)] = 0$$
(14)

(where $p'_v = \frac{\partial p}{\partial x_i}$ for $x_i = x_v$), which implies

$$p'_{v} = \frac{v'(w_0 - x_v)}{\delta[v(w_1 + b) - v(w_1)]}$$
(15)

We now evaluate $U'(x_v)$ obtaining:

$$U'(x_v) = -u'(w_0 - x_v) + \delta p'_v[u(w_1 + b) - u(w_1)]$$
(16)

Since rent-seeker u is more risk averse than rent-seeker v in the sense of Arrow and Pratt, (16) can be rewritten as:

$$U'(x_v) = -h'(v(w_0 - x_v))v'(w_0 - x_v) + \delta p'_v[h(v(w_1 + b)) - h(v(w_1))]$$
(17)

By mean value Theorem, (17) is equivalent to

$$U'(x_v) = -h'(v(w_0 - x_v))v'(w_0 - x_v) + \delta p'_v h'(v(w_1 + k))[v(w_1 + b) - v(w_1)]$$
(18)

(where $k \in (0, b)$). Substituting now (15) into (18) we obtain

$$U'(x_v) = v'(w_0 - x_v)[-h'(v(w_0 - x_v)) + h'(v(w_1 + k))]$$
(19)

Now, since h(.) is concave, the right-hand side of (19) is negative under the assumption $w_0 \leq w_1$, implying that $U'(x_v) < 0$. Since U''(.) < 0 and since $U'(x_u) = 0$ for the first-order condition for rent-seeker u, we get that $x_u < x_v$ proving the proposition. \Box

Proposition 7 generalizes Proposition 6 showing that more risk aversion in the sense of Arrow and Pratt implies less investment in the rent-seeking game when the incentive of consumption smoothing is excluded or acts in the same direction. Note that, while no results on this issue are derived by Treich (2010), Liu et al. (2018) showed that, in the case of one-period games and up front payment, a reduction in optimal investment is obtained when the rent-seeker has more risk aversion and more downside risk aversion in the sense of Ross. Also note that, like Proposition 6, this result is also the opposite to a further result derived by Liu et al. (2018) who show that, in a one-period game where the payment of the investment cost is contingent on winning the contest, more risk aversion in the sense of Arrow and Pratt implies more investment in the rent-seeking game.

4.3 Risky rent

Starting from Wärneryd (2003) a further issue in the analysis of rent-seeking games is the case where rent b is risky instead of being given. In this case we assume that the rent is represented by the random variable \tilde{b} where $E[\tilde{b}] = b$. We now study the effect of the introduction of a random rent, by comparing the optimal choice of the risk averse rent-seeker when the rent is risky with optimal choice when the rent is given.

When the rent is risky, a risk averse rent-seeker chooses the optimal level of investment by maximizing

$$E[Ux_i] = u(w - x_i) + \delta[p_i E[u(w + \tilde{b})] + (1 - p_i)u(w)]$$
(20)

The optimal level of x_i (labelled x_{aa}) thus satisfies the first-order condition:

$$E[U'(x_{aa})] = -u'(w - x_{aa}) + \delta p'_{aa}[E[u(w + \tilde{b})] - u(w)] = 0$$
(21)

(where $p'_{aa} = \frac{\partial p}{\partial x_i}$ for $x_i = x_{aa}$). By comparing (5) and (21) we now obtain that:

Proposition 8. The optimal investment in case of risky rent is lower than in case of given rent under risk aversion.

Proof. Given, \tilde{b} where $E[\tilde{b}] = b$, risk aversion implies $E[u(w + \tilde{b})] < u(w + b)$, implying in turn that, evaluating E[U'(.)] in (21) for $x_i = x_a$, we obtain $E[U'(x_a)] < 0$. Since U''(.) < 0, this implies $x_{aa} < x_a$.

It is significant to compare the result above with those obtained by Treich (2010) for one-period rent-seeking games and Liu et al. (2018) for one-period games with contingent payment. In fact, both Treich (2010) and Liu et al. (2018) obtain that the risk averse rent-seeker chooses less investment with a risky rent only if he also is prudent. On the contrary, Proposition 8 shows that in the two-period framework the same behavior occurs without introducing the assumption of prudence.

4.4 Comparison of results

The results derived in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 show that the effects of risk aversion on the optimal choice of investment in rent-seeking games differ in one-period and two-period games. Table 1 summarizes the main differences, comparing the results obtained herein with those derived in the previous literature. The main conclusions that can be drawn from the comparisons are the following.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

First, in a two-period framework, more risk aversion tends to reduce investment in the rent-seeking game. That finding holds both when comparing a risk-averse agent with a risk-neutral one and when comparing two risk averse rent-seekers.

The result comparing risk averse with risk neutral rent-seekers is similar to that obtained by Treich (2010) in a one-period framework, with the significant difference that, in the one-period framework, the additional assumption of prudence is required, while it is not in the two-period framework.

Similarly, the result comparing two risk averse agents is consistent with that obtained by Liu et al. (2018) in the one-period framework, with the main difference being that, in the one-period framework, we find less investment in the rent-seeking game under the two conditions of more risk aversion and more downside risk aversion á la Ross (1981), which are stronger than the condition of more Arrow-Pratt risk aversion required in the two-period framework. The effect derived also is opposite to that obtained by Liu et al. (2018) in the one-period model with contingent payment.

Moreover, risk aversion likewise has a negative effect on investment in the rent-seeking game when the rent becomes risky. That conclusion holds both in the two-period and oneperiod frameworks with upfront and contingent payments. In the two-period framework, however, risk aversion alone is sufficient to obtain that results, while in both one-period models it must be accompanied by prudence.

Lastly, it is worth noting that the foregoing results also are important in light of the findings from experimental economics. As discussed in Section 1, experimental evidence strongly supports the existence of a negative effect of risk aversion on investment in rent-seeking games. In that regard, the conclusion obtained in the present paper, which confirms the same idea from a theoretical standpoint without requiring the additional condition of prudence, provides a new theoretical foundation for experimental findings, potentially stronger than that provided by the existing literature.

5 Two-period games and changes in wealth

As emphasized recently by Schroyen and Treich (2016), a further significant issue in the analysis of contests relates to the effects of changes in wealth on optimal investments. In the two-period framework examined in the present paper, that issue has many dimensions. First, we consider the case when wealth in the two periods is different (i.e., when $w_0 \neq w_1$) and we study the effect of a change in first-period wealth and of a change in second-period wealth. We then consider cases when wealth in the two periods is the same (i.e., $w_0 = w_1 = w$) and of the effects of changes in it. In all such cases, we focus on the choice of the risk averse agent.

In the case of different wealth in the two periods, we obtain the following results:

Proposition 9. Larger wealth in first period (w_0) increases optimal investment in the rent-seeking game with risk aversion.

Proof. By the implicit function theorem, we have that

$$\frac{dx_a}{dw_0} = -\frac{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial w_0}}{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a}}.$$
(22)

As shown above, $\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a} < 0$, while

$$\frac{\partial U'}{\partial W_0} unexpected'' inmath = -u''(w_0 - x_a) > 0, \tag{23}$$

which implies that $\frac{dx_a}{dw_0} > 0$, thus proving the proposition.

Proposition 10. Larger second-period wealth (w_1) reduces optimal investment in the rent-seeking game with risk aversion.

Proof. By the implicit function theorem, we have that

$$\frac{dx_a}{dw_1} = -\frac{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial w_1}}{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a}}.$$
(24)

As shown above, $\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a} < 0$, while

$$\frac{\partial U'}{\partial W_1} unexpected'' inmath = \delta p'_a [u'(w_1 + b) - u'(w_1)] < 0, \tag{25}$$

implying that $\frac{dx_a}{dw_1} < 0$ and proving the proposition.

The two effects obtained in Propositions 9 and 10 have straightforward interpretations. When first-period wealth increases, the rent seeker's first-period marginal utility declines, reducing the marginal cost of investment and, thus, incentivizing the rent-seeker to invest more. On the other hand, when second-period wealth increases, the rent sseeker's second-period marginal utility declines, reducing the marginal benefit of the potential rent and, hence, incentivizing the rent-seeker to invest less in the game.

It is worth emphasizing some possible applications of the result in Proposition 9. First, it implies that receiving a large inheritance should increase rent-seeking into bequests. That finding has a simple empirical implication: when comparing different generations of entrepreneurs we should observe second-generation wealthy people engaged in more rent-seeking than first-generation self-made entrepreneurs. Similarly, Proposition 9 also suggests that firms experiencing an increase in wealth should invest more in lobbying, possibly explaining the commonly observed pattern in which firms that ignore lobbying at first engage in it after they have become successful.⁹

A more complex situation arises when we assume that wealth in the two periods is the same. In that case we obtain

⁹The sam issue potentially could be studied in a framework wherein firms compete in a sequence of two games: an R&D game and a lobbying game. According to Proposition 9, firms succeeding in the first game should invest more in lobbying in the second game.

Proof. By the implicit function theorem, we have that

$$\frac{dx_a}{dw} = -\frac{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial w}}{\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a}}.$$
(26)

As shown above, $\frac{\partial U'}{\partial x_a} < 0$, while

$$\frac{\partial U'}{\partial w}unexpected''inmath = -u''(w - x_a) + \delta p'_a[u'(w + b) - u'(w)], \qquad (27)$$

which, by the mean value theorem, is equivalent to

$$\frac{\partial U'}{\partial w}unexpected''inmath = -u''(w - x_a) + \delta p'_a b[u''(w + k)]$$
(28)

(when $k \in (0, b)$).

Proposition 5 showed that, when $w_0 = w_1 = w$, $x_a < x_n$, which by assumption A2 implies that $p'_a > p'_n$. That result, together with (3) and u''(.) < 0, implies:

$$-u''(w-x_a) + \delta p'_a b[u''(w+k)] < -u''(w-x_a) + \delta p'_n b[u''(w+k)] = -u''(w-x_a) + [u''(w+k)].$$
(29)

The foregoing implies that $\frac{\partial U'}{\partial w} unexpected'' inmath < 0$ and, thus, $\frac{dx_a}{dw} < 0$ when

$$u''(w+k) < u''(w-x_a).$$
(30)

We have that (30) holds when the third derivative of the utility function is negative, i.e., with imprudence. Thus, risk aversion and imprudence together imply that an increase in w reduces x_a , proving the proposition.

Proposition 11 shows that, if wealth increases in both periods, the rent-seeker reduces investment in the rent-seeking game if he is not only risk averse but also imprudent. The interpretation of that results is related to a possible interpretation of imprudence found in the literature. On the one hand, optimal wealth allocation with risk aversion requires that part of the additional wealth is reallocated to the first period (where expected wealth is smaller by reducing investment in the game. On the other hand, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) and Menegatti (2007) show that imprudence can be seen as a desire to allocate less wealth to the period when uncertainty is faced.¹⁰ Given that interpretation,

¹⁰Both papers provide interpretations for prudence. The interpretation of imprudence can, however, be derived easily. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) relate the result to harm disaggregation, i.e to the desire to separate the harm of incurring a sure loss and the harm of facing a risk. Menegatti (2007) relates it to a reduction in the utility premium.

it is clear that, when wealth in both periods increases, an imprudent rent-seeker is pushed to reallocate some of the additional wealth to the first period and to reduce second-period expected wealth (where uncertainty is faced) by lowering investment in the game. Doing so reinforces the effect of risk aversion, determining a clear direction of the change in rent-seeking investments.

The last change in wealth considered is when second-period wealth becomes risky.¹¹ For that purpose, we assume that second-period wealth to be a random variable \tilde{w} , with $E[\tilde{w}] = w$. As such, the rent-seeker's maximization problem becomes:

$$E[U(x_i)] = u(w - x_i) + \delta[p_i E[u(\tilde{w} + b)] + (1 - p_i) E[u(\tilde{w})]].$$
(31)

The optimal level of x_i (labelled x_{aaa}) thus satisfies the first-order condition:

$$E[U'(x_{aaa})] = -u'(w - x_{aaa}) + \delta p'_{aaa}[E[u(\tilde{w} + b)] - E[u(\tilde{w})]] = 0$$
(32)

(where $p'_{aaa} = \frac{\partial p}{\partial x_i}$ for $x_i = x_{aaa}$). By comparing (5) and (32) we now obtain

Proposition 12. The optimal investment in the rent-seeking game is larger (smaller) with risky second-period wealth under both risk aversion and prudence (imprudence).

Proof. We evaluate E[U'(.)] in (32) for $x_i = x_a$, which is equal to

$$E[U'(x_a)] = -u'(w - x_a) + \delta p'_a[E[u(\tilde{w} + b)] - E[u(\tilde{w})]].$$
(33)

Since U''(.) < 0, we now have that $x_{aaa} > x_a$ if $E[U'(x_a)] > 0$. By (5), that occurs if

$$E[u(\tilde{w}+b)] - E[u(\tilde{w})] > u(w+b) - u(w).$$
(34)

By Jensen's Inequality, the relation holds when the function u(w+b) - u(w) is convex in w, which occurs, in turn, when u''(w+b) - u''(w) > 0. The last inequality holds under prudence. Lastly, the proof in the case of imprudence is similar.

Proposition 12 shows that, if second-period wealth becomes random, the risk averse rent-seeker increases (reduces) investment in the rent-seeking game if he also is prudent (imprudent). The same result likewise is related to the interpretation of prudence provided above. When we introduce a further source of uncertainty owing to the risky income in the second-period, a prudent (imprudent) rent-seeker desires to raise (lower) expected wealth in that period since he will face uncertainty from it. For that reason, the rent-seeker is willing to invest more (less) in the first period in order to affect the probability of winning the rent in the second period so as to increase (reduce) expected second-period wealth. It is important to emphasize that the mechanism at work here is exactly the same as the traditional mechanism in which prudence affects optimal agent behavior when secondperiod income risk is introduced into saving models (e.g., Leland 1968).

¹¹We do not perform the same analysis for first-period wealth since it is plausible to assume that the values of all variables for the period wherein the rent-seeker makes a choice are known with certainty.

6 Conclusions

The time structure of activities that can be described by rent-seeking games suggests that, in many cases, investment in the game precedes the time at which the rent is assigned. Such a structure implies that a two-period formalization, unlike the one-period formalization usually adopted in the literature, is appropriate for such situations.

Starting from those premises, the present article proposes the first formalization of a two-period rent-seeking game, with the aim of studying the effects of risk aversion on the optimal choices made by the rent seekers. The main results are the following.

We first show that, unlike one-period frameworks, the equilibrium level of investment is unique in a two-period framework.

The analysis also shows that risk aversion reduces investments in the rent-seeking game in a two-period framework with respect to the optimal choices of risk neutral agents. Unlike the traditional one-period framework with upfront payments, the same result holds in the two-period framework without introducing the additional condition of prudence. Moreover, the same result holds when comparing two risk averse rent-seekers after introducing more risk aversion á la Arrow and Pratt instead of introducing the stronger condition of more risk aversion and more downside risk aversion á la Ross that is required in the one-period framework. Lastly, introducing a risky rent instead of a given rent in the two-period framework implies less investment when the rent-seeker is risk averse, while the same effect occurs only when the rent-seeker is both risk averse and prudent in the one-period framework.

It is worth noting that the results presented herein imply that less is invested in the rent-seeking game in the two-period framework under a more parsimonious set of conditions on risk attitudes than in a one-period framework.

Examining different kinds of changes in wealth provides other noteworthy results. With risk aversion, larger first-period wealth raises investment in the rent-seeking game and larger second-period wealth reduces it. When both first-period and second-period wealth increase, investment in the rent-seeking game declines when the rent-seeker is risk averse and imprudent. Lastly, when a risky level of wealth in the second-period is introduced, the rent-seeker increases (reduces) investment in the contest when he is risk averse and prudent (imprudent).

It is worth noting that prudence/imprudence, which disappears as a requirement in comparisons between risk aversion and risk neutrality in a two-period framework, is again significant when changes in wealth are analyzed. The role of that feature of agent preferences can be interpreted in the same way that it is interpreted in the literature with respect to other problems, such as saving, and relates to a desire to manage the level of given wealth in the period wherein the rent-seeker faces risks.

The analysis of two-period rent-seeking games proposed in this study also paves the way for future extensions in different directions. One of the most significant extensions would be to explore the optimal rent-seeking investment in contexts where different individual or household choices are made at the same time. In particular, the intertemporal framework studied in this paper implies that rent-seeking effort plays two roles: it changes the probability of winning the contest in the second period and it changes the allocation of wealth over the two periods. That conclusion suggests that one of the next analytical steps could be to examine joint choices of optimal investments in the game and of variables affecting the intertemporal allocation of wealth, such as saving.¹²

Moreover, as mentioned in Section 1, the results derived in the present paper's twoperiod setup usefully could be extended to other rent-seeking models, usually studied in one-period frameworks. It also is important to emphasize that new possible fields of application for rent-seeking analysis specifically related to the time structure introduced in the present paper are possible. In some cases, in fact, rent-seeking processes necessarily occur over time. That is what happens, for instance, in the case of "regime uncertainty" (see Higgs 1997), wherein future changes in regimes may produce uncertainty about the sizes of future rents. A similar effect likewise is generated by creative destruction, which makes future rents uncertain too.¹³ Other applications may involve issues relating to economic history, such as the potential effects of changes in state capacity in creating rent availability uncertainty.

Lastly, notice that a future research strand stemming from the present paper also could explore Tullock's paradox. In fact, the present paper shows that risk aversion pushes agents to reduce investment in rent seeking in a two-period framework. Risk aversion and risky rents in a context of rentseeking across different periods may imply a mitigation of rent dissipation and potentially resolve the paradox at least in part. A specific research agenda in that direction may be promising.

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¹²The spirit of such possible future analyses would be similar to that of work examining in a twoperiod framework the interaction between saving and self-protection (e.g., Menegatti and Rebessi 2011; Steinorth 2011; Peter 2017), starting from models wherein each instrument is first studied on its own.

¹³For instance, the creation of ride-sharing apps generates uncertainty about taxicab rents. Many other applications to the so-called gig economy are possible

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	Risk aversion vs risk neutrality	More risk aversion	Risky rent
ne-period game with up front payment (Treich, 2010) (Liu et al., 2018)	Risk averse rent-seeker invests less in the game under prudence (Treich, 2010)	More risk aversion á la Ross and more downside risk aversion á la Ross implies less investment in the game (Liu et al., 2018)	Risk averse rent-seeker invests less in the game under prudence (Treich, 2010)
ne-period game with contingent payment (Liu et al., 2018)	Risk averse rent-seeker invests more in the game	More risk aversion á la Arrow and Pratt implies more investment in the game	Risk averse rent-seeker invests less in the game under prudence

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         LaTeX Info: Redefining \] on input line 2818.
54
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/amscls/amsthm.sty
55
         Package: amsthm 2017/10/31 v2.20.4
56
         \thm@style=\toks21
57
         \thm@bodyfont=\toks22
58
         \thm@headfont=\toks23
59
         \thm@notefont=\toks24
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
2
3
4
         \thm@headpunct=\toks25
5
         \thm@preskip=\skip46
6
         \thm@postskip=\skip47
7
         \thm@headsep=\skip48
8
         \dth@everypar=\toks26
9
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/amsfonts/amssymb.sty
10
         Package: amssymb 2013/01/14 v3.01 AMS font symbols
11
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/amsfonts/amsfonts.sty
12
         Package: amsfonts 2013/01/14 v3.01 Basic AMSFonts support
13
         \symAMSa=\mathgroup4
14
         \symAMSb=\mathgroup5
15
                             Overwriting math alphabet `\mathfrak' in version
         LaTeX Font Info:
16
         `bold'
17
         (Font)
                                  U/euf/m/n --> U/euf/b/n on input line 106.
18
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/rotfloat/rotfloat.sty
19
         Package: rotfloat 2004/01/04 v1.2 Combining float+rotating package (AS)
20
21
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/float.sty
22
         Package: float 2001/11/08 v1.3d Float enhancements (AL)
23
         \c@float@type=\count104
24
         \float@exts=\toks27
25
         \float@box=\box28
26
         \@float@everytoks=\toks28
27
         \@floatcapt=\box29
28
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics/rotating.sty
29
         Package: rotating 2016/08/11 v2.16d rotated objects in LaTeX
30
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics/graphicx.sty
31
         Package: graphicx 2017/06/01 v1.1a Enhanced LaTeX Graphics (DPC, SPQR)
32
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics/keyval.sty
33
         Package: keyval 2014/10/28 v1.15 key=value parser (DPC)
34
         \KV@toks@=\toks29
35
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics/graphics.sty
36
         Package: graphics 2017/06/25 v1.2c Standard LaTeX Graphics (DPC, SPQR)
37
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics/trig.sty
38
         Package: trig 2016/01/03 v1.10 sin cos tan (DPC)
39
40
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics-cfg/graphics.cfg
41
         File: graphics.cfg 2016/06/04 v1.11 sample graphics configuration
42
         )
43
         Package graphics Info: Driver file: pdftex.def on input line 99.
44
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics-def/pdftex.def
45
         File: pdftex.def 2018/01/08 v1.01 Graphics/color driver for pdftex
46
         ))
47
         \Gin@req@height=\dimen125
48
         \Gin@req@width=\dimen126
49
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/base/ifthen.sty
50
         Package: ifthen 2014/09/29 v1.1c Standard LaTeX ifthen package (DPC)
51
         )
52
         \c@r@tfl@t=\count105
53
         \rotFPtop=\skip49
54
         \rotFPbot=\skip50
55
         \rot@float@box=\box30
56
         \rot@mess@toks=\toks30
57
         )
58
         Package rotfloat Info: float package v1.3 detected on input line 74.
59
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/hyperref/hyperref.sty
60
61
62
63
```

```
2
3
4
         Package: hyperref 2018/02/06 v6.86b Hypertext links for LaTeX
5
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/oberdiek/hobsub-hyperref.sty
6
         Package: hobsub-hyperref 2016/05/16 v1.14 Bundle oberdiek, subset
7
         hyperref (HO)
8
9
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/oberdiek/hobsub-generic.sty
10
         Package: hobsub-generic 2016/05/16 v1.14 Bundle oberdiek, subset generic
11
         (HO)
12
         Package: hobsub 2016/05/16 v1.14 Construct package bundles (HO)
13
         Package: infwarerr 2016/05/16 v1.4 Providing info/warning/error messages
14
         (HO)
15
         Package: ltxcmds 2016/05/16 v1.23 LaTeX kernel commands for general use
16
         (HO)
17
         Package: ifluatex 2016/05/16 v1.4 Provides the ifluatex switch (HO)
18
         Package ifluatex Info: LuaTeX not detected.
19
         Package: ifvtex 2016/05/16 v1.6 Detect VTeX and its facilities (HO)
20
21
         Package ifvtex Info: VTeX not detected.
22
         Package: intcalc 2016/05/16 v1.2 Expandable calculations with integers
23
         (HO)
24
         Package: ifpdf 2017/03/15 v3.2 Provides the ifpdf switch
25
         Package: etexcmds 2016/05/16 v1.6 Avoid name clashes with e-TeX commands
26
         (HO)
27
         Package etexcmds Info: Could not find \expanded.
28
         (etexcmds)
                                That can mean that you are not using pdfTeX 1.50
29
         or
30
                                 that some package has redefined \expanded.
         (etexcmds)
31
         (etexcmds)
                                 In the latter case, load this package earlier.
32
         Package: kvsetkeys 2016/05/16 v1.17 Key value parser (HO)
33
         Package: kvdefinekeys 2016/05/16 v1.4 Define keys (HO)
34
         Package: pdftexcmds 2018/01/30 v0.27 Utility functions of pdfTeX for
35
         LuaTeX (HO
36
         )
37
         Package pdftexcmds Info: LuaTeX not detected.
38
         Package pdftexcmds Info: \pdf@primitive is available.
39
         Package pdftexcmds Info: \pdf@ifprimitive is available.
40
         Package pdftexcmds Info: \pdfdraftmode found.
41
42
         Package: pdfescape 2016/05/16 v1.14 Implements pdfTeX's escape features
43
         (HO)
44
         Package: bigintcalc 2016/05/16 v1.4 Expandable calculations on big
45
         integers (HO
46
         )
47
         Package: bitset 2016/05/16 v1.2 Handle bit-vector datatype (HO)
48
         Package: uniquecounter 2016/05/16 v1.3 Provide unlimited unique counter
49
         (HO)
50
         )
51
         Package hobsub Info: Skipping package `hobsub' (already loaded).
52
         Package: letltxmacro 2016/05/16 v1.5 Let assignment for LaTeX macros (HO)
53
         Package: hopatch 2016/05/16 v1.3 Wrapper for package hooks (HO)
54
         Package: xcolor-patch 2016/05/16 xcolor patch
55
         Package: atveryend 2016/05/16 v1.9 Hooks at the very end of document (HO)
56
         Package atveryend Info: \enddocument detected (standard20110627).
57
         Package: atbegshi 2016/06/09 v1.18 At begin shipout hook (HO)
58
         Package: refcount 2016/05/16 v3.5 Data extraction from label references
59
         (HO)
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
2
3
4
         Package: hycolor 2016/05/16 v1.8 Color options for hyperref/bookmark (HO)
5
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/ifxetex/ifxetex.sty
6
         Package: ifxetex 2010/09/12 v0.6 Provides ifxetex conditional
7
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/oberdiek/auxhook.sty
8
         Package: auxhook 2016/05/16 v1.4 Hooks for auxiliary files (HO)
9
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/oberdiek/kvoptions.sty
10
         Package: kvoptions 2016/05/16 v3.12 Key value format for package options
11
         (HO)
12
         )
13
         \@linkdim=\dimen127
14
         \Hy@linkcounter=\count106
15
         \Hy@pagecounter=\count107
16
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/hyperref/pdlenc.def
17
         File: pdlenc.def 2018/02/06 v6.86b Hyperref: PDFDocEncoding definition
18
         (HO)
19
         Now handling font encoding PD1 ...
20
21
         ... no UTF-8 mapping file for font encoding PD1
22
         )
23
         \Hy@SavedSpaceFactor=\count108
24
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/latexconfig/hyperref.cfg
25
         File: hyperref.cfg 2002/06/06 v1.2 hyperref configuration of TeXLive
26
         )
27
         Package hyperref Info: Option `unicode' set `true' on input line 4383.
28
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/hyperref/puenc.def
29
         File: puenc.def 2018/02/06 v6.86b Hyperref: PDF Unicode definition (HO)
30
         Now handling font encoding PU ...
31
         ... no UTF-8 mapping file for font encoding PU
32
         )
33
         Package hyperref Info: Option `bookmarks' set `false' on input line 4383.
34
         Package hyperref Info: Option `breaklinks' set `false' on input line
35
         4383.
36
         Package hyperref Info: Option `colorlinks' set `false' on input line
37
         4383.
38
         Package hyperref Info: Hyper figures OFF on input line 4509.
39
40
         Package hyperref Info: Link nesting OFF on input line 4514.
         Package hyperref Info: Hyper index ON on input line 4517.
41
42
         Package hyperref Info: Plain pages OFF on input line 4524.
43
         Package hyperref Info: Backreferencing ON on input line 4527.
44
         Package hyperref Info: Implicit mode ON; LaTeX internals redefined.
45
         Package hyperref Info: Bookmarks OFF on input line 4768.
46
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/hyperref/backref.sty
47
         Package: backref 2016/05/21 v1.39 Bibliographical back referencing
48
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/oberdiek/rerunfilecheck.sty
49
         Package: rerunfilecheck 2016/05/16 v1.8 Rerun checks for auxiliary files
50
         (HO)
51
         Package uniquecounter Info: New unique counter `rerunfilecheck' on input
52
         line 2
53
         82.
54
         ))
55
         \c@Hy@tempcnt=\count109
56
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/url/url.sty
57
         \Urlmuskip=\muskip11
58
         Package: url 2013/09/16 ver 3.4 Verb mode for urls, etc.
59
         )
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
2
3
4
         LaTeX Info: Redefining \url on input line 5115.
5
         \XeTeXLinkMargin=\dimen128
6
         \Fld@menulength=\count110
7
         \Field@Width=\dimen129
8
         \Fld@charsize=\dimen130
9
         Package hyperref Info: Hyper figures OFF on input line 6369.
10
         Package hyperref Info: Link nesting OFF on input line 6374.
11
         Package hyperref Info: Hyper index ON on input line 6377.
12
         Package hyperref Info: backreferencing ON on input line 6382.
13
         Package hyperref Info: Link coloring OFF on input line 6389.
14
         Package hyperref Info: Link coloring with OCG OFF on input line 6394.
15
         Package hyperref Info: PDF/A mode OFF on input line 6399.
16
         LaTeX Info: Redefining \ref on input line 6439.
17
         LaTeX Info: Redefining \pageref on input line 6443.
18
         \Hy@abspage=\count111
19
         \c@Item=\count112
20
21
         \c@Hfootnote=\count113
22
         )
23
         Package hyperref Info: Driver (autodetected): hpdftex.
24
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/hyperref/hpdftex.def
25
         File: hpdftex.def 2018/02/06 v6.86b Hyperref driver for pdfTeX
26
         \Fld@listcount=\count114
27
         \c@bookmark@seq@number=\count115
28
         \Hy@SectionHShift=\skip51
29
         )
30
31
         Package hyperref Warning: Option `hypertex' has already been used,
32
                                    setting the option has no effect on input line
         (hyperref)
33
         15.
34
35
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/frontendlayer/tikz.sty
36
         (c:/TeXLive/20
37
         18/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/basiclayer/pgf.sty (c:/TexLive/2018/texmf-
38
         dist/tex/
39
40
         latex/pqf/utilities/pqfrcs.sty (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
41
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/util
42
         ities/pgfutil-common.tex
43
         \pgfutil@everybye=\toks31
44
         \pqfutil@tempdima=\dimen131
45
         \pgfutil@tempdimb=\dimen132
46
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/utilities/pgfutil-common-
47
         lists.tex)
48
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/utilities/pgfutil-latex.def
49
         \pgfutil@abb=\box31
50
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/ms/everyshi.sty
51
         Package: everyshi 2001/05/15 v3.00 EveryShipout Package (MS)
52
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/utilities/pgfrcs.code.tex
53
         Package: pgfrcs 2015/08/07 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.31)
54
         ))
55
         Package: pgf 2015/08/07 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.15)
56
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcore.sty
57
         (c:/TeXLive/20
58
         18/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/systemlayer/pgfsys.sty
59
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
2
3
4
         tex/generic/pgf/systemlayer/pgfsys.code.tex
5
         Package: pgfsys 2014/07/09 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.48)
6
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/utilities/pgfkeys.code.tex
7
         \pgfkeys@pathtoks=\toks32
8
         \pgfkeys@temptoks=\toks33
9
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
10
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/utilities/pgfkeysfiltered.code.tex
11
         \pgfkeys@tmptoks=\toks34
12
         ))
13
         \pqf@x=\dimen133
14
         \pgf@y=\dimen134
15
         \pgf@xa=\dimen135
16
         \pgf@ya=\dimen136
17
         \pgf@xb=\dimen137
18
         \pgf@yb=\dimen138
19
20
         \pgf@xc=\dimen139
21
         \pgf@yc=\dimen140
22
         \w@pgf@writea=\write3
23
         \r@pgf@reada=\read1
24
         \c@pgf@counta=\count116
25
         \c@pgf@countb=\count117
26
         \c@pgf@countc=\count118
27
         \c@pgf@countd=\count119
28
         \t@pgf@toka=\toks35
29
         \t@pgf@tokb=\toks36
30
         \t@pqf@tokc=\toks37
31
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/systemlayer/pgf.cfg
32
         File: pgf.cfg 2008/05/14 (rcs-revision 1.7)
33
34
         Driver file for pgf: pgfsys-pdftex.def
35
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/systemlayer/pgfsys-pdftex.def
36
         File: pgfsys-pdftex.def 2014/10/11 (rcs-revision 1.35)
37
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/systemlayer/pgfsys-common-
38
39
         pdf.def
40
         File: pgfsys-common-pdf.def 2013/10/10 (rcs-revision 1.13)
41
         )))
42
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
43
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/systemlayer/pgfsyssoftpath.code.tex
44
         File: pqfsyssoftpath.code.tex 2013/09/09 (rcs-revision 1.9)
45
         \pgfsyssoftpath@smallbuffer@items=\count120
46
         \pgfsyssoftpath@bigbuffer@items=\count121
47
         )
48
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
49
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/systemlayer/pgfsysprotocol.code.tex
50
         File: pqfsysprotocol.code.tex 2006/10/16
                                                   (rcs-revision 1.4)
51
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/xcolor/xcolor.sty
52
         Package: xcolor 2016/05/11 v2.12 LaTeX color extensions (UK)
53
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/graphics-cfg/color.cfg
54
         File: color.cfg 2016/01/02 v1.6 sample color configuration
55
         )
56
         Package xcolor Info: Driver file: pdftex.def on input line 225.
57
         Package xcolor Info: Model `cmy' substituted by `cmy0' on input line
58
         1348.
59
         Package xcolor Info: Model `hsb' substituted by `rgb' on input line 1352.
60
61
62
63
```

3 4 Package xcolor Info: Model `RGB' extended on input line 1364. 5 Package xcolor Info: Model `HTML' substituted by `rgb' on input line 6 1366. 7 Package xcolor Info: Model `Hsb' substituted by `hsb' on input line 1367. 8 Package xcolor Info: Model `tHsb' substituted by `hsb' on input line 9 1368. 10 Package xcolor Info: Model `HSB' substituted by `hsb' on input line 1369. 11 Package xcolor Info: Model `Gray' substituted by `gray' on input line 12 1370. 13 Package xcolor Info: Model `wave' substituted by `hsb' on input line 14 1371. 15) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcore.code.tex 16 Package: pgfcore 2010/04/11 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.7) 17 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmath.code.tex 18 (c:/TeXLive/2 19 018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathcalc.code.tex 20 21 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf 22 -dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathutil.code.tex) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-23 dist/te 24 x/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathparser.code.tex 25 \pgfmath@dimen=\dimen141 26 \pgfmath@count=\count122 27 \pgfmath@box=\box32 28 \pgfmath@toks=\toks38 29 \pgfmath@stack@operand=\toks39 30 \pgfmath@stack@operation=\toks40 31) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-32 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.code.tex 33 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-34 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.basic.code.te 35 X) 36 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-37 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.trigonometric 38 .code.tex) 39 40 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmfdist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.random.code.t 41 42 ex) 43 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-44 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.comparison.co 45 de.tex) 46 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-47 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.base.code.tex 48) 49 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-50 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.round.code.te 51 X) 52 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-53 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.misc.code.tex 54) 55 (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-56 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfunctions.integerarithm 57 etics.code.tex))) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-58 dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmathfloat 59 .code.tex 60 61 62 63 64

1 2

```
2
3
4
         \c@pgfmathroundto@lastzeros=\count123
5
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
6
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorepoints.code.te
7
         х
8
         File: pgfcorepoints.code.tex 2013/10/07 (rcs-revision 1.27)
9
         \pgf@picminx=\dimen142
10
         \pgf@picmaxx=\dimen143
11
         \pgf@picminy=\dimen144
12
         \pgf@picmaxy=\dimen145
13
         \pgf@pathminx=\dimen146
14
         \pgf@pathmaxx=\dimen147
15
         \pgf@pathminy=\dimen148
16
         \pgf@pathmaxy=\dimen149
17
         \pqf@xx=\dimen150
18
         \pgf@xy=\dimen151
19
         \pgf@yx=\dimen152
20
21
         \pgf@yy=\dimen153
22
         \pgf@zx=\dimen154
23
         \pgf@zy=\dimen155
24
         )
25
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
26
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorepathconstruct.cod
27
         e.tex
28
         File: pgfcorepathconstruct.code.tex 2013/10/07 (rcs-revision 1.29)
29
         \pgf@path@lastx=\dimen156
30
         \pgf@path@lasty=\dimen157
31
         )
32
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
33
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorepathusage.code.te
34
         х
35
         File: pgfcorepathusage.code.tex 2014/11/02 (rcs-revision 1.24)
36
         \pgf@shorten@end@additional=\dimen158
37
         \pgf@shorten@start@additional=\dimen159
38
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
39
40
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorescopes.code.tex
41
         File: pgfcorescopes.code.tex 2015/05/08 (rcs-revision 1.46)
42
         \pgfpic=\box33
43
         \pqf@hbox=\box34
44
         \pqf@layerbox@main=\box35
45
         \pgf@picture@serial@count=\count124
46
         )
47
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
48
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcoregraphicstate.code
49
         .tex
50
         File: pgfcoregraphicstate.code.tex 2014/11/02 (rcs-revision 1.12)
51
         \pgflinewidth=\dimen160
52
         )
53
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
54
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcoretransformations.c
55
         ode.tex
56
         File: pgfcoretransformations.code.tex 2015/08/07 (rcs-revision 1.20)
57
         \pgf@pt@x=\dimen161
58
         \pqf@pt@y=\dimen162
59
         \pgf@pt@temp=\dimen163
60
61
62
63
```

```
3
4
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
5
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorequick.code.tex
6
         File: pgfcorequick.code.tex 2008/10/09 (rcs-revision 1.3)
7
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
8
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcoreobjects.code.te
9
         Х
10
         File: pgfcoreobjects.code.tex 2006/10/11 (rcs-revision 1.2)
11
         )
12
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
13
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorepathprocessing.co
14
         de.tex
15
         File: pgfcorepathprocessing.code.tex 2013/09/09 (rcs-revision 1.9)
16
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
17
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorearrows.code.tex
18
         File: pgfcorearrows.code.tex 2015/05/14 (rcs-revision 1.43)
19
20
         \pgfarrowsep=\dimen164
21
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
22
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcoreshade.code.tex
23
         File: pgfcoreshade.code.tex 2013/07/15 (rcs-revision 1.15)
24
         \pgf@max=\dimen165
25
         \pgf@sys@shading@range@num=\count125
26
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
27
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcoreimage.code.tex
28
         File: pgfcoreimage.code.tex 2013/07/15 (rcs-revision 1.18)
29
30
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
31
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcoreexternal.code.tex
32
         File: pgfcoreexternal.code.tex 2014/07/09 (rcs-revision 1.21)
33
         \pgfexternal@startupbox=\box36
34
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
35
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorelayers.code.te
36
37
         Х
         File: pqfcorelayers.code.tex 2013/07/18 (rcs-revision 1.7)
38
39
         )
40
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
41
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcoretransparency.code
42
         .tex
43
         File: pgfcoretransparency.code.tex 2013/09/30 (rcs-revision 1.5)
44
         )
45
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
46
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/basiclayer/pgfcorepatterns.code.tex
47
         File: pgfcorepatterns.code.tex 2013/11/07 (rcs-revision 1.5)
48
         ))) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
49
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/modules/pgfmoduleshapes.code.te
50
         Х
51
         File: pgfmoduleshapes.code.tex 2014/03/21 (rcs-revision 1.35)
52
         \pgfnodeparttextbox=\box37
53
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
54
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/modules/pgfmoduleplot.code.tex
55
         File: pgfmoduleplot.code.tex 2015/08/03 (rcs-revision 1.13)
56
         )
57
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/compatibility/pgfcomp-version-
58
         0-65.st
59
60
         У
61
62
63
64
```

```
3
4
         Package: pgfcomp-version-0-65 2007/07/03 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.7)
5
         \pgf@nodesepstart=\dimen166
б
         \pgf@nodesepend=\dimen167
7
         )
8
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/compatibility/pgfcomp-version-
9
         1-18.st
10
         V
11
         Package: pgfcomp-version-1-18 2007/07/23 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.1)
12
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/utilities/pgffor.sty
13
         (c:/TeXLive/2
14
         018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/pgf/utilities/pgfkeys.sty
15
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/
16
         tex/generic/pgf/utilities/pgfkeys.code.tex)) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
17
         dist/tex/la
18
         tex/pgf/math/pgfmath.sty (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
19
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfma
20
21
         th.code.tex)) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
22
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/utilities/pgffor.code
23
         .tex
24
         Package: pgffor 2013/12/13 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.25)
25
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/pgf/math/pgfmath.code.tex)
26
         \pgffor@iter=\dimen168
27
         \pgffor@skip=\dimen169
28
         \pgffor@stack=\toks41
29
         \pgffor@toks=\toks42
30
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
31
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/frontendlayer/tikz/tikz.code.tex
32
         Package: tikz 2015/08/07 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.151)
33
34
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
35
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/libraries/pgflibraryplothandlers.co
36
         de.tex
37
         File: pgflibraryplothandlers.code.tex 2013/08/31 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision
38
         1.20)
39
         \pgf@plot@mark@count=\count126
40
41
         \pgfplotmarksize=\dimen170
42
43
         \tikz@lastx=\dimen171
44
         \tikz@lasty=\dimen172
45
         \tikz@lastxsaved=\dimen173
46
         \tikz@lastysaved=\dimen174
47
         \tikzleveldistance=\dimen175
48
         \tikzsiblingdistance=\dimen176
49
         \tikz@figbox=\box38
50
         \tikz@fiqbox@bg=\box39
51
         \tikz@tempbox=\box40
52
         \tikz@tempbox@bg=\box41
53
         \tikztreelevel=\count127
54
         \tikznumberofchildren=\count128
55
         \tikznumberofcurrentchild=\count129
56
         \tikz@fig@count=\count130
57
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
58
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/modules/pgfmodulematrix.code.tex
59
         File: pgfmodulematrix.code.tex 2013/09/17 (rcs-revision 1.8)
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
2
3
4
         \pgfmatrixcurrentrow=\count131
5
         \pgfmatrixcurrentcolumn=\count132
6
         \pgf@matrix@numberofcolumns=\count133
7
         )
8
         \tikz@expandcount=\count134
9
10
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
11
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/frontendlayer/tikz/libraries/tikzli
12
         brarytopaths.code.tex
13
         File: tikzlibrarytopaths.code.tex 2008/06/17 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.2)
14
         )))
15
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-
16
         dist/tex/generic/pgf/frontendlayer/tikz/libraries/tikzli
17
         brarycalc.code.tex
18
         File: tikzlibrarycalc.code.tex 2013/07/15 v3.0.1a (rcs-revision 1.9)
19
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/caption/caption.sty
20
21
         Package: caption 2018/05/01 v3.3-147 Customizing captions (AR)
22
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/caption/caption3.sty
23
         Package: caption3 2018/05/27 v1.8a caption3 kernel (AR)
24
         Package caption3 Info: TeX engine: e-TeX on input line 64.
25
         \captionmargin=\dimen177
26
         \captionmargin@=\dimen178
27
         \captionwidth=\dimen179
28
         \caption@tempdima=\dimen180
29
         \caption@indent=\dimen181
30
         \caption@parindent=\dimen182
31
         \caption@hangindent=\dimen183
32
         )
33
         \c@ContinuedFloat=\count135
34
         Package caption Info: float package is loaded.
35
         Package caption Info: hyperref package is loaded.
36
         Package caption Info: rotating package is loaded.
37
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/ctable/ctable.sty
38
         Package: ctable 2015/10/17 v1.31 ctable package for flexible typesetting
39
40
         of tab
41
         le and figure floats using key/value directives
42
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/etoolbox/etoolbox.sty
43
         Package: etoolbox 2018/02/11 v2.5e e-TeX tools for LaTeX (JAW)
44
         \etb@tempcnta=\count136
45
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/xkeyval/xkeyval.sty
46
         Package: xkeyval 2014/12/03 v2.7a package option processing (HA)
47
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/xkeyval/xkeyval.tex
48
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/te
49
         xmf-dist/tex/generic/xkeyval/xkvutils.tex
50
         \XKV@toks=\toks43
51
         \XKV@tempa@toks=\toks44
52
         )
53
         \XKV@depth=\count137
54
         File: xkeyval.tex 2014/12/03 v2.7a key=value parser (HA)
55
         )) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/tools/array.sty
56
         Package: array 2018/04/30 v2.4h Tabular extension package (FMi)
57
         \col@sep=\dimen184
58
         \ar@mcellbox=\box42
59
         \extrarowheight=\dimen185
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
2
3
4
         \NC@list=\toks45
5
         \extratabsurround=\skip52
6
         \backup@length=\skip53
7
         \ar@cellbox=\box43
8
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/tools/tabularx.sty
9
         Package: tabularx 2016/02/03 v2.11b `tabularx' package (DPC)
10
         \TX@col@width=\dimen186
11
         \TX@old@table=\dimen187
12
         \TX@old@col=\dimen188
13
         \TX@target=\dimen189
14
         \TX@delta=\dimen190
15
         \TX@cols=\count138
16
         \TX@ftn=\toks46
17
         )
18
19
         Package ctable Warning: Transparency disabled: incompatible with tikz
20
21
         package
22
          on input line 36.
23
24
         \@CTframesep=\dimen191
25
         \@dfltCTframesep=\dimen192
2.6
         \@CTframerule=\dimen193
27
         \@dfltCTframerule=\dimen194
28
         \@CTwidth=\dimen195
29
         \@dfltCTwidth=\dimen196
30
         \@CTcaptionskip=\dimen197
31
         \@dfltCTcaptionskip=\dimen198
32
         \@CTmaxwidth=\dimen199
33
         \@dfltCTmaxwidth=\dimen256
34
         \@CTmincapwidth=\dimen257
35
         \@dfltCTmincapwidth=\dimen258
36
         \@CTfooterwidth=\dimen259
37
         \@dfltCTfooterwidth=\dimen260
38
         \@CTw=\dimen261
39
40
         \@CTfloatwidth=\dimen262
41
         \@CToldsep=\dimen263
42
         \@CToldrule=\dimen264
43
         \CT@t=\box44
44
         \@CTcurftwidth=\dimen265
45
         )
46
         \c@theorem=\count139
47
         (./WFS Edits_manuscript_PubChoice_2019_accepted_corrected.aux)
48
         \openout1 = 
49
         Edits manuscript PubChoice 2019 accepted corrected.aux"'.
50
51
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              Checking defaults for OML/cmm/m/it on input line 50.
52
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              ... okay on input line 50.
53
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              Checking defaults for T1/cmr/m/n on input line 50.
54
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              ... okay on input line 50.
55
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              Checking defaults for OT1/cmr/m/n on input line 50.
56
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              ... okay on input line 50.
57
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              Checking defaults for OMS/cmsy/m/n on input line 50.
58
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              ... okay on input line 50.
59
         LaTeX Font Info:
                              Checking defaults for OMX/cmex/m/n on input line 50.
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
2
3
4
                             ... okay on input line 50.
         LaTeX Font Info:
5
         LaTeX Font Info:
                             Checking defaults for U/cmr/m/n on input line 50.
б
         LaTeX Font Info:
                             ... okay on input line 50.
7
         LaTeX Font Info:
                             Checking defaults for PD1/pdf/m/n on input line 50.
8
         LaTeX Font Info:
                             ... okay on input line 50.
9
         LaTeX Font Info:
                             Checking defaults for PU/pdf/m/n on input line 50.
10
         LaTeX Font Info:
                             ... okay on input line 50.
11
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/context/base/mkii/supp-pdf.mkii
12
         [Loading MPS to PDF converter (version 2006.09.02).]
13
         \scratchcounter=\count140
14
         \scratchdimen=\dimen266
15
         \scratchbox=\box45
16
         \nofMPsegments=\count141
17
         \nofMParguments=\count142
18
         \everyMPshowfont=\toks47
19
         \MPscratchCnt=\count143
20
21
         \MPscratchDim=\dimen267
22
         \MPnumerator=\count144
23
         \makeMPintoPDFobject=\count145
24
         \everyMPtoPDFconversion=\toks48
25
         ) (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/oberdiek/epstopdf-base.sty
26
         Package: epstopdf-base 2016/05/15 v2.6 Base part for package epstopdf
27
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/oberdiek/grfext.sty
28
         Package: grfext 2016/05/16 v1.2 Manage graphics extensions (HO)
29
         )
30
         Package epstopdf-base Info: Redefining graphics rule for `.eps' on input
31
         line 4
32
         38.
33
         Package grfext Info: Graphics extension search list:
34
         (grfext)
35
         [.pdf,.png,.jpg,.mps,.jpeg,.jbig2,.jb2,.PDF,.PNG,.JPG,.JPE
36
         G,.JBIG2,.JB2,.eps]
37
                               \AppendGraphicsExtensions on input line 456.
         (grfext)
38
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/latexconfig/epstopdf-sys.cfg
39
         File: epstopdf-sys.cfg 2010/07/13 v1.3 Configuration of (r)epstopdf for
40
41
         TeX Liv
42
         е
43
         ))
44
         \AtBeginShipoutBox=\box46
45
         Package hyperref Info: Link coloring OFF on input line 50.
46
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/hyperref/nameref.sty
47
         Package: nameref 2016/05/21 v2.44 Cross-referencing by name of section
48
         (c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/generic/oberdiek/gettitlestring.sty
49
         Package: gettitlestring 2016/05/16 v1.5 Cleanup title references (HO)
50
         )
51
         \c@section@level=\count146
52
         )
53
         LaTeX Info: Redefining \ref on input line 50.
54
         LaTeX Info: Redefining \pageref on input line 50.
55
         LaTeX Info: Redefining \nameref on input line 50.
56
         ABD: EveryShipout initializing macros
57
         Package caption Info: Begin \AtBeginDocument code.
58
         Package caption Info: End \AtBeginDocument code.
59
         ! Undefined control sequence.
60
61
62
63
64
```

```
1.51 \doublespacing
The control sequence at the end of the top line
of your error message was never \def'ed. If you have
misspelled it (e.g., `\hobx'), type `I' and the correct
spelling (e.g., `I\hbox'). Otherwise just continue,
and I'll forget about whatever was undefined.
                    Try loading font information for U+msa on input line
LaTeX Font Info:
56.
(c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/amsfonts/umsa.fd
File: umsa.fd 2013/01/14 v3.01 AMS symbols A
)
LaTeX Font Info:
                    Try loading font information for U+msb on input line
56.
(c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/amsfonts/umsb.fd
File: umsb.fd 2013/01/14 v3.01 AMS symbols B
)
LaTeX Warning: No \author given.
[1
Non-PDF special ignored!
<special> papersize=597.50787pt,845.04684pt
{c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-var/fonts/map/pdftex/updmap/pdftex.map}] [2] [3]
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) in paragraph at lines 242--264
 []
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) in paragraph at lines 242--264
 []
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) in paragraph at lines 242--264
 []
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) in paragraph at lines 242--264
 []
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) in paragraph at lines 242--264
 []
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) in paragraph at lines 642--648
 []
```

```
[12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
. . .
1.967 \item A
             ligica, P. D. \& Tarko V. (2014). Crony capitalism: Rent
seeking,
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 967
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
. . .
1.970 \item A
             nderson, L. A., \& Freeborn, B. A. (2010). Varying the
intensity
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 970
[][]
[]
[18]
LaTeX Font Info:
                    Try loading font information for OMS+cmr on input
line 974.
(c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/tex/latex/base/omscmr.fd
File: omscmr.fd 2014/09/29 v2.5h Standard LaTeX font definitions
LaTeX Font Info:
                    Font shape `OMS/cmr/m/n' in size <12> not available
                    Font shape `OMS/cmsy/m/n' tried instead on input line
(Font)
974.
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
```

```
64
65
```

1.978 \item B aumol, W. J. (1990). Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 978 [][] [] ! Package inputenc Error: Keyboard character used is undefined in inputencoding `latin9'. (inputenc) See the inputenc package documentation for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.979 ... it{Journal of Political Economy 98,} 893-921. You need to provide a definition with \DeclareInputText or \DeclareInputMath before using this key. ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.981 \item C arugati, F., Ober, J., \& Weingast, B. (2019). Is development Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 981 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.985 \item C ongleton, R. D. (2018). On the emergence of a classic work: Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.

```
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 985
[][]
[]
! Package inputenc Error: Keyboard character used is undefined
(inputenc)
                          in inputencoding `latin9'.
See the inputenc package documentation for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
1.986 ... history of the impact of Gordon Tullock'
                                                  s Welfare costs of
You need to provide a definition with \DeclareInputText
or \DeclareInputMath before using this key.
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
. . .
1.989 \item C
            ornes R. \& Hartley R. (2003). Risk aversion, heterogeneity
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 989
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
1.992 \item C
            ornes R. \&Hartley R. (2012). Risk aversion in symmetric and
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 992
[][]
[]
```

```
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
1.995 \item D
             echenaux, E., Kovenock, D. \& Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). A
survey
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 995
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
. . .
1.999 \item E
             eckhoudt L., \& Gollier C. (2005). The impact of prudence
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 999
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
. . .
1.1002 \item E
              eckhoudt L. \& Schlesinger H. (2006). Putting risk in its
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1002
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
```

See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1005 \item G ollier C. (2001). \textit{The economics of risk and time}, Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1005 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1008 \item H aber, S. (2002). \textit{Crony capitalism and economic growth Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1008 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1012 \item H iggs R. (1997). Regime uncertainty. Why the Great Depression Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1012 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.

```
Type H <return> for immediate help.
. . .
1.1016 \item K
              imball M.S. (1990) Precautionary saving in the small and in
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1016
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
1.1019 \item K
             onrad K. A. \& Schlesinger H. (1997). Risk aversion in
rent-se...
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1019
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
1.1026 \item L
              eland H. (1968). Saving and uncertainty: the precautionary
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1026
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
```

```
63
64
65
```

```
. . .
1.1029 \item L
              evy, H. (2006). \textit{Stochastic Dominance. Investment
Decision
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1029
[][]
[]
[19]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
1.1032 \item L
              iu L., Meyer J., Rettenmaier A.J. \& Saving T.S. (2018)
Risk
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1032
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
. . .
1.1036 \item M
              ago, S. D., Sheremeta, R. M., \& Yates, A. (2013). Best-of-
three
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1036
[][]
[]
! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
```

```
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
 . . .
1.1040 \item M
              enegatti M. (2007) A new interpretation for the
precautionary
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1040
[][]
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! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
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1.1043 \item M
              enegatti M. (2009). Optimal prevention and prudence in a
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1.1046 \item M
              enegatti M. \& Rebessi F. (2011). On the substitution
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See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1050 \item M enegatti M. (2014) New results on the relationship among risk Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1050 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1054 \item P eter, R., 2017. Optimal self-protection in two periods: on Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1054 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1058 \item M itchell W.C. (2019) Rent seeking at 52: an introduction to Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1058 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.

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1.1061 \item M
              itchell W.C. \& Munger M. C. (1981) Economic Models of
Interest
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If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1061
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! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
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1.1065 \item M
              urphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., \& Vishny, R. W. (1993). Why is
Try typing <return> to proceed.
If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit.
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1065
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! Package inputenc Error: Keyboard character used is undefined
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See the inputenc package documentation for explanation.
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1.1067 Papers and Proceedings 83, } 409--
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! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment.
See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
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1.1072 \item R
              obinson, J. \&Acemoglu, D. (2019). Rents and economic
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See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
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1.1079 \item S
              chroyen F. \& Treich N. (2016) The power of money: Wealth
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See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
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1.1082 \item S
              heremeta, R. M. (2010). Experimental comparison of multi-
stage
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See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
Type H <return> for immediate help.
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1.1086 \item S
              heremeta, R.M. 

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1.1090 \item S
              tracke, R., Höchtl, W., Kerschbamer, R. \& Sunde, U.
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See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation.
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1.1095 \item S
              teinorth P. (2011). Impact of health savings accounts on
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1.1099 \item T
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arko, V., \& Farrant, A. (2019). The efficiency of regulatory Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1099 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1102 \item T reich N. (2010) Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1102 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1105 \item T ullock G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J. M. Buchanan, Try typing <return> to proceed. If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1105 [][] [] ! LaTeX Error: Lonely \item--perhaps a missing list environment. See the LaTeX manual or LaTeX Companion for explanation. Type H <return> for immediate help. . . . 1.1110 \item Y

3 4 amazaki T. (2009). The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash 5 equili... 6 7 Try typing <return> to proceed. 8 If that doesn't work, type X <return> to quit. 9 10 11 Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) detected at line 1110 12 [][] 13 [] 14 15 [21] 16 Package atveryend Info: Empty hook `BeforeClearDocument' on input line 17 1153. 18 [22] 19 Package atveryend Info: Empty hook `AfterLastShipout' on input line 1153. 20 (./WFS Edits manuscript PubChoice 2019 accepted corrected.aux) 21 22 Package atveryend Info: Executing hook `AtVeryEndDocument' on input line 23 1153. 24 Package atveryend Info: Empty hook `AtEndAfterFileList' on input line 25 1153. 26 Package atveryend Info: Empty hook `AtVeryVeryEnd' on input line 1153. 27) 28 Here is how much of TeX's memory you used: 29 21617 strings out of 492646 30 376086 string characters out of 6133325 31 435686 words of memory out of 5000000 32 25083 multiletter control sequences out of 15000+600000 33 16328 words of font info for 60 fonts, out of 8000000 for 9000 34 1141 hyphenation exceptions out of 8191 35 55i,13n,77p,972b,477s stack positions out of 36 5000i,500n,10000p,200000b,80000s 37 {c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dist/fonts/enc/dvips/cm-super/cm-super-38 t1.enc}<c:/TeXL 39 ive/2018/texmf-40 dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmbx10.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/ 41 42 texmf-43 dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmbx12.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dis 44 t/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmbx8.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-45 dist/fonts/ty 46 pe1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmex10.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-47 dist/fonts/type1/publi 48 c/amsfonts/cm/cmmi12.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-49 dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfont 50 s/cm/cmmi6.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-51 dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmmi8 52 .pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-53 dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr10.pfb><c:/T 54 eXLive/2018/texmf-55 dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr12.pfb><c:/TeXLive/201 56 8/texmf-57 dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr6.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-dis 58 t/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr7.pfb><c:/TeXLive/2018/texmf-59 dist/fonts/typ 60 61 62

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